Volume 3, Issue 4 (2023)                   jpt 2023, 3(4): 293-307 | Back to browse issues page


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Rezaeirah T, Alizade B, Yousofsani S. On Attributing the Confusion of Secondary Intelligibles to Suhrawardi. jpt 2023; 3 (4) :293-307
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-71531-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran
2- Department of Logic, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran
Abstract:   (601 Views)
According to Some Ṣadrian researchers, Suhrawardī confuses philosophical secondary intelligibles with logical ones and rejects the idea that philosophical concepts are attributes of external objects. The main supporting evidence for this claim could be divided into two categories; A) Suhrawardī’s assertions that philosophical attributes are mental, and B) his assertions that the mind ascribes philosophical attributes to external beings. But first, the evidence is not sufficient to prove their claim, and second, there is clear evidence against it. Ṣadrā himself accuses Surawardī of confusing the two types of intelligibles in another way. He reads one of Surawardī’s statements as claiming that logical attributes like “particularity” are attributes of objective beings. This objection is also unfounded since Suhrawardī employs “particularity” in a different sense referring to a philosophical concept in that context. Therefore, Suhrawardī does not confuse the two types of secondary intelligibles, in either of the two mentioned senses.
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Article Type: Original Research | Subject: Metaphysics (Islamic)
Received: 2023/08/12 | Accepted: 2023/09/24 | Published: 2023/10/7
* Corresponding Author Address: Post Address: - (trezaeirah@yahoo.com)

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