Volume 4, Issue 4 (2024)
jpt 2024, 4(4): 333-350 |
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Soleimani M, Hosseini D. Myth, Social Ontology, and The Problem of Intentionality. jpt 2024; 4 (4) :333-350
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79371-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79371-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract: (432 Views)
Regarding the characteristics of myth in various mythological approaches, it is evident that myth functions in the culture, society, mind, or psyche of human beings, has a collective aspect, is connected to an unconscious or preconscious state, and finally has a normative dimension. These characteristics make social ontology an appropriate place for the analysis of myths. Following the ideas of some social ontologists such as Searl or Tuomela, myth can be considered an institutional fact. However, according to the dominant approach in social ontology in the contemporary analytic tradition, all institutional facts are implicated by individual or collective intentionality. We argue that the peculiarity of myth’s connection with the unconscious state challenges all subcategories of the dominant approach in contemporary social ontology; hence, a shortcoming of the dominant approaches in analyzing myth as an intuitional fact.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Metaphysics (Analytical)
Received: 2024/11/23 | Accepted: 2024/12/21 | Published: 2024/12/29
Received: 2024/11/23 | Accepted: 2024/12/21 | Published: 2024/12/29
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