Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 03 06 Critique of Paul Horwich's Interpretation of Later Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy; Pure Description and Theoretical Structure Challenge Critique of Paul Horwich's Interpretation of Later Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy; Pure Description and Theoretical Structure Challenge 125 139 28980 10.58209/jpt.6.2.125 FA H. Mohammad Ghorbanian Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Sh. Moeini Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Journal Article 2026 01 15 Late Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, with its emphasis on the central role of language in generating and resolving philosophical misunderstandings, offers a metaphilosophical approach that moves philosophy away from its traditional theoretical mode and transforms it into an essentially descriptive, therapeutic, and anti-theoretical activity. Paul Horwich, in Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy, proposes an eight-step project in which traditional philosophical problems are identified as pseudo-problems, and Wittgenstein’s therapeutic solution is reinterpreted. The central question is to what extent Horwich’s reinterpretation is consistent with Wittgenstein’s purely descriptive and anti-theoretical spirit. The findings indicate that Horwich is notably successful in emphasizing the role of language, defending anti-theoretical philosophy, and clarifying its therapeutic dimension. However, in presenting the eight-step project as a form of systematization, in claiming that all philosophical problems can be reduced to an a priori/a posteriori conflict as an overgeneralization, in displaying inconsistency in the analysis of the problem of consciousness, and in attributing explanatory power to philosophical theories, he introduces tensions that at times steer his interpretation toward theoretical construction. Late Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, with its emphasis on the central role of language in generating and resolving philosophical misunderstandings, offers a metaphilosophical approach that moves philosophy away from its traditional theoretical mode and transforms it into an essentially descriptive, therapeutic, and anti-theoretical activity. Paul Horwich, in Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy, proposes an eight-step project in which traditional philosophical problems are identified as pseudo-problems, and Wittgenstein’s therapeutic solution is reinterpreted. The central question is to what extent Horwich’s reinterpretation is consistent with Wittgenstein’s purely descriptive and anti-theoretical spirit. The findings indicate that Horwich is notably successful in emphasizing the role of language, defending anti-theoretical philosophy, and clarifying its therapeutic dimension. However, in presenting the eight-step project as a form of systematization, in claiming that all philosophical problems can be reduced to an a priori/a posteriori conflict as an overgeneralization, in displaying inconsistency in the analysis of the problem of consciousness, and in attributing explanatory power to philosophical theories, he introduces tensions that at times steer his interpretation toward theoretical construction.

https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_28980_4bd5096853abc791756085adf90dfe7f.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 05 A Solution for the Harman–MacFarlane Dispute Based on Steinberger’s Three Normative Roles of Logic A Solution for the Harman–MacFarlane Dispute Based on Steinberger’s Three Normative Roles of Logic 141 159 28981 10.58209/jpt.6.2.141 FA S. Panahi Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran S.A. Kalantari Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran A.A. Karbasizade Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Journal Article 2026 02 02 The theory of the normativity of logic is a fundamental issue in the philosophy of logic and epistemology that examines the role of logic in organizing beliefs and guiding everyday reasoning. Within this framework, there are serious disagreements between advocates of this theory, such as MacFarlane, and critics such as Harman. The present article, using Steinberger's distinction between the three normative roles of logic, shows that the difference between Harman and MacFarlane is largely "verbal" and is rooted in a confusion between the distinct functions of logic. However, while we accept Steinberger's claim, we argue that by making some modifications to MacFarlane's criteria for assessing the normativity of logic, his position can be changed in a way that is resistant to Harman's criticisms. In other words, with these reforms, the disagreement between Harman and MacFarlane, contrary to Steinberger's claim, will no longer be a formal disagreement, and the principles of the bridge of normative logic can be reconstructed in a way that is immune to Harman's objections. The theory of the normativity of logic is a fundamental issue in the philosophy of logic and epistemology that examines the role of logic in organizing beliefs and guiding everyday reasoning. Within this framework, there are serious disagreements between advocates of this theory, such as MacFarlane, and critics such as Harman. The present article, using Steinberger's distinction between the three normative roles of logic, shows that the difference between Harman and MacFarlane is largely "verbal" and is rooted in a confusion between the distinct functions of logic. However, while we accept Steinberger's claim, we argue that by making some modifications to MacFarlane's criteria for assessing the normativity of logic, his position can be changed in a way that is resistant to Harman's criticisms. In other words, with these reforms, the disagreement between Harman and MacFarlane, contrary to Steinberger's claim, will no longer be a formal disagreement, and the principles of the bridge of normative logic can be reconstructed in a way that is immune to Harman's objections.

