Department of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran , davood.hosseini.c@gmail.com
Abstract: (3217 Views)
In this note, I argue that Fine's pure logic of ground is nothing but the structural fragment of RM. This result raises a problem for discriminating between ground and relevantistic deduction in Fine's theory of ground.
Article Type:
Note |
Subject:
Logic and Philosophy of Logic (Analytical) Received: 2021/11/30 | Accepted: 2022/02/14 | Published: 2022/03/20
| * Corresponding Author Address: Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Jalal Highway, Tehran, Iran. Postal Code: 14115-139 |
References
1. Anderson AR, Belnap ND (1976). Entailment: the logic of relevance and necessity. Volume 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [
Link]
2. Fine K (1994). Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives. 8(Logic and Language):1-16. [
Link] [
DOI:10.2307/2214160]
3. Fine K (2012a). The pure logic of ground. The Review of Symbolic Logic. 5(1):1-25. [
Link] [
DOI:10.1017/S1755020311000086]
4. Fine K (2012b). Guide to ground. In: Correia F, Schnieder B, editors. Metaphysical grounding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 37-80. [
Link] [
DOI:10.1017/CBO9781139149136.002]
5. Rosen G (2010). Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. In: Hale B, Hoffmann A, editors. Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-136. [
Link] [
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007]