Tarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28733120230317Phenomenal Concepts Strategy and Chalmers' ArgumentPhenomenal Concepts Strategy and Chalmers' Argument1132308210.58209/jpt.3.1.1FAM.LotfiSchool of Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, IranJournal Article20221215Physicalists have given several responses to anti-physicalist arguments based on epistemic/explanatory gaps. One of the most critical answers has become known as the phenomenal concepts strategy. Proponents of this strategy embrace the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, appealing to the special nature of phenomenal concepts, they try to explain why we confront this gap. Chalmers has presented an argument in the form of a dilemma against this strategy. He argues that each horn of the dilemma results in the failure of the strategy. In this paper, I will explain Chalmers’ argument. Focusing on the second horn, I will attempt to show that one of the premises of his arguments faces the problem; then, I will argue that following the second horn, the strategy could be successful, even if one of the conditions he takes necessary for the success of the strategy is not met.Physicalists have given several responses to anti-physicalist arguments based on epistemic/explanatory gaps. One of the most critical answers has become known as the phenomenal concepts strategy. Proponents of this strategy embrace the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, appealing to the special nature of phenomenal concepts, they try to explain why we confront this gap. Chalmers has presented an argument in the form of a dilemma against this strategy. He argues that each horn of the dilemma results in the failure of the strategy. In this paper, I will explain Chalmers’ argument. Focusing on the second horn, I will attempt to show that one of the premises of his arguments faces the problem; then, I will argue that following the second horn, the strategy could be successful, even if one of the conditions he takes necessary for the success of the strategy is not met.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23082_874652a830c04985d23bef8ea1c584c1.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28733120230310Samuel Clarke's Fitness Theory on Moral Value and a Brief Comparison of it with the Theory of Existential FitnessSamuel Clarke's Fitness Theory on Moral Value and a Brief Comparison of it with the Theory of Existential Fitness15322308310.58209/jpt.3.1.15FAM.A.MobiniDepartment of Moral Philosophy, Research Centre for Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, IranJournal Article20221203Samuel Clark has a completely rationalist explanation of ethics and uses the concept of fitness a lot to explain his view; hence, his moral theory is known as the fitness theory. Clark considers moral values and obligations to be based on fitness relations and believes that the reason can understand self-evidently a large part of these relationships, and the other part can be obtained through rational arguments or revelation. Critics have found some ambiguities and defects in Clarke's fitness theory. In this article, Clarkeian fitness theory is examined according to the criticisms raised, and then in a brief comparison with the theory of existential fitness, it is shown that the theory of existential fitness does not have these ambiguities and defects.Samuel Clark has a completely rationalist explanation of ethics and uses the concept of fitness a lot to explain his view; hence, his moral theory is known as the fitness theory. Clark considers moral values and obligations to be based on fitness relations and believes that the reason can understand self-evidently a large part of these relationships, and the other part can be obtained through rational arguments or revelation. Critics have found some ambiguities and defects in Clarke's fitness theory. In this article, Clarkeian fitness theory is examined according to the criticisms raised, and then in a brief comparison with the theory of existential fitness, it is shown that the theory of existential fitness does not have these ambiguities and defects.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23083_57ba5f17ed6198b54e4ccf755c6749be.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28733120221222Comparison of the Concept of Perfection in the Definition of Beauty from the Perspective of Avicenna and AquinasComparison of the Concept of Perfection in the Definition of Beauty from the Perspective of Avicenna and Aquinas33452308410.58209/jpt.3.1.33FAR.AinechiDepartment of Art Research, Faculty of Arts, Ferdows Institute of Higher Education, Mashhad, IranJ.A.KhandaqiDepartment of Dramatic Literature, Faculty of Arts, Ferdows Institute of Higher Education, Mashhad, IranJournal Article20221017Defining beauty is one of the most critical issues in philosophical aesthetics. Walking philosophers have brought or referred to the concept of "perfection" as one of the main elements of the definition of beauty. After explaining the views of Avicenna and Aquinas in this field, this research deals with the question of what is the place of the concept of perfection in the definition of the beauty of both of them. This research is descriptive-analytical. In the collection, it uses the library method, and in the analysis, it uses the qualitative method. The results of this research show that beauty is essential in the view of both philosophers about tangibles and abstractions. From Avicenna's perspective, the perfection of the senses should have three aesthetic elements: good order, good composition (composition), and good moderation. Aquinas also uses the concepts of pleasure, proportion, and clarity in his definitions. These elements in the definitions of beauty can be evaluated in some way in connection with the idea of the second perfection.Defining beauty is one of the most critical issues in philosophical aesthetics. Walking philosophers have brought or referred to the concept of "perfection" as one of the main elements of the definition of beauty. After explaining the views of Avicenna and Aquinas in this field, this research deals with the question of what is the place of the concept of perfection in the definition of the beauty of both of them. This research is descriptive-analytical. In the collection, it uses the library method, and in the analysis, it uses the qualitative method. The results of this research show that beauty is essential in the view of both philosophers about tangibles and abstractions. From Avicenna's perspective, the perfection of the senses should have three aesthetic elements: good order, good composition (composition), and good moderation. Aquinas also uses the concepts of pleasure, proportion, and clarity in his definitions. These elements in the definitions of beauty can be evaluated in some way in connection with the idea of the second perfection.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23084_009bd2262ae5a8afab700b5bc96b157a.