Tarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28735420251004Non-Conceptualism and Transcendental Exposition of the SpaceNon-Conceptualism and Transcendental Exposition of the Space4334482842810.58209/jpt.5.4.433FAA.NajjarnezhadDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranM.ZaliDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250823The conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate is very significant in Kantian scholarship. Conceptualists argue that apperception is involved in the appearance of all sensory intuitions. In contrast, non-conceptualism claims that at least some sensory intuitions in the subject's consciousness are independent of apperception. The focus of this debate has been the role of intuition in the Transcendental Deduction. However, Kant requires an argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic to show that space is a form of intuition, and this argument, too, must be considered in this debate. Therefore, this article shifts the focus of the dispute to demonstrate that in the Transcendental Exposition of space, space as a form of intuition is a condition for synthetic a priori propositions. Then, by considering the role of spatial intuition in synthetic a priori propositions, it will be proven that the distinction non-conceptualists draw between intuitive and conceptual space is incompatible with Kant's argument in the Transcendental Exposition.The conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate is very significant in Kantian scholarship. Conceptualists argue that apperception is involved in the appearance of all sensory intuitions. In contrast, non-conceptualism claims that at least some sensory intuitions in the subject's consciousness are independent of apperception. The focus of this debate has been the role of intuition in the Transcendental Deduction. However, Kant requires an argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic to show that space is a form of intuition, and this argument, too, must be considered in this debate. Therefore, this article shifts the focus of the dispute to demonstrate that in the Transcendental Exposition of space, space as a form of intuition is a condition for synthetic a priori propositions. Then, by considering the role of spatial intuition in synthetic a priori propositions, it will be proven that the distinction non-conceptualists draw between intuitive and conceptual space is incompatible with Kant's argument in the Transcendental Exposition.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_28428_fdf7a157d555f8ac35f2a820488c342c.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28735420251011The Relationship between Moral Overridingness and Ethical Egoism in Nietzsche’s Moral PhilosophyThe Relationship between Moral Overridingness and Ethical Egoism in Nietzsche’s Moral Philosophy4494622416710.58209/jpt.5.4.449FAF.AghagoliDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, IranS.F.FazeliDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, IranJournal Article20250526Despite the implicit contradiction between “moral overridingness” and “egoism” in moral philosophy, these two concepts are fundamentally connected in Nietzsche’s ethics. Relying on the notions of the “will to power” and the “Übermensch,” Nietzsche emphasizes morality as grounded in individuality and liberation from traditional constraints. In this context, egoism is closely linked to the will to power, which serves as a means for attaining the Übermensch—an individual capable of creating new values and achieving moral overridingness. Such moral overridingness empowers one to transcend prevailing social values. Given the reciprocal relationship between the will to power and the Übermensch, Nietzsche’s thought presents the possibility of analyzing the connection between egoism and moral overridingness not as oppositional, but as two constructive forces that advance individual freedom and emancipation from social constraints within moral philosophy.<strong> </strong>Despite the implicit contradiction between “moral overridingness” and “egoism” in moral philosophy, these two concepts are fundamentally connected in Nietzsche’s ethics. Relying on the notions of the “will to power” and the “Übermensch,” Nietzsche emphasizes morality as grounded in individuality and liberation from traditional constraints. In this context, egoism is closely linked to the will to power, which serves as a means for attaining the Übermensch—an individual capable of creating new values and achieving moral overridingness. Such moral overridingness empowers one to transcend prevailing social values. Given the reciprocal relationship between the will to power and the Übermensch, Nietzsche’s thought presents the possibility of analyzing the connection between egoism and moral overridingness not as oppositional, but as two constructive forces that advance individual freedom and emancipation from social constraints within moral philosophy.<strong> </strong>https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_24167_2661df8764c1c5f784dd9a03ccf419ea.