https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_28981_cfdb837185d240f5ac2271882e295c23.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 06 Criticism of Prinz's Epistemological View of the Theory of Moral Emotionalism Criticism of Prinz's Epistemological View of the Theory of Moral Emotionalism 161 177 28982 10.58209/jpt.6.2.161 FA M. Molaee Department of Ethics, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2026 02 07 The question of the role of emotions in morality has long been a concern of moral philosophers from the past to the present. Prinz's theory of moral emotionalism is one of the serious contemporary responses to this issue. This theory is a version of moral sentimentalism. According to this theory, morality is inherently dependent on emotions. In the epistemological sense, moral concepts are not only constructed from emotions but are, in fact, emotions. According to this view of moral emotionalism, moral concepts represent emotions that predispose the moral agent to a specific emotional experience in the range of approval or disapproval. In this article, after the semantics of moral emotionalism, an analysis of the epistemological view of this theory will follow, drawing on Prinz's perspective. Then, the evidence he relies on for the sufficiency and necessity of emotions for moral judgment will be examined. Finally, it will be shown that, according to recent findings, Prinz's evidence is not very capable of demonstrating the correctness of his claim. The question of the role of emotions in morality has long been a concern of moral philosophers from the past to the present. Prinz's theory of moral emotionalism is one of the serious contemporary responses to this issue. This theory is a version of moral sentimentalism. According to this theory, morality is inherently dependent on emotions. In the epistemological sense, moral concepts are not only constructed from emotions but are, in fact, emotions. According to this view of moral emotionalism, moral concepts represent emotions that predispose the moral agent to a specific emotional experience in the range of approval or disapproval. In this article, after the semantics of moral emotionalism, an analysis of the epistemological view of this theory will follow, drawing on Prinz's perspective. Then, the evidence he relies on for the sufficiency and necessity of emotions for moral judgment will be examined. Finally, it will be shown that, according to recent findings, Prinz's evidence is not very capable of demonstrating the correctness of his claim.

https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_28982_e3fd383f6ed435f35f70175031cb4697.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 06 Metaphysical Explanation as “What Represents Grounding” Metaphysical Explanation as “What Represents Grounding” 179 195 28983 10.58209/jpt.6.2.179 FA M.J. Moallemi Department of Moral Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Vali Asr Research Institute, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2026 02 17 Metaphysical explanation in contemporary metaphysics faces a profound conflict between the alleged objectivity of grounding relations and the mind-dependent features of explanation. This study explores the nature of the link between grounding and explanation, aiming to resolve the "inheritance problem"—i.e., how the properties of grounding are inherited from the properties of explanation—and the resulting methodological crisis within realist accounts. To this end, two primary frameworks, "Unionism" and "Separatism," are evaluated across five distinct realist and anti-realist versions. It is argued that traditional versions of realism fail to provide a consistent account of the relationship between objective reality and epistemic access. Ultimately, "Hybrid Separatism" is introduced as the preferred solution. By distinguishing between "explanation per se" (defined as that which represents grounding) and "successful explanation" (conceived as an epistemic act), this model offers a coherent framework that preserves the metaphysical objectivity of grounding without sacrificing its essential explanatory character. Metaphysical explanation in contemporary metaphysics faces a profound conflict between the alleged objectivity of grounding relations and the mind-dependent features of explanation. This study explores the nature of the link between grounding and explanation, aiming to resolve the "inheritance problem"—i.e., how the properties of grounding are inherited from the properties of explanation—and the resulting methodological crisis within realist accounts. To this end, two primary frameworks, "Unionism" and "Separatism," are evaluated across five distinct realist and anti-realist versions. It is argued that traditional versions of realism fail to provide a consistent account of the relationship between objective reality and epistemic access. Ultimately, "Hybrid Separatism" is introduced as the preferred solution. By distinguishing between "explanation per se" (defined as that which represents grounding) and "successful explanation" (conceived as an epistemic act), this model offers a coherent framework that preserves the metaphysical objectivity of grounding without sacrificing its essential explanatory character.

