Philosophical Thought

Dretske's Analysis of Knowledge: Closure Preserved

Document Type : Original Research

Author

S.M. Moosavi

Department of Analytical Philosophy, Research Center of Analytical Philosophy, Research Institute of Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.3.3.259
Abstract
Hypothetical logic has a special place in the tradition of Avicennan logic. In this tradition, various opinions have been presented about the conditions of the truth of hypothetical sentences and the conditions of syllogisms with hypothetical premises. One of the most prominent Avicennan logicians who discussed it is Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī. The truth of singular cogent hypotheticals is a special topic of Samarqandī about hypotheticals. His analysis of this type of hypotheticals finally led to limiting the number of hypothetical syllogisms. In this article, I compare the opinions of Samarqandī about the conditions for the truth of singular cogent hypotheticals with the opinions of Fakhruddīn Rāzī and Abdullah Jīlanī. I show that the origin of the differences between these logicians is the difference in their interpretations of Avicenna’s texts about quantifiers of hypotheticals.

Keywords

Dretske
Knowledge Analysis
Recursive Analysis
Closure Principle
Skepticism
Subjects
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Philosophical Thought
Volume 3, Issue 3 - Serial Number 11
Summer 2023
Summer 2023
Pages 259-270

  • Receive Date 31 May 2023
  • Accept Date 01 September 2023
  • Publish Date 16 September 2023