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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>Tarbiat Modares University (TMU)</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophical Thought</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>1973-2873</Issn>
				<Volume>3</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>17</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Phenomenal Concepts Strategy and Chalmers&#039; Argument</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Phenomenal Concepts Strategy and Chalmers&#039; Argument</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>13</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">23082</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.58209/jpt.3.1.1</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>M.</FirstName>
					<LastName>Lotfi</LastName>
<Affiliation>School of Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>15</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		    <Abstract>Physicalists have given several responses to anti-physicalist arguments based on epistemic/explanatory gaps. One of the most critical answers has become known as the phenomenal concepts strategy. Proponents of this strategy embrace the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, appealing to the special nature of phenomenal concepts, they try to explain why we confront this gap. Chalmers has presented an argument in the form of a dilemma against this strategy. He argues that each horn of the dilemma results in the failure of the strategy. In this paper, I will explain Chalmers’ argument. Focusing on the second horn, I will attempt to show that one of the premises of his arguments faces the problem; then, I will argue that following the second horn, the strategy could be successful, even if one of the conditions he takes necessary for the success of the strategy is not met.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Physicalists have given several responses to anti-physicalist arguments based on epistemic/explanatory gaps. One of the most critical answers has become known as the phenomenal concepts strategy. Proponents of this strategy embrace the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, appealing to the special nature of phenomenal concepts, they try to explain why we confront this gap. Chalmers has presented an argument in the form of a dilemma against this strategy. He argues that each horn of the dilemma results in the failure of the strategy. In this paper, I will explain Chalmers’ argument. Focusing on the second horn, I will attempt to show that one of the premises of his arguments faces the problem; then, I will argue that following the second horn, the strategy could be successful, even if one of the conditions he takes necessary for the success of the strategy is not met.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Explanatory Gap</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Physicalism</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Phenomenal Concepts Strategy</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Chalmers</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23082_874652a830c04985d23bef8ea1c584c1.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
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