Tarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28734420241221The Ontological Position of Intelligence in Kitab al-AlalThe Ontological Position of Intelligence in Kitab al-Alal3013122312410.58209/jpt.4.4.301FAH.Abasi HosseinabadiDepartment of Islamic Philosophy and Theosophy, Shahr-e-Ray Branch, Payam-e-Noor University, Shahr-e-Ray, IranJournal Article20240828Kitab al-Alal explains the principles and first causes of things and discusses God. The issue of this article is the ontological position of intelligence in Kitab al-Alal. The question is, what is the ontological position of intelligence in Kitab al-Alal, and how can it be explained? Is it possible to assign the position of teleology to the perfection and happiness of man in the Book of Causes? In terms of existence, intelligence is the first creature and the closest being to the first cause, and it is in the second place after the first cause. The ontological effectiveness of intelligence is measured in two ways: planning, ruling, and creating. The act of intellection is the act of creation. In this article, to explain this issue and answer the questions descriptively and analytically, we will explain and analyze the chapters related to intelligence.Kitab al-Alal explains the principles and first causes of things and discusses God. The issue of this article is the ontological position of intelligence in Kitab al-Alal. The question is, what is the ontological position of intelligence in Kitab al-Alal, and how can it be explained? Is it possible to assign the position of teleology to the perfection and happiness of man in the Book of Causes? In terms of existence, intelligence is the first creature and the closest being to the first cause, and it is in the second place after the first cause. The ontological effectiveness of intelligence is measured in two ways: planning, ruling, and creating. The act of intellection is the act of creation. In this article, to explain this issue and answer the questions descriptively and analytically, we will explain and analyze the chapters related to intelligence.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23124_075a3a646faea7bfa9cd8b86c51a026b.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28734420241230Cassam’s Philosophical Account of the Extremist Mindset; Assessment with a Focus on the Forqan GroupCassam’s Philosophical Account of the Extremist Mindset; Assessment with a Focus on the Forqan Group3133312312510.58209/jpt.4.4.313FAM.H.Mohammad Ali KhalajDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Khatam University, Tehran, IranH.Sheykh RezaeeDepartment of Science Studies, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, IranJournal Article20241031Philosophers have recently turned their attention to the problem of extremism, partly inspired by the “Extremism: A Philosophical Analysis” book. We introduce this debate, particularly focusing on Cassam’s perspective, and use it to examine the extremism of the Iranian militant group known as Forqan. In the first part, drawing on Cassam’s account of different types of extremism, we argue that Forqan was not only a method extremist group but also that its members exhibited what Cassam calls the extremist mindset. In the second part, we contend that Forqan's extremism challenges Cassam’s account of the extremist mindset. According to his framework, purity is an important element of the extremist mindset, yet Forqan, as an extremist group, was eclectic in nature. In the remainder of the paper, we address this challenge through a linguistic and conceptual analysis of the notion of purity.Philosophers have recently turned their attention to the problem of extremism, partly inspired by the “Extremism: A Philosophical Analysis” book. We introduce this debate, particularly focusing on Cassam’s perspective, and use it to examine the extremism of the Iranian militant group known as Forqan. In the first part, drawing on Cassam’s account of different types of extremism, we argue that Forqan was not only a method extremist group but also that its members exhibited what Cassam calls the extremist mindset. In the second part, we contend that Forqan's extremism challenges Cassam’s account of the extremist mindset. According to his framework, purity is an important element of the extremist mindset, yet Forqan, as an extremist group, was eclectic in nature. In the remainder of the paper, we address this challenge through a linguistic and conceptual analysis of the notion of purity.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23125_5595d5735eb1f5e775f86979f81dfb2e.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28734420241229Myth, Social Ontology, and The Problem of IntentionalityMyth, Social Ontology, and The Problem of Intentionality3333502312610.58209/jpt.4.4.333FAM.H.SoleimaniDepartment of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, IranD.HosseiniDepartment of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20241123Regarding the characteristics of myth in various mythological approaches, it is evident that myth functions in the culture, society, mind, or psyche of human beings, has a collective aspect, is connected to an unconscious or preconscious state, and finally has a normative dimension. These characteristics make social ontology an appropriate place for the analysis of myths. Following the ideas of some social ontologists such as Searl or Tuomela, myth can be considered an institutional fact. However, according to the dominant approach in social ontology in the contemporary analytic tradition, all institutional facts are implicated by individual or collective intentionality. We argue that the peculiarity of myth’s connection with the unconscious state challenges all subcategories of the dominant approach in contemporary social ontology; hence, a shortcoming of the dominant approaches in analyzing myth as an intuitional fact.Regarding the characteristics of myth in various mythological approaches, it is evident that myth functions in the culture, society, mind, or psyche of human beings, has a collective aspect, is connected to an unconscious or preconscious state, and finally has a normative dimension. These characteristics make social ontology an appropriate place for the analysis of myths. Following the ideas of some social ontologists such as Searl or Tuomela, myth can be considered an institutional fact. However, according to the dominant approach in social ontology in the contemporary analytic tradition, all institutional facts are implicated by individual or collective intentionality. We argue that the peculiarity of myth’s connection with the unconscious state challenges all subcategories of the dominant approach in contemporary social ontology; hence, a shortcoming of the dominant approaches in analyzing myth as an intuitional fact.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23126_935a0def48ff0d1979324d773278f945.