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Mikaeili M, Jafari Valani A. Criticism of the Duality of Causality-Coincidence and the Solution to the Challenge Arising from it Based on Lewis's Idea of Possible Worlds. jpt 2025; 5 (2) :179-190
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79947-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79947-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Shahid Motahari University, Tehran Iran
Keywords: Causality, Coincidence, Possible Worlds, Essential Possibility, Allameh Tabataba'i, David Lewis
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Introduction
The duality of causality and coincidence in philosophical discussions, in addition to creating interest, has provided solutions to complex intellectual problems. This opposition stems from two main intellectual traditions: theology, which is based on causality, and atheism, which relies on coincidence. In Islamic philosophy, causality reached its peak in the theories of Avicenna, where essential possibility formed the basis of causality. This concept was proposed as a response to the theory of temporal occurrence in the problem of the necessity of a cause, and with its proposal, the debate about the acceptance or rejection of temporal beings, which theologians had previously rejected, was reconsidered.
Avicenna's idea continued until the time of Mulla Sadra, who developed the concept of existential possibility based on his innovative principles. However, substantive possibility remained for three main reasons: (1) the lack of a coherent philosophical system based on Mulla Sadra's ideas, which led to the use of old concepts with minor modifications; (2) the complexity of analysis based on existential possibility, which made it difficult to learn and teach these foundations; and (3) the philosophical claims that substantive possibility may produce results similar to existential possibility and that analysts are free to choose.
In modern philosophy, causality has been heavily criticized. David Hume, as the primary critic, viewed causality as a mental habit arising from repeated observations and rejected any objective necessity between events. Hume's criticisms are rooted in substantive possibility because existential possibility did not enter his view. Contemporary research on the causality-coincidence dichotomy has tended to strengthen one side and weaken the other. In Islamic philosophy, this opposition is the main focus of research, where either causality is reinforced or attempts are made to reconcile the two, as has been similarly done in analytic philosophy. David Lewis, for example, used the idea of possible worlds to challenge the necessity of causality.
Despite extensive research, the lack of a third metaphysical perspective remains evident. This article critiques the concept of causality-coincidence and, by presenting an innovative perspective, dissolves the duality, creating the groundwork for a new intellectual framework.
Causation in the Context of Substantive Possibility from the Perspective of Allamah Tabataba'i
Necessity creates specific characteristics for the existence or non-existence of an object: if existence is necessary, the object is necessary; if non-existence is necessary, the object is forbidden; and if neither of these is necessary, the possible is called special possibility [Tabataba'i, 2010].
According to Allamah Tabataba'i's definition, a possible entity is ineligible concerning existence and non-existence, and to be characterized by one of these, it needs an external priority that turns the equilibrium state into necessity. Such an entity may become necessary by other means or forbidden by other means [Tabataba'i, 2006].
Allamah Tabataba'i examines the theory of substantive possibility, in which the impossibility of preference without priority is confirmed. The nature of the possible concerning existence and non-existence needs a cause to create this necessity. [Tabataba'i, 2011] This argument has been confirmed by philosophers and is considered the basis of the need for the cause of the effect, while David Hume has challenged this theory.
Critique of Causality and Its Necessity from Hume's Perspective
David Hume, by carefully analyzing human perceptions, rejected the notion of a necessary relationship between entities and considered causality to be a mental construct. He examined the origins of human beliefs about causality and necessity, dividing them into three categories: self-evident, demonstrable, and empirical. Hume criticized all these sources and considered causality to be the result of mental habit, not an objective reality [Hume, 1988].
He rejected the self-evident nature of causality without providing any evidence to support his rejection. He also denies the demonstrable nature of causality, claiming that the idea of the existence or non-existence of an object does not require the idea of its cause. Consequently, causality must be an empirical matter. However, empirical observations only show the sequence of events and do not prove any necessity. Hume concludes that the elimination of the necessary relationship between cause and effect is tantamount to chance [Hume, 1969].
Evaluation of Hume's view in the context of essential possibility
Essence is superficial to existence and non-existence, and to attribute one of these two, it needs a priori outside the essence. In this way, the possible by nature can be characterized by the necessary by nature. Hume believes that this attribution can occur spontaneously, without the necessity of the essence. This view has also been confirmed by Shahid Sadr, who has confirmed that the idea of an entity without a cause does not create a contradiction [Sadr, 1982].
In the realm of mind and proof, reason requires a reason outside itself to rule on the existence or non-existence of an entity; however, this reason does not imply an external cause, but rather the result of observing the external existence of the entity. However, in the realm of externality and proof, the question of why an entity is attributed to existence faces challenges because the assumptions put forward, such as the separate realization of the entity and its existence, create contradictions.
Despite the obviousness of the principle of causality, the analyses presented show that the essence of an entity cannot have a specific cause. As a result, it is possible to prove coincidence and chance, but other arguments are raised that also question this view.
