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Dargahifar R. Tuomas Pernu’s Cluster Approach to the Marks of the Mental Phenomena. jpt 2024; 4 (4) :351-367
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-78419-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-78419-en.html
Department of Cognitive Science, Faculty of Strategic Sciences and Technologies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
Keywords: Marks of the Mental Phenomena, Physical Phenomena, Philosophy of Mind, Intentionality, Consciousness, Free Will, Tuomas Pernu
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Expanding Pernu’s List
Pernu’s list could be expanded. Some philosophical traditions identify universality, abstraction, temporality, and spatiality as mental characteristics. Additionally, further empirical research into cognition might reveal additional markers.
A comprehensive methodology for identifying mental features would involve:
Conclusion
Pernu’s cluster approach offers a pluralistic alternative to traditional single-property views. By identifying intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity as key features, he underscores the irreducibility of mental phenomena to purely physicalist accounts. His work challenges the notion of a single mind-body problem, instead revealing multiple intersecting challenges.
While the cluster view offers flexibility, it raises questions about the unity of the mental. Future research should seek a balance between pluralism and coherence, potentially identifying deeper unifying principles underlying mentality.
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Introduction
What distinguishes mental entities from non-mental ones? If the mental realm is not illusory, positive criteria must set apart mental phenomena from non-mental ones. Philosophers have sought to identify defining characteristics of mentality—a search often framed as the quest for the "mark of the mental." This involves pinpointing one or more properties necessary and sufficient for mentality, aiming to capture its very essence [Bayne, 2021: 8-9].
This paper categorizes existing views on the mark of the mental [Adams & Beighley, 2011] and then focuses on the cluster approach advocated by Thomas Pernu [2017]. It critically examines Pernu’s perspective by clarifying ambiguities, addressing objections, and suggesting refinements to his proposal.
Theories on the Mark of the Mental
Philosophers have proposed diverse criteria to identify mental phenomena. Yet, no single criterion seems to comprehensively encompass the wide variety of mental states—such as pain, belief, emotion, perception, imagination, and reasoning—without exclusions or exceptions [Kim, 2010: 17-18].
Three broad categories of theories emerge: single-property views, single-system views, and cluster views. The single-property view posits that all mental states share a defining characteristic. Some philosophers are not hopeful that such a feature exists and have found flaws in every candidate proposed for this status [Kim, 2010: 27; Crumley, 2006: 15]. Examples include Rorty's claim that incorrigibility marks the mental [Rorty, 1970] and the view that intentionality [Adams & Beighley, 2011: 60-64] or consciousness [Ludwig, 2003: 2-3] alone suffices.
The single-system view contends that mentality is best understood as a system possessing unique properties. However, individual mental states need not exhibit all of them [Adams & Beighley, 2011: 56, 66]. John Searle’s theory exemplifies this, linking intentionality to consciousness and introducing the "Background thesis," wherein mental representations rely on non-representational capacities [Searle, 1992: 178, 132].
The cluster view maintains that mentality is characterized by a set of properties, none of which are individually necessary but collectively define mental states [Adams & Beighley, 2011: 56]. This approach accommodates the idea that some mental states are conscious while others are intentional.
Pernu [2017] proposes a cluster view that identifies five marks of the mental: intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity. He argues that previous discussions have been incomplete, as they have traditionally focused only on intentionality and consciousness.
Pernu’s Cluster Approach
Pernu asserts that the five properties he identifies do not individually suffice to define mentality, but together, they demarcate the mental from the physical. Each of these properties, he argues, creates a distinct mind-body problem, revealing tensions between mental and physicalist accounts of reality. Pernu (2017) critiques the traditional approach to defining mentality, noting that only the first two characteristics typically indicate the mental, with the first often serving as the primary criterion. He argues that existing discussions on the signs of mentality are incomplete and seeks to expand the list of these signs in his work. He aims to provide a broader understanding of mentality by breaking down the singular concept of "the mental" into sub-concepts and exploring their interconnections. Pernu emphasizes that the signs of mentality he discusses are points of distinction from the physical, indirectly serving as negative signs of the physical. He highlights the opposition between the mental and the physical, suggesting that any positive sign of one is a negative sign of the other, akin to the characteristics of life and death. Pernu concludes that the mind-body problem can be divided into two related issues: the problem of the mind and the problem of the body. While the mental aspect is often seen as more intriguing, the nature of "the body" in this context remains unclear. This nuanced approach challenges conventional views and calls for a more comprehensive understanding of mentality and its relationship to the physical [Pernu, 2017: 2].