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28734420241225Tuomas Pernu’s Cluster Approach to the Marks of the Mental PhenomenaTuomas Pernu’s Cluster Approach to the Marks of the Mental Phenomena3513672312710.58209/jpt.4.4.351FAR.DargahifarDepartment of Cognitive Science, Faculty of Strategic Sciences and Technologies, University of Qom, Qom, IranJournal Article20241111Distinguishing between mental and non-mental phenomena requires clear marks. This article examines one perspective on the marks of the mental phenomena. Tuomas K. Pernu offers a "cluster" approach to identifying the marks of the mental phenomena. To differentiate between mental and physical phenomena, which serves as his guide in identifying mental characteristics, Pernu introduces the notions of intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity. After presenting Pernu’s view, this article critically examines his approach. The relationship of this perspective to essentialistic investigations of the mind is assessed, and several questions and critiques regarding his view are raised and addressed. Pernu’s proposed list is deemed incomplete. Furthermore, the article examines how the last three marks on Pernu’s list can be understood as characteristics of mental phenomena. Finally, a methodological proposal is presented to refine the process of discovering the features of mental states.Distinguishing between mental and non-mental phenomena requires clear marks. This article examines one perspective on the marks of the mental phenomena. Tuomas K. Pernu offers a "cluster" approach to identifying the marks of the mental phenomena. To differentiate between mental and physical phenomena, which serves as his guide in identifying mental characteristics, Pernu introduces the notions of intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity. After presenting Pernu’s view, this article critically examines his approach. The relationship of this perspective to essentialistic investigations of the mind is assessed, and several questions and critiques regarding his view are raised and addressed. Pernu’s proposed list is deemed incomplete. Furthermore, the article examines how the last three marks on Pernu’s list can be understood as characteristics of mental phenomena. Finally, a methodological proposal is presented to refine the process of discovering the features of mental states.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23127_80f36d40ae61e66db4e732fcb1587f3a.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28734420250212Philosophical Explanation of the Implication of Near-Death Experiences on the Immateriality of the SoulPhilosophical Explanation of the Implication of Near-Death Experiences on the Immateriality of the Soul3693862312810.58209/jpt.4.4.369FAH.Karkon BeiraqDepartment of Islamic Education and Training, Farhangian University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20241122This article aims to explain the implication of "near-death experiences" on the immateriality of the soul. After defining the experiences, explaining their components, and answering the problems, it has been argued that these experiences indicate the soul's immateriality (mind). Ideologies such as physicalism, naturalism, and scientism, which have no scientific and philosophical basis, are the reason for denying these experiences by naturalists and attributing them to illusions and chemical changes in the brain. But what is the scientific justification for having very clear perceptions during unconsciousness or clinical death when a person lacks perceptions?! Therefore, if the presuppositions and mental prejudices are discarded in interpreting the experiences, it seems that accepting the immaterial dimension is not so difficult for humans. Near-death experiences also pose a serious challenge to physicalist theories of "consciousness" that must be taken seriously in the philosophy of mind.This article aims to explain the implication of "near-death experiences" on the immateriality of the soul. After defining the experiences, explaining their components, and answering the problems, it has been argued that these experiences indicate the soul's immateriality (mind). Ideologies such as physicalism, naturalism, and scientism, which have no scientific and philosophical basis, are the reason for denying these experiences by naturalists and attributing them to illusions and chemical changes in the brain. But what is the scientific justification for having very clear perceptions during unconsciousness or clinical death when a person lacks perceptions?! Therefore, if the presuppositions and mental prejudices are discarded in interpreting the experiences, it seems that accepting the immaterial dimension is not so difficult for humans. Near-death experiences also pose a serious challenge to physicalist theories of "consciousness" that must be taken seriously in the philosophy of mind.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23128_f83ba74c8756ee5e420a8c85db294e30.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28734420241230Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics in the Mirror of Political PhilosophyGadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics in the Mirror of Political Philosophy3874022312910.58209/jpt.4.4.387FAF.GoldouzDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranM.Raayat JahromiDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranJournal Article20241121The main problem of philosophical hermeneutics is the problem of understanding. Understanding is determined in what context, how, and by what components. Gadamer explains these influential components by emphasizing tradition and history and emphasizes the plurality of understanding by expressing the ontological characteristics of human understanding. From this perspective, subjectivist and non-pluralist approaches are denied. In this article, we aim to examine, based on the characteristics of the understanding process in Gadamer's hermeneutic approach, namely historicity, pluralism, eventfulness, practicality, and linguistics, its relationship and proportion with political totalitarianism and pluralism, and to assess the possibility of convergence or incompatibility of the foundations of philosophical hermeneutics with political pluralism as a pluralistic political approach and divergence or compatibility of philosophical hermeneutics with political totalitarianism as a non-pluralistic political approach. Although Gadamer cannot be considered a full-fledged political philosopher, it is possible to examine political systems and their epistemological foundations based on his hermeneutic approach and evaluate their relationship.The main problem of philosophical hermeneutics is the problem of understanding. Understanding is determined in what context, how, and by what components. Gadamer explains these influential components by emphasizing tradition and history and emphasizes the plurality of understanding by expressing the ontological characteristics of human understanding. From this perspective, subjectivist and non-pluralist approaches are denied. In this article, we aim to examine, based on the characteristics of the understanding process in Gadamer's hermeneutic approach, namely historicity, pluralism, eventfulness, practicality, and linguistics, its relationship and proportion with political totalitarianism and pluralism, and to assess the possibility of convergence or incompatibility of the foundations of philosophical hermeneutics with political pluralism as a pluralistic political approach and divergence or compatibility of philosophical hermeneutics with political totalitarianism as a non-pluralistic political approach. Although Gadamer cannot be considered a full-fledged political philosopher, it is possible to examine political systems and their epistemological foundations based on his hermeneutic approach and evaluate their relationship.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_23129_8c8c976f599f97663bd04d1cc4b15ed1.pdf