Jacob Nathan argues that the mind–body problem has historically worn three different faces, and that, in light of its most recent face, the proper task of philosophy of mind in the present era is restricted to investigating how the mind can be empirically studied within the neuroscientific age, thus requiring that ontological investigations be set aside. The present paper offers a reconstruction and a critical evaluation of Nathan's position. An instance of the articulation of the proper task of philosophy within contemporary mind studies can be observed in the 'critical neuroscience' approach as expounded by David Låg Tomasi. Tomasi conceives of philosophy not as a peripheral discipline, but as a " Philosophy as basic approach toward neuroscience." On this account, philosophy, in its relation to neuroscience, is charged with analyzing theoretical presuppositions, interpreting empirical data, integrating various levels of explanation, and appraising the existential, ethical, and social consequences of neuroscientific research—without relinquishing its own ongoing inquiries into its characteristic problems.