Revolution, in essence, is a challenge to the duality of causality-coincidence
Essence is indifferent to existence and non-existence due to its inevitability, but since these two are opposites, essence is forced to be characterized by one. Hume's theory considers this attribute to be automatic, but this view is criticized because departing from the inevitability of essence means revolution in essence, which is rationally rejected.
In the theory of causality, the attribution of essence to one of these two is attributed to an external cause. This cause does not affect the essence or the attributes of the essence, but only causes the preference of one of the attributes. However, this preference also faces philosophical problems, as the relation between essence and existence or non-existence remains impossible, and cause cannot transform this relation into necessity.
This problem presents a dilemma between two contradictory states: the simultaneous presence of both attributes, which violates the law of contradiction, or the necessity of determining one of them, which entails a revolution in the essence of essence. The only solution is to reinterpret one of these two states. The non-contingent reinterpretation of essence within the framework of Lewisian possible worlds is proposed as a solution.
Solution to the challenge through the idea of Lewisian possible worlds
The idea of possible worlds is presented as a conceptual tool to explain the philosophical concepts of necessity and possibility. David Lewis proposes possible worlds as concrete and independent realities. These worlds are separate from each other and have no causal or physical connection [Nolan, 2005].
For example, there may be a world in which elephants are red. These worlds are causally independent and do not conflict in space-time. Lewis argues that our world is simply one of many possible worlds, with no metaphysical superiority over other worlds. Using this idea, the contradiction of essential possibility is resolved: an entity can exist in one world and not exist in another without any contradiction.
By accepting this view, the causality-coincidence duality dissolves, since all possible states of an entity are accepted.
The Importance of the Causality-Chance Duality Despite the Acceptance of the Third View
Although the Third View resolves metaphysical contradictions, the duality between causality and chance remains relevant in human perception. The human mind naturally asks whether an event is causal or merely accidental. By presenting the solution to the causality-chance duality in the previous section, the question of the causality-chance duality has been transferred to the epistemological realm. In this way, the causality-chance duality is transformed from an ontological debate into an epistemological debate.
Conclusion
The discussion of causality and chance is based on the axis of essential possibility, and both views face challenges, including logical contradictions and the problem of inherent contradiction. The concept of possible worlds, regardless of its philosophical acceptance, offers a perspective that transcends duality and introduces a third way. Despite the resolution of the causality-coincidence duality, ontological questions about causality and coincidence have become and continue to be epistemological.
The duality of causality and coincidence in philosophical discussions, in addition to creating interest, has provided solutions to complex intellectual problems. This opposition stems from two main intellectual traditions: theology, which is based on causality, and atheism, which relies on coincidence. In Islamic philosophy, causality reached its peak in the theories of Avicenna, where essential possibility formed the basis of causality. This concept was proposed as a response to the theory of temporal occurrence in the problem of the necessity of a cause, and with its proposal, the debate about the acceptance or rejection of temporal beings, which theologians had previously rejected, was reconsidered.
Avicenna's idea continued until the time of Mulla Sadra, who developed the concept of existential possibility based on his innovative principles. However, substantive possibility remained for three main reasons: (1) the lack of a coherent philosophical system based on Mulla Sadra's ideas, which led to the use of old concepts with minor modifications; (2) the complexity of analysis based on existential possibility, which made it difficult to learn and teach these foundations; and (3) the philosophical claims that substantive possibility may produce results similar to existential possibility and that analysts are free to choose.
In modern philosophy, causality has been heavily criticized. David Hume, as the primary critic, viewed causality as a mental habit arising from repeated observations and rejected any objective necessity between events. Hume's criticisms are rooted in substantive possibility because existential possibility did not enter his view. Contemporary research on the causality-coincidence dichotomy has tended to strengthen one side and weaken the other. In Islamic philosophy, this opposition is the main focus of research, where either causality is reinforced or attempts are made to reconcile the two, as has been similarly done in analytic philosophy. David Lewis, for example, used the idea of possible worlds to challenge the necessity of causality.
Despite extensive research, the lack of a third metaphysical perspective remains evident. This article critiques the concept of causality-coincidence and, by presenting an innovative perspective, dissolves the duality, creating the groundwork for a new intellectual framework.
Causation in the Context of Substantive Possibility from the Perspective of Allamah Tabataba'i
Necessity creates specific characteristics for the existence or non-existence of an object: if existence is necessary, the object is necessary; if non-existence is necessary, the object is forbidden; and if neither of these is necessary, the possible is called special possibility [Tabataba'i, 2010].
According to Allamah Tabataba'i's definition, a possible entity is ineligible concerning existence and non-existence, and to be characterized by one of these, it needs an external priority that turns the equilibrium state into necessity. Such an entity may become necessary by other means or forbidden by other means [Tabataba'i, 2006].