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28733120230310The Problem of Emanation in Farabi; From Aristotelian- to Independent WorksThe Problem of Emanation in Farabi; From Aristotelian- to Independent Works47572308510.58209/jpt.3.1.47FAH.AhmadizadeDepartment of Religions & Philosophy, Faculty of Literature & Foreign Languages, University of Kashan, Kashan, IranJournal Article20221120Surveying the problem of emanation in Farabi's view, has some difficulties like that does for Farabi this problem is a fundamental problem in metaphysics or a secondary one? In this issue we are confronted with two main difficulties: one is that some scholars doubted to two Farabi's works that he discussed there the problem of emanation, mean Fosus Al-hekam and Ouoon Al-masael. They cannot say that these two books certainly are Farabi's books. But the more difficult problem is that Farabi's views on the problem of emanation are different in his works. It seem that some of Farabi's books are basically written in the Aristotelian context and some of his books are from his personally views. In addition, there is another difficulty: Farabi discussed the problem of emanation in some of his books that are not basically metaphysical but are psychological. In the present article, we try to survey these difficulties in Farabi's works.Surveying the problem of emanation in Farabi's view, has some difficulties like that does for Farabi this problem is a fundamental problem in metaphysics or a secondary one? In this issue we are confronted with two main difficulties: one is that some scholars doubted to two Farabi's works that he discussed there the problem of emanation, mean Fosus Al-hekam and Ouoon Al-masael. They cannot say that these two books certainly are Farabi's books. But the more difficult problem is that Farabi's views on the problem of emanation are different in his works. It seem that some of Farabi's books are basically written in the Aristotelian context and some of his books are from his personally views. In addition, there is another difficulty: Farabi discussed the problem of emanation in some of his books that are not basically metaphysical but are psychological. In the present article, we try to survey these difficulties in Farabi's works.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23085_339e1f3c4cfdd33fa17637c74bf5df09.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28733120230220Phronesis and its Relationship with Theoretical Wisdom According to AristotlePhronesis and its Relationship with Theoretical Wisdom According to Aristotle59722308610.58209/jpt.3.1.59FAH.Roshani RadDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20221101In Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle divides the soul into two fundamental parts, the knowing part and the calculating part, the virtue of the first part is theoretical wisdom (Sophia) and the virtue of the second part is practical wisdom (Phronesis). This distinction is based on the ontological distinction between becoming and stability because the subject of practical wisdom is the realm of changeable affairs and the subject of theoretical wisdom is eternal affairs. In this research, we will first show that the intuitive intellect or Nous is the connecting factor of these two realms: Nous receives the ultimate principles from both sides, in the framework of theoretical knowledge, Nous knows the most general concepts of eternity and in the framework of Practical wisdom receives the partial individual. We will also argue that practical wisdom is the agent of realization of theoretical wisdom: Phronesis is the power of receiving the highest good, that is, the life according to the Sophia. The interpretation of the relationship between Phronesis and Sophia as a “necessary – end” suggests a way out of two conflicting interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics- the rationalist and holistic interpretation of happiness – which we will address.In Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle divides the soul into two fundamental parts, the knowing part and the calculating part, the virtue of the first part is theoretical wisdom (Sophia) and the virtue of the second part is practical wisdom (Phronesis). This distinction is based on the ontological distinction between becoming and stability because the subject of practical wisdom is the realm of changeable affairs and the subject of theoretical wisdom is eternal affairs. In this research, we will first show that the intuitive intellect or Nous is the connecting factor of these two realms: Nous receives the ultimate principles from both sides, in the framework of theoretical knowledge, Nous knows the most general concepts of eternity and in the framework of Practical wisdom receives the partial individual. We will also argue that practical wisdom is the agent of realization of theoretical wisdom: Phronesis is the power of receiving the highest good, that is, the life according to the Sophia. The interpretation of the relationship between Phronesis and Sophia as a “necessary – end” suggests a way out of two conflicting interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics- the rationalist and holistic interpretation of happiness – which we will address.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23086_26adbe9d22d735666aa3800c798872fc.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28733120230310Murphy's Holistic Physicalism on Mind ProblemMurphy's Holistic Physicalism on Mind Problem73872308710.58209/jpt.3.1.73FAS.AbdollahiDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, Tehran University, Mashhad, IranM.NasiriDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, Tehran University, Qom, IranJournal Article20221023Based on the interaction between science and religion, Nancy Murphy turns to a special version of non-transitive physicalism that uses empirical science, physicalism, and the Bible to formulate her holistic physicalism; A middle position between essential dualism and illusionism that defines humans as spiritual beings and hides the problem of the mind within it. Murphy brings the soul into holistic physicalism with his theological assumptions and not with scientific evidence and philosophical arguments. The distinguishing feature of non-transmission physicalism from transmission physicalism is the attention to the explanatory gap in the issue of "supervenience". Holistic physicalism has not filled this gap and has only changed the form of the problem from explaining the relationship between human parts to explaining the relationship between human dimensions. Therefore, combining the universal and weak perceptions of supervenience, along with the positive and negative teachings of holistic physicalism, that is, the use of pure holistic physicalism and avoiding introducing theological presuppositions in a philosophical theory, can be used to solve the problem.Based on the interaction between science and religion, Nancy Murphy turns to a special version of non-transitive physicalism that uses empirical science, physicalism, and the Bible to formulate her holistic physicalism; A middle position between essential dualism and illusionism that defines humans as spiritual beings and hides the problem of the mind within it. Murphy brings the soul into holistic physicalism with his theological assumptions and not with scientific evidence and philosophical arguments. The distinguishing feature of non-transmission physicalism from transmission physicalism is the attention to the explanatory gap in the issue of "supervenience". Holistic physicalism has not filled this gap and has only changed the form of the problem from explaining the relationship between human parts to explaining the relationship between human dimensions. Therefore, combining the universal and weak perceptions of supervenience, along with the positive and negative teachings of holistic physicalism, that is, the use of pure holistic physicalism and avoiding introducing theological presuppositions in a philosophical theory, can be used to solve the problem.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23087_cd7adf7555f811fa22deff50759e73a0.pdf