Volume 3, Issue 4 (2023)                   jpt 2023, 3(4): 357-378 | Back to browse issues page


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Abdollahi J. Epistemological Comparison of Rational Disagreement in Kuhn and Feyerabend Viewpoints. jpt 2023; 3 (4) :357-378
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-71653-en.html
Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
Abstract:   (510 Views)
I examine the characteristics and justifications of rational disagreement in science. It explores the relationship between the justification of rational disagreement in science and the justification of rational disagreement in the epistemology of disagreement, specifically religious disagreement. In this regard, I focus on the views of two famous philosophers of science from the second half of the 20th century, namely Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. The views of these two philosophers on rational disagreement in science can be seen as significant, concrete, and tangible examples of the main approaches in the epistemology of (religious) disagreement, in which rational religious disagreement is justified. I bring together insights from both epistemology and philosophy of science and show reflection on disagreement in science can improve our intuitive understanding of rational disagreement in epistemology. To better understand the existing approaches in epistemology, I utilize intuitive ideas found in rational disagreement in science.
 
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Article Type: Original Research | Subject: Epistemology (Analytical)
Received: 2023/09/20 | Accepted: 2023/12/6 | Published: 2023/12/21
* Corresponding Author Address: Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Azadi Avenue, Tehran, Iran. Postal Code: 1458889694 (jalaljalal13721372@gmail.com)

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