https://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article_28983_ef295b7a92930794597daf0d4a1b9bf7.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 21 Aristotelian and Modern Logic Approaches to “Copula” Aristotelian and Modern Logic Approaches to “Copula” 1001 1013 28979 FA Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati Deptartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2026 05 18 It is well known that in Aristotelian logic, the analysis of a categorical sentence is three-partite, i.e., “subject”, “predicate” and “copula”. In contrast, in modern logic- Fregean and Russellian- it is bipartite. i.e., “function” and “argument”. Although bipartite analysis is sometimes mentioned in some writings of Aristotelian logicians, scrutiny reveals that the copula is considered, even though it is hidden. It seems that this difference in their analysis is rooted in their approaches: the Aristotelian approach is linguistic, and the modern approach is semantical. In sum, we may say that the modern approach is more logical and has some consequences that are ignored in Aristotelian logic. It is well known that in Aristotelian logic, the analysis of a categorical sentence is three-partite, i.e., “subject”, “predicate” and “copula”. In contrast, in modern logic- Fregean and Russellian- it is bipartite. i.e., “function” and “argument”. Although bipartite analysis is sometimes mentioned in some writings of Aristotelian logicians, scrutiny reveals that the copula is considered, even though it is hidden. It seems that this difference in their analysis is rooted in their approaches: the Aristotelian approach is linguistic, and the modern approach is semantical. In sum, we may say that the modern approach is more logical and has some consequences that are ignored in Aristotelian logic.

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 21 Does the Theory-Ladenness of Observation Necessarily Entail Constructivism? Does the Theory-Ladenness of Observation Necessarily Entail Constructivism? 1001 1019 28984 FA Habib Mamkarimi آموزش و پرورش Mehry Mortazavy M.A. in General Psychology, Islamic Azad University of Tabriz, Iran Journal Article 2026 01 03 This article addresses the central question of whether accepting the “theory-ladenness of observation” necessarily commits one to an epistemological “constructivist” stance. The thesis of theory-ladenness asserts that no observation is entirely neutral or independent of theoretical presuppositions. Some philosophers have inferred from this that objective reality—a mind-independent reality—does not exist, and that human knowledge of the world is merely a social construct. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine this claim and assess the purported necessary link between these two concepts. First, the key concepts of “theory-ladenness of observation” and “constructivism” will be clarified. It will then be argued that while the theory-ladenness thesis is plausible, it does not provide conclusive grounds for endorsing constructivism. Instead, the thesis can be interpreted within a realist framework that still allows for meaningful discourse about reality. Finally, the implications of this analysis for epistemological theories will be outlined. This article addresses the central question of whether accepting the “theory-ladenness of observation” necessarily commits one to an epistemological “constructivist” stance. The thesis of theory-ladenness asserts that no observation is entirely neutral or independent of theoretical presuppositions. Some philosophers have inferred from this that objective reality—a mind-independent reality—does not exist, and that human knowledge of the world is merely a social construct. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine this claim and assess the purported necessary link between these two concepts. First, the key concepts of “theory-ladenness of observation” and “constructivism” will be clarified. It will then be argued that while the theory-ladenness thesis is plausible, it does not provide conclusive grounds for endorsing constructivism. Instead, the thesis can be interpreted within a realist framework that still allows for meaningful discourse about reality. Finally, the implications of this analysis for epistemological theories will be outlined.

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 21 From Protest to Commitment: The Evolution of Ethical Criticism in the Anti-Theodicy School From Protest to Commitment: The Evolution of Ethical Criticism in the Anti-Theodicy School 1001 1020 28985 FA Eisa Mohammadinia Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, College of Theology, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran Journal Article 2026 05 01 This article employs an analytical-historical method to examine the evolution of ethical criticism within the anti-theodicy school. It argues that this school has traversed a dynamic path from an initial protest against the theological justification of evil to the formulation of a concrete ethical-practical obligation. This transition is analyzed in four stages: first, the philosophical foundation laid by Phillips and the Wittgensteinians, critiquing the logical contradictions of theodicy; second, the ethical deepening of the critique through Surin's focus on radical evil and the concept of unforgivable moral blindness; third, the politicization of the critique in Tilley's thought, which presents theodicy as an ideological tool for justifying passivity; and fourth, the formulation of an alternative through Pihlström's pragmatist framework, which shifts the central question from "why?" to "what is to be done?" This research demonstrates that the anti-theodicy school not only deems the traditional theodicy project invalid but also opens new horizons for a committed, pragmatist theology that stands in solidarity with the victims of evil. This article employs an analytical-historical method to examine the evolution of ethical criticism within the anti-theodicy school. It argues that this school has traversed a dynamic path from an initial protest against the theological justification of evil to the formulation of a concrete ethical-practical obligation. This transition is analyzed in four stages: first, the philosophical foundation laid by Phillips and the Wittgensteinians, critiquing the logical contradictions of theodicy; second, the ethical deepening of the critique through Surin's focus on radical evil and the concept of unforgivable moral blindness; third, the politicization of the critique in Tilley's thought, which presents theodicy as an ideological tool for justifying passivity; and fourth, the formulation of an alternative through Pihlström's pragmatist framework, which shifts the central question from "why?" to "what is to be done?" This research demonstrates that the anti-theodicy school not only deems the traditional theodicy project invalid but also opens new horizons for a committed, pragmatist theology that stands in solidarity with the victims of evil.

