S.h. Eslami Ardakani,
Volume 2, Issue 1 (3-2022)
Abstract
While sports are often viewed from a health perspective or with an emphasis on economic aspects, in this article, the author tries to examine the ethical function of sports and show its dimensions. The existence of some common patterns and attitudes towards sports and the dominance of medical or commercial attitudes towards them has prevented attention to the fundamental ethical aspects of sports. While sports, especially aerobic and non-competitive, are tied to moral virtues. With this in mind, the author suggests that non-competitive endurance sports have three moral functions in the long run. First, it leads to self-understanding, self-awareness and self-knowledge, second, it leads to domination of the body, emotions and feelings, and third, it cultivates many moral virtues, including courage, order, tolerance of pain and wisdom.
M. Samadieh,
Volume 2, Issue 3 (11-2022)
Abstract
Aristotle's discussions about Tuche (Τύχη) or fortune have obvious contradictions in two domains of ontology and axiology. In the domain of ontology, he has testified to the existence of fortune as a cause by accident- a cause by accident for an event which has occurred out of a choice based on thought and for a given intention. Aristotle believes that fortune-based affairs are subjects of intention and intellection which emerge from those agents who can take volitional actions. At the same time, he introduced fortune as an anti-rule and instable affair with indeterminate and purposeless causes. He accepted the existence of fortune even in the domain of the actions related to Techne and human happiness. However, he does not attach any value to it in axiology and declares it to be a cause by accident that comes after nature and intellect, even believing that there is no knowledge for it. Moreover, it is valueless in the domain of the action related to human happiness.
M. Samadieh,
Volume 2, Issue 4 (12-2022)
Abstract
Orexis or desire in Aristotle’s point of view is divided into rational and irrational desires. Rational desire includes Boulêsis while irrational desire includes Epithumia (appetite) and Thumos (passion). The study of Aristotle’s ideas shows that rational desire is different from other types of desire from different aspects. Firstly, rational desire as compared to the appetite and passion belongs to the rational part of the soul and thus is exclusively for human being whereas appetite and passion exist in animals too. Secondly, rational desire is concerned with goals which are realized through rational deliberation and such goals are good from the point of view of the agent instead of being merely pleasant and pleasurable. Thirdly, rational desire is engaged with the identification of truth and also contrary to the appetite and passion is a future-oriented desire. Finally, the striking feature of rational desire is its being an origin for moral actions; because the issue of rational desire is a rational goal; something from which the animals are deprived.
R. Ainechi, J.a. Khandaqi,
Volume 3, Issue 1 (3-2023)
Abstract
Defining beauty is one of the most critical issues in philosophical aesthetics. Walking philosophers have brought or referred to the concept of "perfection" as one of the main elements of the definition of beauty. After explaining the views of Avicenna and Aquinas in this field, this research deals with the question of what is the place of the concept of perfection in the definition of the beauty of both of them. This research is descriptive-analytical. In the collection, it uses the library method, and in the analysis, it uses the qualitative method. The results of this research show that beauty is essential in the view of both philosophers about tangibles and abstractions. From Avicenna's perspective, the perfection of the senses should have three aesthetic elements: good order, good composition (composition), and good moderation. Aquinas also uses the concepts of pleasure, proportion, and clarity in his definitions. These elements in the definitions of beauty can be evaluated in some way in connection with the idea of the second perfection.
S.amir.a. Mousavian ,
Volume 3, Issue 4 (12-2023)
Abstract
The aporia of causal necessity can be defined by looking at the dilemma of (1) the permanent, logical, and metaphysical concomitance of necessity and causation, or (2) the negation of one without the negation of the other, and in fact, the denial of the permanent concomitance of necessity and causation. This Aristotelian doctrine that everything has a cause cannot necessarily be a logical and philosophical result of determinism, the negation of the possibility of the future, and the collapse of potentiality into actuality. Necessity is the description of the causality that occurred in the context of the current reality of the present and the past, not the causality that occurs in the future. It is possible not to consider this meaning of necessity as requiring determinism and the principle of causality. In fact, the operator and the logical and metaphysical modality of causality is the actual reality of necessity, which is not always coextensive with determinism. By ignoring the final cause, Democritus reduces all the actions of nature to necessity. The reductionism resulting from the denial of the teleology of the world is a characteristic feature of Democritean mechanical necessitism.
