According to some important philosophers of science, such as Popper, Hempel and Tarski, consistency is a necessary condition of establishing any scientific theory. They hold that all inconsistent scientific theories are uninformative, meaningless or deficient. In this paper I will first argue against their clams, then I consider some inconsistencies which happened at the heart of some well-accepted scientific theories (Empirical or Non-Empirical), and by this I will try to open the door for the possibility of the paraconsistent philosophy of science.
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Farsian, K. (2022). Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science. Philosophical Thought, 2(3), 269–282. https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.2.3.269
MLA
Farsian, K. "Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science", Philosophical Thought, 2, 3, 2022, 269–282. doi: 10.58209/jpt.2.3.269
HARVARD
Farsian, K. (2022). 'Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science', Philosophical Thought, 2(3), pp. 269–282. doi: 10.58209/jpt.2.3.269
CHICAGO
Farsian, K., "Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science." Philosophical Thought, 2 3 (2022): 269–282, doi: 10.58209/jpt.2.3.269
VANCOUVER
Farsian K. Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science. Philosophical Thought. 2022;2(3):269–282 (In Persian). doi: 10.58209/jpt.2.3.269