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 21 A Reflection on the Possibility of Meaning in Suffering from Viktor Frankl’s Perspective and Its Relation to the Problem of Evil and Human Happiness in Avicenna’s Philosophical System A Reflection on the Possibility of Meaning in Suffering from Viktor Frankl’s Perspective and Its Relation to the Problem of Evil and Human Happiness in Avicenna’s Philosophical System 1001 1021 28986 FA Mohammad Zabihi Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran Amirhasan Zargar Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, University of Qom, Iran. Journal Article 2026 05 07 This research examines the relationship between suffering, freedom, and happiness in Avicenna’s philosophy and Frankls existential logotherapy, with the central problem being the possibility of an ontological formulation for “meaning in suffering.” In the analysis of Avicenna’s philosophy, evil is explained as the privation of the perfection proper to the essence of contingent beings, and suffering is introduced as the soul’s perception of this privation; through the argument for the corporeality of the imaginative faculty, it is then analyzed within the soul’s perfective movement from potentiality to actuality. Next, on the basis of Frankl’s theory of the will to meaning, existential situational suffering is considered in terms of the possibility of attitudinal choice and responsibility. The result of the research shows that the possibility of meaning in suffering rests on the structure of possibility and the soul’s inherent directedness toward happiness; that is to say, the perception of deficiency, when accompanied by conscious choice, can be placed on the path of the soul’s perfection and the realization of happiness. Hence, Frankl’s conception of meaning in suffering always possesses an ontological capacity that draws on the latent possibilities within Avicenna’s philosophical system. This research examines the relationship between suffering, freedom, and happiness in Avicenna’s philosophy and Frankls existential logotherapy, with the central problem being the possibility of an ontological formulation for “meaning in suffering.” In the analysis of Avicenna’s philosophy, evil is explained as the privation of the perfection proper to the essence of contingent beings, and suffering is introduced as the soul’s perception of this privation; through the argument for the corporeality of the imaginative faculty, it is then analyzed within the soul’s perfective movement from potentiality to actuality. Next, on the basis of Frankl’s theory of the will to meaning, existential situational suffering is considered in terms of the possibility of attitudinal choice and responsibility. The result of the research shows that the possibility of meaning in suffering rests on the structure of possibility and the soul’s inherent directedness toward happiness; that is to say, the perception of deficiency, when accompanied by conscious choice, can be placed on the path of the soul’s perfection and the realization of happiness. Hence, Frankl’s conception of meaning in suffering always possesses an ontological capacity that draws on the latent possibilities within Avicenna’s philosophical system.

