Volume 3, Issue 2 (2023)
jpt 2023, 3(2): 121-139 |
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Bashiri M, Zakeri M. The Snapshot Model and the Atomic Content of Temporal Experiences. jpt 2023; 3 (2) :121-139
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-66454-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-66454-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
Abstract: (409 Views)
Temporal experiences are experiences that represent the temporal aspects of the world. Phenomenologically, our temporal experiences directly and immediately belong to temporal properties. This obvious phenomenological truth leads to a paradox with the addition of other premises. Three models have been presented to explain the possibility of direct perceptual experience of temporal properties to solve this paradox. These models are the snapshot or atomic model, extensionalism, and retentionalism. The snapshot model or atomism is that perceptual experiences are only instantaneous or short-term conscious events that occur in succession, and their succession is explanatory and adequate for temporal experience. We will first describe the paradox of temporal experiences and the approach of temporal experience models, try to explain the criticisms of the atomic model and their rejection, and finally show the explanatory adequacy of the succession of atomic experiences for the temporal experience.
Keywords: Temporal Experiences, Snapshot Model, Temporal Properties, Succession, Atomic Content, Co-Consciousness
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Metaphysics (Analytical)
Received: 2022/12/31 | Accepted: 2023/05/26 | Published: 2023/06/19
Received: 2022/12/31 | Accepted: 2023/05/26 | Published: 2023/06/19
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