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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>Tarbiat Modares University (TMU)</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophical Thought</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>1973-2873</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>3</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>19</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>269</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>282</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">23075</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.58209/jpt.2.3.269</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>K.</FirstName>
					<LastName>Farsian</LastName>
<Affiliation>Deptartment of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>18</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>According to some important philosophers of science, such as Popper, Hempel and Tarski, consistency is a necessary condition of establishing any scientific theory. They hold that all inconsistent scientific theories are uninformative, meaningless or deficient. In this paper I will first argue against their clams, then I consider some inconsistencies which happened at the heart of some well-accepted scientific theories (Empirical or Non-Empirical), and by this I will try to open the door for the possibility of the paraconsistent philosophy of science.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">According to some important philosophers of science, such as Popper, Hempel and Tarski, consistency is a necessary condition of establishing any scientific theory. They hold that all inconsistent scientific theories are uninformative, meaningless or deficient. In this paper I will first argue against their clams, then I consider some inconsistencies which happened at the heart of some well-accepted scientific theories (Empirical or Non-Empirical), and by this I will try to open the door for the possibility of the paraconsistent philosophy of science.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Paraconsistency</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Philosophy of Science</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Contradiction in Science</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Paraconsistent Logics</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Graham Priest</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23075_0df840aed5f513a02964d0c27bc4f277.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
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