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 21 The Subject-Predicate Transposition (âAks al-Haml) in Mulla á¹¢adraâs Doctrine: A Historical Foundation Analysis The Subject-Predicate Transposition (âAks al-Haml) in Mulla á¹¢adraâs Doctrine: A Historical Foundation Analysis 1001 1023 28987 FA Ahmad Hosseini Sangchal Assistant Professor in the Department of faculty of Theology and Islamic StudiesUniversity of Tehran Journal Article 2026 01 07 The analysis of The Subject-Predicate Transposition (‘Aks al-Haml) of simple helliyya propositions structures the proposition “Man is existent” (al-insÄn mawjÅ«d) in the form of “This is the existence of man” (inna-hu wujÅ«d al-insÄn). Generally, this transposition is articulated by referencing Mulla á¹¢adra’s doctrine of the Primacy of Existence (aá¹£Älat al-wujÅ«d). In this article, I will demonstrate that: Firstly, historical roots—largely stemming from textual interpretative disputes—paved the way for Mulla á¹¢adra to propose this theory. Secondly, in formulating this theory, Mulla á¹¢adra is compelled to adopt numerous foundational principles from DawÄnÄ« amidst the polemic between DashtakÄ« and DawÄnÄ«, including the Law of Attribution and Relation (qÄnÅ«n al-ittiá¹£Äf wa-l-nisba), the Expanded Attribution (ittiá¹£Äf mutawassi‘), the Separation of the (Sphere/Diathesis) of Attribution from the of Realization of Attribution, the Types of Attributive Correspondence of Predication (anwÄ‘ muá¹Äbaqat al-haml), and the Derivative Rule (qÄ‘idat al-far‘iyya) arising from the Expanded Attribution. Thirdly, taking into account these historical foundations and juxtaposing numerous texts from Mulla á¹¢adra, a more precise interpretation of this theory will be offered. The analysis of The Subject-Predicate Transposition (‘Aks al-Haml) of simple helliyya propositions structures the proposition “Man is existent” (al-insÄn mawjÅ«d) in the form of “This is the existence of man” (inna-hu wujÅ«d al-insÄn). Generally, this transposition is articulated by referencing Mulla á¹¢adra’s doctrine of the Primacy of Existence (aá¹£Älat al-wujÅ«d). In this article, I will demonstrate that: Firstly, historical roots—largely stemming from textual interpretative disputes—paved the way for Mulla á¹¢adra to propose this theory. Secondly, in formulating this theory, Mulla á¹¢adra is compelled to adopt numerous foundational principles from DawÄnÄ« amidst the polemic between DashtakÄ« and DawÄnÄ«, including the Law of Attribution and Relation (qÄnÅ«n al-ittiá¹£Äf wa-l-nisba), the Expanded Attribution (ittiá¹£Äf mutawassi‘), the Separation of the (Sphere/Diathesis) of Attribution from the of Realization of Attribution, the Types of Attributive Correspondence of Predication (anwÄ‘ muá¹Äbaqat al-haml), and the Derivative Rule (qÄ‘idat al-far‘iyya) arising from the Expanded Attribution. Thirdly, taking into account these historical foundations and juxtaposing numerous texts from Mulla á¹¢adra, a more precise interpretation of this theory will be offered.

Tarbiat Modares University (TMU) Philosophical Thought 1973-2873 6 2 2026 04 21 A Study of Nasir al-Din al-Tusiâs View on the Distinction Between Existence and Essence A Study of Nasir al-Din al-Tusiâs View on the Distinction Between Existence and Essence 1001 1023 28988 FA Vahid Khademzadeh Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran, 0009-0007-2995-1298 Journal Article 2026 01 10 The principle of the distinction between existence and essence is often presented as the distinguishing feature of the philosophy of Farabi and Avicenna compared to Aristotelian philosophy. However, the interpretation of this principle has become a point of contention among commentators and researchers. Some believe that existence and essence have a real and metaphysical distinction, while others consider their distinction to be merely a product of mental abstraction and analysis. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, in his response to Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's objections, asserts that the attribution of existence to essence is solely a result of mental analysis. A careful examination of Tusi's statements in the Fourth Namat of Isharat wa Tanbihat reveals that his words in various contexts seem to imply an external distinction between existence and essence, and perhaps even the separation and precedence of essence over existence. However, potential solutions can be proposed to reconcile the various claims and statements made by Tusi The principle of the distinction between existence and essence is often presented as the distinguishing feature of the philosophy of Farabi and Avicenna compared to Aristotelian philosophy. However, the interpretation of this principle has become a point of contention among commentators and researchers. Some believe that existence and essence have a real and metaphysical distinction, while others consider their distinction to be merely a product of mental abstraction and analysis. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, in his response to Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's objections, asserts that the attribution of existence to essence is solely a result of mental analysis. A careful examination of Tusi's statements in the Fourth Namat of Isharat wa Tanbihat reveals that his words in various contexts seem to imply an external distinction between existence and essence, and perhaps even the separation and precedence of essence over existence. However, potential solutions can be proposed to reconcile the various claims and statements made by Tusi