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28735420250923Validation of Naser Khusraw's Argument Rejecting the Celestial Spheres as CreatorValidation of Naser Khusraw's Argument Rejecting the Celestial Spheres as Creator4634882417010.58209/jpt.5.4.463FAK.MehrabadiDepartment of Persian Language and Literature, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabatabaie University, Tehran, IranM.H.Hasanzadeh NiriDepartment of Persian Language and Literature, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabatabaie University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250710In the Sixth Discourse of the Zad al-Musafirin, Nasir Khusraw presents his most extensive argument refuting the claim of the materialists that the celestial spheres are the creators of the universe. This argument’s foundation comprises concepts related to the motion of elemental natures and generated beings, as well as the subjugated or dominant nature of celestial spheres and their rotational motion. The findings ultimately reveal that, while Nasir Khusraw’s argument is methodologically sound and formally valid, its premises contain unsubstantiated assumptions and exhibit false analogies. Additionally, the argument includes auxiliary lemmas, some of which hold scholarly value, while others are redundant and could be excised from its core framework.In the Sixth Discourse of the Zad al-Musafirin, Nasir Khusraw presents his most extensive argument refuting the claim of the materialists that the celestial spheres are the creators of the universe. This argument’s foundation comprises concepts related to the motion of elemental natures and generated beings, as well as the subjugated or dominant nature of celestial spheres and their rotational motion. The findings ultimately reveal that, while Nasir Khusraw’s argument is methodologically sound and formally valid, its premises contain unsubstantiated assumptions and exhibit false analogies. Additionally, the argument includes auxiliary lemmas, some of which hold scholarly value, while others are redundant and could be excised from its core framework.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_24170_133232fc800034e36792956ebea38deb.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28735420251012From the Will to Truth to Liberation from it; André van der Braak’s Comparative Reading of Nietzsche and NāgārjunaFrom the Will to Truth to Liberation from it; André van der Braak’s Comparative Reading of Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna4895022416810.58209/jpt.5.4.489FAA.Mahdavi SulaDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250622Does the will to truth, as shaped by metaphysical thinking, necessarily originate from a justified, liberating, and life-affirming source? Focusing on Chapter Four of <em>Nietzsche and Zen: Self-Overcoming Without a Self</em> by André van der Braak, this article examines how both Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna respond negatively to this question. It first analyzes Nietzsche’s critique of the Western tradition’s "will to truth," followed by an exploration of Nāgārjuna’s analogous confrontation with Buddhist orthodoxy. The third section investigates the convergence of their approaches in deconstructing and transcending this will. Finally, van der Braak’s interpretation is subjected to critical assessment. The article argues that in both traditions, the desire for truth demands thorough critique, and overcoming it opens a path toward a lived philosophy beyond the dichotomy of truth and untruth—although van der Braak’s reading still requires greater clarity in conceptual and methodological distinctions.Does the will to truth, as shaped by metaphysical thinking, necessarily originate from a justified, liberating, and life-affirming source? Focusing on Chapter Four of <em>Nietzsche and Zen: Self-Overcoming Without a Self</em> by André van der Braak, this article examines how both Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna respond negatively to this question. It first analyzes Nietzsche’s critique of the Western tradition’s "will to truth," followed by an exploration of Nāgārjuna’s analogous confrontation with Buddhist orthodoxy. The third section investigates the convergence of their approaches in deconstructing and transcending this will. Finally, van der Braak’s interpretation is subjected to critical assessment. The article argues that in both traditions, the desire for truth demands thorough critique, and overcoming it opens a path toward a lived philosophy beyond the dichotomy of truth and untruth—although van der Braak’s reading still requires greater clarity in conceptual and methodological distinctions.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_24168_ff67b4f15981e27c157d955922c4e509.