Intentionality
Following Brentano, intentionality has often been considered the sole mark of the mental. Mental states inherently refer to objects or states of affairs, even when those objects do not exist in the external world [Brentano, 1874/1995: 68]. Pernu highlights intentionality's key challenge for physicalism: intentional objects exist "in the mind" without existing in the physical world. Thus, intentionality seems incompatible with a strictly physicalist ontology [Pernu, 2017: 3].
Pernu acknowledges, however, that recent developments in embodied and extended cognition challenge the necessity of intrinsic intentionality. These theories propose that cognition extends beyond the brain, potentially undermining the view that intentionality is an essential mental feature [Pernu, 2017: 3-4].
Consciousness
Consciousness, particularly phenomenal consciousness, is another defining feature of mentality. Some philosophers argue that all mental states are intentional, while others maintain that phenomenal states have a distinct qualitative character. These positions yield four main perspectives:
What distinguishes mental entities from non-mental ones? If the mental realm is not illusory, positive criteria must set apart mental phenomena from non-mental ones. Philosophers have sought to identify defining characteristics of mentality—a search often framed as the quest for the "mark of the mental." This involves pinpointing one or more properties necessary and sufficient for mentality, aiming to capture its very essence [Bayne, 2021: 8-9].
This paper categorizes existing views on the mark of the mental [Adams & Beighley, 2011] and then focuses on the cluster approach advocated by Thomas Pernu [2017]. It critically examines Pernu’s perspective by clarifying ambiguities, addressing objections, and suggesting refinements to his proposal.
Theories on the Mark of the Mental
Philosophers have proposed diverse criteria to identify mental phenomena. Yet, no single criterion seems to comprehensively encompass the wide variety of mental states—such as pain, belief, emotion, perception, imagination, and reasoning—without exclusions or exceptions [Kim, 2010: 17-18].
Three broad categories of theories emerge: single-property views, single-system views, and cluster views. The single-property view posits that all mental states share a defining characteristic. Some philosophers are not hopeful that such a feature exists and have found flaws in every candidate proposed for this status [Kim, 2010: 27; Crumley, 2006: 15]. Examples include Rorty's claim that incorrigibility marks the mental [Rorty, 1970] and the view that intentionality [Adams & Beighley, 2011: 60-64] or consciousness [Ludwig, 2003: 2-3] alone suffices.
The single-system view contends that mentality is best understood as a system possessing unique properties. However, individual mental states need not exhibit all of them [Adams & Beighley, 2011: 56, 66]. John Searle’s theory exemplifies this, linking intentionality to consciousness and introducing the "Background thesis," wherein mental representations rely on non-representational capacities [Searle, 1992: 178, 132].
The cluster view maintains that mentality is characterized by a set of properties, none of which are individually necessary but collectively define mental states [Adams & Beighley, 2011: 56]. This approach accommodates the idea that some mental states are conscious while others are intentional.
Pernu [2017] proposes a cluster view that identifies five marks of the mental: intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity. He argues that previous discussions have been incomplete, as they have traditionally focused only on intentionality and consciousness.
