Volume 3, Issue 1 (2023)                   jpt 2023, 3(1): 15-32 | Back to browse issues page


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Mobini M. Samuel Clarke's Fitness Theory on Moral Value and a Brief Comparison of it with the Theory of Existential Fitness. jpt 2023; 3 (1) :15-32
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-65785-en.html
Department for Philosophy of Ethics, Research Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy
Abstract:   (1034 Views)
Samuel Clark has a completely rationalist explanation of ethics and uses the concept of fitness a lot to explain his view; hence, his moral theory is known as the fitness theory. Clark considers moral values ​​and obligations to be based on fitness relations and believes that the reason can understand self-evidently a large part of these relationships, and the other part can be obtained through rational arguments or revelation. Critics have found some ambiguities and defects in Clarke's fitness theory. In this article, Clarkeian fitness theory is examined according to the criticisms raised, and then in a brief comparison with the theory of existential fitness, it is shown that the theory of existential fitness does not have these ambiguities and defects.
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Article Type: Original Research | Subject: Philosophy of Ethics (Analytical)
Received: 2022/12/3 | Accepted: 2023/02/4 | Published: 2023/03/10
* Corresponding Author Address: Department of Moral Philosophy, Research Centre for Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, University Boulevard, Pardisan, Qom, Iran. Postal Code: 37185-3688 (ma.mobini@isca.ac.ir)

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