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28735420251013Consistency of the Individuation Criterion in the Thoughts of Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla SadraConsistency of the Individuation Criterion in the Thoughts of Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra5035142416910.58209/jpt.5.4.503FAM.T.KarimiDepartment of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Farabi College, University of Tehran, Qom, IranJournal Article20250626One of the most complex issues in metaphysics is the problem of individuation and its criterion. Muslim philosophers have given this issue serious attention from the very beginning. Among the schools of Islamic philosophy, the Peripatetic philosophers—particularly Avicenna—have explicitly addressed the criterion of individuation, and other Peripatetics have also reflected on this subject. An important point regarding the criterion of individuation is the lack of distinction and the conflation between the mental and the external (objective) realms among the Peripatetic philosophers. Suhrawardi, being aware of this issue, sought to provide a well-founded answer to the question of the criterion of individuation. Following Suhrawardi, other philosophers, including Mulla Sadra, employed this distinction and offered different responses to the issue—responses that undoubtedly stem from it. After examining the criterion of individuation in the thought of the philosophers as mentioned earlier, the author ultimately concludes that it is compatible across the philosophies of Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra.One of the most complex issues in metaphysics is the problem of individuation and its criterion. Muslim philosophers have given this issue serious attention from the very beginning. Among the schools of Islamic philosophy, the Peripatetic philosophers—particularly Avicenna—have explicitly addressed the criterion of individuation, and other Peripatetics have also reflected on this subject. An important point regarding the criterion of individuation is the lack of distinction and the conflation between the mental and the external (objective) realms among the Peripatetic philosophers. Suhrawardi, being aware of this issue, sought to provide a well-founded answer to the question of the criterion of individuation. Following Suhrawardi, other philosophers, including Mulla Sadra, employed this distinction and offered different responses to the issue—responses that undoubtedly stem from it. After examining the criterion of individuation in the thought of the philosophers as mentioned earlier, the author ultimately concludes that it is compatible across the philosophies of Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_24169_e59dbe69c119b5d59e91b9b630dadc05.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28735420251021Phronesis and the Autonomy of the Will; a Comparative Study of the Moral Foundations of Aristotle and Kant PhilosophiesPhronesis and the Autonomy of the Will; a Comparative Study of the Moral Foundations of Aristotle and Kant Philosophies5155302843610.58209/jpt.5.4.515FAM.SarebannejadDepartment of Advanced Studies of Art, College of Fine Arts, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250804The concept of <em>phronesis</em> in Aristotle’s <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em>, as practical reason, functions as the connecting link between moral and intellectual virtues and represents wisdom oriented toward judgment in particular situations of human life. In contrast, Kant in the <em>Critique of Practical Reason</em>, through the principle of autonomy of the will, conceives reason as the source of moral law and the foundation of the subject’s self-sufficiency. This article, using a comparative approach, analyzes the conceptual relation between Aristotelian <em>phronesis</em> and Kantian autonomy, and, in light of Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy as a complementary theory, examines the possibility of a historical and situational interpretation of practical reason. It concludes that, across these three frameworks, practical reason evolves from lived wisdom to transcendental law and finally to historical understanding, establishing a dynamic link among Aristotle, Kant, and Gadamer.The concept of <em>phronesis</em> in Aristotle’s <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em>, as practical reason, functions as the connecting link between moral and intellectual virtues and represents wisdom oriented toward judgment in particular situations of human life. In contrast, Kant in the <em>Critique of Practical Reason</em>, through the principle of autonomy of the will, conceives reason as the source of moral law and the foundation of the subject’s self-sufficiency. This article, using a comparative approach, analyzes the conceptual relation between Aristotelian <em>phronesis</em> and Kantian autonomy, and, in light of Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy as a complementary theory, examines the possibility of a historical and situational interpretation of practical reason. It concludes that, across these three frameworks, practical reason evolves from lived wisdom to transcendental law and finally to historical understanding, establishing a dynamic link among Aristotle, Kant, and Gadamer.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_28436_dd473ece077230d91b9340e3b4e57c11.