Pernu’s Cluster Approach
Pernu asserts that the five properties he identifies do not individually suffice to define mentality, but together, they demarcate the mental from the physical. Each of these properties, he argues, creates a distinct mind-body problem, revealing tensions between mental and physicalist accounts of reality. Pernu (2017) critiques the traditional approach to defining mentality, noting that only the first two characteristics typically indicate the mental, with the first often serving as the primary criterion. He argues that existing discussions on the signs of mentality are incomplete and seeks to expand the list of these signs in his work. He aims to provide a broader understanding of mentality by breaking down the singular concept of "the mental" into sub-concepts and exploring their interconnections. Pernu emphasizes that the signs of mentality he discusses are points of distinction from the physical, indirectly serving as negative signs of the physical. He highlights the opposition between the mental and the physical, suggesting that any positive sign of one is a negative sign of the other, akin to the characteristics of life and death. Pernu concludes that the mind-body problem can be divided into two related issues: the problem of the mind and the problem of the body. While the mental aspect is often seen as more intriguing, the nature of "the body" in this context remains unclear. This nuanced approach challenges conventional views and calls for a more comprehensive understanding of mentality and its relationship to the physical [Pernu, 2017: 2].
Intentionality
Following Brentano, intentionality has often been considered the sole mark of the mental. Mental states inherently refer to objects or states of affairs, even when those objects do not exist in the external world [Brentano, 1874/1995: 68]. Pernu highlights intentionality's key challenge for physicalism: intentional objects exist "in the mind" without existing in the physical world. Thus, intentionality seems incompatible with a strictly physicalist ontology [Pernu, 2017: 3].
Pernu acknowledges, however, that recent developments in embodied and extended cognition challenge the necessity of intrinsic intentionality. These theories propose that cognition extends beyond the brain, potentially undermining the view that intentionality is an essential mental feature [Pernu, 2017: 3-4].
Consciousness
Consciousness, particularly phenomenal consciousness, is another defining feature of mentality. Some philosophers argue that all mental states are intentional, while others maintain that phenomenal states have a distinct qualitative character. These positions yield four main perspectives:
- Intentionalism: Intentionality alone defines mentality.
- Phenomenism: Consciousness is fundamental, and intentionality is secondary.
- Interdependency: Consciousness and intentionality are inseparable.
- Primacy of Consciousness: Consciousness is the core of mentality, underpinning all intentional states.
Consciousness presents an explanatory gap in physicalist theories, reinforcing its status as a defining mental characteristic [Pernu, 2017: 6-7].
Free Will
Pernu includes free will as a mark of the mental, noting its intuitive connection to human agency. He finds it surprising that free will is rarely considered a fundamental feature of mentality despite its centrality in folk psychology and moral responsibility debates [Pernu, 2017: 7].
However, free will face philosophical difficulties, particularly the challenge of determinism. If determinism is true, then free will is an illusion; if indeterminism is true, then choices may be arbitrary rather than free. Compatibilists argue that free will is compatible with determinism, while incompatibilists maintain that true free will requires indeterminism [Pernu, 2017: 8].
Pernu also links free will to mental causation, questioning how non-physical mental states can influence physical events. This problem, known as the causal exclusion problem, remains a central challenge for dualist and non-reductive physicalist views [Pernu, 2017: 9].
Pernu concludes that three components of free will create tension between the mental and physical: awareness of will, the causal efficacy of will, and freedom of will. The first can be reduced to access consciousness, but the latter two better distinguish the mental. Causal efficacy challenges physical causal closure, while free will conflicts with deterministic physical laws, leaving no room for conscious choice [Pernu, 2017: 10].
Teleology
Teleology, or goal-directedness, is another mental hallmark. Unlike purely physical processes unfolding mechanistically, mental phenomena are often purposeful. Intentional action presupposes goal-directedness, as does deliberative cognition. Teleology thus aligns with intentionality, consciousness, and free will, reinforcing its status as a mark of the mental [Pernu, 2017: 10].
Normativity
Finally, Pernu identifies normativity as a distinguishing mental feature. Mental states are subject to rational norms, distinguishing them from physical ones. Unlike physical processes, which unfold according to causal laws, beliefs and intentions are evaluated in terms of justification, truth, and rational coherence [Pernu, 2017: 12].
Normativity also introduces a distinction between causes and reasons. Physical events have causes, while reasons often explain mental actions. This explanatory framework suggests that normativity is uniquely mental, posing further challenges to a reductionist account of cognition [Pernu, 2017: 13-14].