Allamah Tabataba'i examines the theory of substantive possibility, in which the impossibility of preference without priority is confirmed. The nature of the possible concerning existence and non-existence needs a cause to create this necessity. [Tabataba'i, 2011] This argument has been confirmed by philosophers and is considered the basis of the need for the cause of the effect, while David Hume has challenged this theory.
Critique of Causality and Its Necessity from Hume's Perspective
David Hume, by carefully analyzing human perceptions, rejected the notion of a necessary relationship between entities and considered causality to be a mental construct. He examined the origins of human beliefs about causality and necessity, dividing them into three categories: self-evident, demonstrable, and empirical. Hume criticized all these sources and considered causality to be the result of mental habit, not an objective reality [Hume, 1988].
He rejected the self-evident nature of causality without providing any evidence to support his rejection. He also denies the demonstrable nature of causality, claiming that the idea of the existence or non-existence of an object does not require the idea of its cause. Consequently, causality must be an empirical matter. However, empirical observations only show the sequence of events and do not prove any necessity. Hume concludes that the elimination of the necessary relationship between cause and effect is tantamount to chance [Hume, 1969].
Evaluation of Hume's view in the context of essential possibility
Essence is superficial to existence and non-existence, and to attribute one of these two, it needs a priori outside the essence. In this way, the possible by nature can be characterized by the necessary by nature. Hume believes that this attribution can occur spontaneously, without the necessity of the essence. This view has also been confirmed by Shahid Sadr, who has confirmed that the idea of an entity without a cause does not create a contradiction [Sadr, 1982].
In the realm of mind and proof, reason requires a reason outside itself to rule on the existence or non-existence of an entity; however, this reason does not imply an external cause, but rather the result of observing the external existence of the entity. However, in the realm of externality and proof, the question of why an entity is attributed to existence faces challenges because the assumptions put forward, such as the separate realization of the entity and its existence, create contradictions.
Despite the obviousness of the principle of causality, the analyses presented show that the essence of an entity cannot have a specific cause. As a result, it is possible to prove coincidence and chance, but other arguments are raised that also question this view.
Revolution, in essence, is a challenge to the duality of causality-coincidence
Essence is indifferent to existence and non-existence due to its inevitability, but since these two are opposites, essence is forced to be characterized by one. Hume's theory considers this attribute to be automatic, but this view is criticized because departing from the inevitability of essence means revolution in essence, which is rationally rejected.
In the theory of causality, the attribution of essence to one of these two is attributed to an external cause. This cause does not affect the essence or the attributes of the essence, but only causes the preference of one of the attributes. However, this preference also faces philosophical problems, as the relation between essence and existence or non-existence remains impossible, and cause cannot transform this relation into necessity.
This problem presents a dilemma between two contradictory states: the simultaneous presence of both attributes, which violates the law of contradiction, or the necessity of determining one of them, which entails a revolution in the essence of essence. The only solution is to reinterpret one of these two states. The non-contingent reinterpretation of essence within the framework of Lewisian possible worlds is proposed as a solution.
Solution to the challenge through the idea of Lewisian possible worlds
The idea of possible worlds is presented as a conceptual tool to explain the philosophical concepts of necessity and possibility. David Lewis proposes possible worlds as concrete and independent realities. These worlds are separate from each other and have no causal or physical connection [Nolan, 2005].
For example, there may be a world in which elephants are red. These worlds are causally independent and do not conflict in space-time. Lewis argues that our world is simply one of many possible worlds, with no metaphysical superiority over other worlds. Using this idea, the contradiction of essential possibility is resolved: an entity can exist in one world and not exist in another without any contradiction.
By accepting this view, the causality-coincidence duality dissolves, since all possible states of an entity are accepted.
The Importance of the Causality-Chance Duality Despite the Acceptance of the Third View
Although the Third View resolves metaphysical contradictions, the duality between causality and chance remains relevant in human perception. The human mind naturally asks whether an event is causal or merely accidental. By presenting the solution to the causality-chance duality in the previous section, the question of the causality-chance duality has been transferred to the epistemological realm. In this way, the causality-chance duality is transformed from an ontological debate into an epistemological debate.
Conclusion
The discussion of causality and chance is based on the axis of essential possibility, and both views face challenges, including logical contradictions and the problem of inherent contradiction. The concept of possible worlds, regardless of its philosophical acceptance, offers a perspective that transcends duality and introduces a third way. Despite the resolution of the causality-coincidence duality, ontological questions about causality and coincidence have become and continue to be epistemological.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Metaphysics (Islamic)
Received: 2025/03/11 | Accepted: 2025/04/18 | Published: 2025/05/16
Received: 2025/03/11 | Accepted: 2025/04/18 | Published: 2025/05/16
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