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28735420251021The Ontology of Causality in Kant's Pre-Critical PhilosophyThe Ontology of Causality in Kant's Pre-Critical Philosophy5315482843810.58209/jpt.5.4.531FAM.Roshani PayanDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IranA.VaeziDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250731The issue of causality is one of the most key and complex issues in Kant's philosophy, and has been the subject of much debate. However, most of this debate, like most other debates in Kantian philosophy, has focused on Kant's critical period. Part of the theoretical difficulties and complexities of the question of causality in Kant's critical philosophy, which have led to serious disagreements, is because Kant had discussed many of the basic issues of this topic in his pre-critical writings, and therefore, in the critical period, he only addressed the theoretical implications of this topic. Therefore, the present article seeks to simplify some of these theoretical difficulties and complexities by examining the issue of causality in Kant's pre-critical texts and by analyzing the philosophical atmosphere surrounding the young Kant, which was particularly marked by the dominance of Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalists and Naturalists.The issue of causality is one of the most key and complex issues in Kant's philosophy, and has been the subject of much debate. However, most of this debate, like most other debates in Kantian philosophy, has focused on Kant's critical period. Part of the theoretical difficulties and complexities of the question of causality in Kant's critical philosophy, which have led to serious disagreements, is because Kant had discussed many of the basic issues of this topic in his pre-critical writings, and therefore, in the critical period, he only addressed the theoretical implications of this topic. Therefore, the present article seeks to simplify some of these theoretical difficulties and complexities by examining the issue of causality in Kant's pre-critical texts and by analyzing the philosophical atmosphere surrounding the young Kant, which was particularly marked by the dominance of Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalists and Naturalists.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_28438_4f3e1a55bdd71769da5e20b374f20f43.pdfTarbiat Modares University (TMU)Philosophical Thought1973-28735420251018The Boundary Between Philosophical Rationality and Religious Belief in the Earliest Phase of Islamic PhilosophyThe Boundary Between Philosophical Rationality and Religious Belief in the Earliest Phase of Islamic Philosophy5495652843710.58209/jpt.5.4.549FAH.KoohihajiabadiDepartment of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Hormozgan, Bandar Abbas, IranM.BonyaniDepartment of Theology, Faculty of Humanities, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, IranJournal Article20250710This study re-examines the relationship between philosophical rationality and religious belief in the early formative stages of Islamic philosophy, focusing on the views of al-Kindī and al-Fārābī. The analysis shows that the boundary between philosophical reason and religion was neither fixed nor conceptually coherent at this initial stage; rather, it gradually emerged through engagement with the Greek intellectual heritage. Al-Kindī, adopting a flexible and cautious approach, sought to preserve the possibility of harmony between reason and revelation—an approach that opened an initial path toward their synthesis, though it largely amounted to a provisional management of theoretical tensions and conceptual discontinuities. In contrast, al-Fārābī may be regarded as the theoretical architect of this interaction; through his systematic organization of the sciences, articulation of epistemic hierarchies, and symbolic interpretation of religious teachings, he helped to consolidate the role of religion within practical philosophy. The findings indicate that the interaction between reason and religion in early Islamic philosophy was a developing and transitional process.This study re-examines the relationship between philosophical rationality and religious belief in the early formative stages of Islamic philosophy, focusing on the views of al-Kindī and al-Fārābī. The analysis shows that the boundary between philosophical reason and religion was neither fixed nor conceptually coherent at this initial stage; rather, it gradually emerged through engagement with the Greek intellectual heritage. Al-Kindī, adopting a flexible and cautious approach, sought to preserve the possibility of harmony between reason and revelation—an approach that opened an initial path toward their synthesis, though it largely amounted to a provisional management of theoretical tensions and conceptual discontinuities. In contrast, al-Fārābī may be regarded as the theoretical architect of this interaction; through his systematic organization of the sciences, articulation of epistemic hierarchies, and symbolic interpretation of religious teachings, he helped to consolidate the role of religion within practical philosophy. The findings indicate that the interaction between reason and religion in early Islamic philosophy was a developing and transitional process.https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_28437_7a5400eeb415675960d6822b6bdffb7a.pdf