H. Karon Beirag,
Volume 2, Issue 2 (11-2022)
Abstract
In this article, first, the philosophical implications of the metaphor of mind as the computer, were inferred from three perspectives: ontological, epistemological, and anthropological; Then, the elements of the curriculum were deduced from the mentioned philosophical implications, and finally, the implications of the mentioned metaphor in education were criticized. Since we think based on metaphors, according to the above-mentioned metaphor the mind is passive and has a mechanistic view to the student. The student does not have individuality and freewill. Evaluation based on this approach is also based on measuring low levels of educational goals and measuring memory instead of deep learning. The criticisms that have been made show that such an attitude towards human being is not acceptable from a philosophical and especially from an educational point of view. The above-mentioned metaphor can only be useful in explaining the function of the mind or brain on the basis of a weak version of functionalism, and has no further implications.
S. Abdollahi, M. Nasiri,
Volume 3, Issue 1 (3-2023)
Abstract
Based on the interaction between science and religion, Nancy Murphy turns to a special version of non-transitive physicalism that uses empirical science, physicalism, and the Bible to formulate her holistic physicalism; A middle position between essential dualism and illusionism that defines humans as spiritual beings and hides the problem of the mind within it. Murphy brings the soul into holistic physicalism with his theological assumptions and not with scientific evidence and philosophical arguments. The distinguishing feature of non-transmission physicalism from transmission physicalism is the attention to the explanatory gap in the issue of "supervenience". Holistic physicalism has not filled this gap and has only changed the form of the problem from explaining the relationship between human parts to explaining the relationship between human dimensions. Therefore, combining the universal and weak perceptions of supervenience, along with the positive and negative teachings of holistic physicalism, that is, the use of pure holistic physicalism and avoiding introducing theological presuppositions in a philosophical theory, can be used to solve the problem.
M. Lotfi,
Volume 3, Issue 1 (3-2023)
Abstract
Physicalists have given several responses to anti-physicalist arguments based on epistemic/explanatory gaps. One of the most critical answers has become known as the phenomenal concepts strategy. Proponents of this strategy embrace the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, appealing to the special nature of phenomenal concepts, they try to explain why we confront this gap. Chalmers has presented an argument in the form of a dilemma against this strategy. He argues that each horn of the dilemma results in the failure of the strategy. In this paper, I will explain Chalmers’ argument. Focusing on the second horn, I will attempt to show that one of the premises of his arguments faces the problem; then, I will argue that following the second horn, the strategy could be successful, even if one of the conditions he takes necessary for the success of the strategy is not met.
H. Karon Beirag,
Volume 4, Issue 1 (1-2024)
Abstract
I first described philosophers' metaphors for "mind", then classified and critically examined them, and finally deduced their educational implications. The results indicate that nine metaphors were used about the mind, based on which I divided the mind into passive and active. Among the mentioned metaphors, the metaphor of the fertile earth and the metaphor of the glasses are active metaphors according to which, unlike other metaphors, every student is a unique and thinking creature with freedom of choice and individuality. This perspective has a fluid view of the man who believes in free will and does not view him as a machine. The implications of the mentioned attitude in the curriculum elements are presented in a table. Since each teacher has a personal philosophy, his attitude toward students' minds can guide how he teaches and treats them.
H. Karkon Beiraq,
Volume 4, Issue 4 (12-2024)
Abstract
This article aims to explain the implication of "near-death experiences" on the immateriality of the soul. After defining the experiences, explaining their components, and answering the problems, it has been argued that these experiences indicate the soul's immateriality (mind). Ideologies such as physicalism, naturalism, and scientism, which have no scientific and philosophical basis, are the reason for denying these experiences by naturalists and attributing them to illusions and chemical changes in the brain. But what is the scientific justification for having very clear perceptions during unconsciousness or clinical death when a person lacks perceptions?! Therefore, if the presuppositions and mental prejudices are discarded in interpreting the experiences, it seems that accepting the immaterial dimension is not so difficult for humans. Near-death experiences also pose a serious challenge to physicalist theories of "consciousness" that must be taken seriously in the philosophy of mind.
R. Dargahifar,
Volume 4, Issue 4 (12-2024)
Abstract
Distinguishing between mental and non-mental phenomena requires clear marks. This article examines one perspective on the marks of the mental phenomena. Tuomas K. Pernu offers a "cluster" approach to identifying the marks of the mental phenomena. To differentiate between mental and physical phenomena, which serves as his guide in identifying mental characteristics, Pernu introduces the notions of intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity. After presenting Pernu’s view, this article critically examines his approach. The relationship of this perspective to essentialistic investigations of the mind is assessed, and several questions and critiques regarding his view are raised and addressed. Pernu’s proposed list is deemed incomplete. Furthermore, the article examines how the last three marks on Pernu’s list can be understood as characteristics of mental phenomena. Finally, a methodological proposal is presented to refine the process of discovering the features of mental states.