Critique of Pernu’s Approach
Pernu’s cluster approach has several strengths. It avoids the essentialist pitfalls of single-property views, instead recognizing the complexity of mental phenomena. Additionally, his account highlights the multiple mind-body problems rather than assuming a single overarching issue.
However, several challenges arise:
Free Will
Pernu includes free will as a mark of the mental, noting its intuitive connection to human agency. He finds it surprising that free will is rarely considered a fundamental feature of mentality despite its centrality in folk psychology and moral responsibility debates [Pernu, 2017: 7].
However, free will face philosophical difficulties, particularly the challenge of determinism. If determinism is true, then free will is an illusion; if indeterminism is true, then choices may be arbitrary rather than free. Compatibilists argue that free will is compatible with determinism, while incompatibilists maintain that true free will requires indeterminism [Pernu, 2017: 8].
Pernu also links free will to mental causation, questioning how non-physical mental states can influence physical events. This problem, known as the causal exclusion problem, remains a central challenge for dualist and non-reductive physicalist views [Pernu, 2017: 9].
Pernu concludes that three components of free will create tension between the mental and physical: awareness of will, the causal efficacy of will, and freedom of will. The first can be reduced to access consciousness, but the latter two better distinguish the mental. Causal efficacy challenges physical causal closure, while free will conflicts with deterministic physical laws, leaving no room for conscious choice [Pernu, 2017: 10].
Teleology
Teleology, or goal-directedness, is another mental hallmark. Unlike purely physical processes unfolding mechanistically, mental phenomena are often purposeful. Intentional action presupposes goal-directedness, as does deliberative cognition. Teleology thus aligns with intentionality, consciousness, and free will, reinforcing its status as a mark of the mental [Pernu, 2017: 10].
Normativity
Finally, Pernu identifies normativity as a distinguishing mental feature. Mental states are subject to rational norms, distinguishing them from physical ones. Unlike physical processes, which unfold according to causal laws, beliefs and intentions are evaluated in terms of justification, truth, and rational coherence [Pernu, 2017: 12].
Normativity also introduces a distinction between causes and reasons. Physical events have causes, while reasons often explain mental actions. This explanatory framework suggests that normativity is uniquely mental, posing further challenges to a reductionist account of cognition [Pernu, 2017: 13-14].
Critique of Pernu’s Approach
Pernu’s cluster approach has several strengths. It avoids the essentialist pitfalls of single-property views, instead recognizing the complexity of mental phenomena. Additionally, his account highlights the multiple mind-body problems rather than assuming a single overarching issue.
However, several challenges arise:
- Non-essentialist nature: How can the mental be precisely delineated if no feature is necessary for all mental states?
- Multiplicity of mind-body problems: While Pernu identifies multiple problems, he does not clarify whether a unifying explanation is possible.
- Inclusion of free will, teleology, and normativity: Unlike intentionality and consciousness, these features might characterize mental systems rather than individual mental states.
Expanding Pernu’s List
Pernu’s list could be expanded. Some philosophical traditions identify universality, abstraction, temporality, and spatiality as mental characteristics. Additionally, further empirical research into cognition might reveal additional markers.
A comprehensive methodology for identifying mental features would involve:
- Cataloging a wide range of mental states.
- Testing existing criteria against this dataset.
- Exploring new distinguishing characteristics.
Conclusion
Pernu’s cluster approach offers a pluralistic alternative to traditional single-property views. By identifying intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity as key features, he underscores the irreducibility of mental phenomena to purely physicalist accounts. His work challenges the notion of a single mind-body problem, instead revealing multiple intersecting challenges.
While the cluster view offers flexibility, it raises questions about the unity of the mental. Future research should seek a balance between pluralism and coherence, potentially identifying deeper unifying principles underlying mentality.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Philosophy of Mind (Analytical)
Received: 2024/11/11 | Accepted: 2024/12/21 | Published: 2024/12/25
Received: 2024/11/11 | Accepted: 2024/12/21 | Published: 2024/12/25
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