Volume 3, Issue 1 (2023)
jpt 2023, 3(1): 73-87 |
Back to browse issues page
Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
Abdollahi S, Nasiri M. Murphy’s Holistic Physicalism on Mind Problem. jpt 2023; 3 (1) :73-87
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-64987-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-64987-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, Tehran University, Mashhad, Iran
2- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, Tehran University, Qom, Iran
2- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, Tehran University, Qom, Iran
Keywords: Nancey Murphy, Holism, Holistic Physicalism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mind Problem, Supervenience, Explanatory Gap
Full-Text [PDF 1105 kb]
(4117 Downloads)
| Abstract (HTML) (2446 Views)
MHP, which defines human beings as spirited bodies [Baker, 2006] and considers the soul as physical, has the problem of mind (MP) hidden itself: according to MHP, how is the relationship between the physical and spiritual dimensions of man? This main problem can be divided into the following research questions:
RQ1= Can MHP solve MP?
RQ2= Does MHP help to solve MP?
2- Her two main sources for 1 are:
- The Bible → a holistic-dimensional-non-partial approach to human [Murphy, 2006: 10 & 21];
- Science → physicalist approach to man [Murphy, 2006: 39-70; Murphy, 2002b: 62].
3- Murphy considers theology in interaction with science (and not in conflict or separation) [Nasiri, 2004: 12 & 15].
4- 2+3 = MHP. Can MHP solve MP? (RQ1)
1- Theology is knowledge [Nasiri, 2004: 86].
2- Theology is different (and not conflicting), relatively independent from other knowledge, and has its subject [Nasiri, 2004: 151].
3- Theology is placed at the top of the (non-reducible) hierarchy of knowledge due to its comprehensiveness and complexity [Murphy, 1999b: 629; Murphy, 1997: 92].
4- The relationship between science and theology is neither conflict nor separation but effective interaction (double-faced influence) [Nasiri, 2004: 12 & 151].
5- The mechanism of this interaction is from top to bottom.
Since Murphy sees theology interacting with science (TS), he develops the theory of MHP by using the Bible and science to solve the problem of human nature. In this way, he combines H (respective view in a complex system, different levels of properties, and downward causation), TS (coherence between scientific findings and theology), and MN (non-conflict of MHP with science) to shape MHP.
1- MP, which is essentially a product of the Platonic-Cartesian partitive account of HN and is derived from SD, is not raised by MHP.
2- Even if MP is raised, H defines the mind and the body as different dimensions of a whole with an aspective (not partitive) view and explains their relationship with downward causation. These dimensions are meaningless and independent of this unit; their importance depends on the whole of human existence [Murphy, 2006: 22-23 & 8-10].
This is also true for H and MN. Purely physicalistic perceptions of humans are not believable for religious people and will lead to their opposition to MN. H, which emphasizes downward causation and respective views, will not be easily related to the dominant view of the scientific community, which is eliminativist and emphasizes causation and partitive views upward.
Full-Text: (118 Views)
Introduction
Nancey Murphy believes God inspired her to use her philosophical knowledge to help the church [Murphy, 2006: 70] and considers studying human nature her most important concern. For this study, she turns to a special presentation of non-reductive physicalism [Murphy, 2013] based on the interaction between science and religion (TS). She borrows physicalism from science and holism (H) from the Bible to formulate her holistic physicalism (MHP), which is the middle position between substance dualism (SD) and illusionism [Abdollahi & Nasiri, 2022; Chalmers, 2020; Dennett, 2019].MHP, which defines human beings as spirited bodies [Baker, 2006] and considers the soul as physical, has the problem of mind (MP) hidden itself: according to MHP, how is the relationship between the physical and spiritual dimensions of man? This main problem can be divided into the following research questions:
RQ1= Can MHP solve MP?
RQ2= Does MHP help to solve MP?
Problem Statement
1- Murphy's research's main concern is understanding human nature.2- Her two main sources for 1 are:
- The Bible → a holistic-dimensional-non-partial approach to human [Murphy, 2006: 10 & 21];
- Science → physicalist approach to man [Murphy, 2006: 39-70; Murphy, 2002b: 62].
3- Murphy considers theology in interaction with science (and not in conflict or separation) [Nasiri, 2004: 12 & 15].
4- 2+3 = MHP. Can MHP solve MP? (RQ1)
Bases of MHP
MHP has three bases, which we will discuss in order.Interaction Between Theology and Science
Effective interaction between theology and science (TS) is the main foundation of MHP. Based on TS, Murphy defines physicalism in interaction with H and man as a spirited body. TS will be as follows:1- Theology is knowledge [Nasiri, 2004: 86].
2- Theology is different (and not conflicting), relatively independent from other knowledge, and has its subject [Nasiri, 2004: 151].
3- Theology is placed at the top of the (non-reducible) hierarchy of knowledge due to its comprehensiveness and complexity [Murphy, 1999b: 629; Murphy, 1997: 92].
4- The relationship between science and theology is neither conflict nor separation but effective interaction (double-faced influence) [Nasiri, 2004: 12 & 151].
5- The mechanism of this interaction is from top to bottom.
Holism and Downward Causation
The explanation of human nature as a spirited body and a complex system will be possible only with a physicalistic perspective (ascending: bottom to top) and holistic (descending: top to bottom) [Hershenov, 2007: 1; Murphy, 2006: 10 & 73; DeVries, 2021]. The meaning of holism is that in the case of a complex system like a human being, attention should be paid to its entirety first and not its parts individually. Secondly, in explaining the nature of this complex system, it should be looked at as a whole and at this complex from the top (a holistic-dimensional view) and not at its parts (partitive view) [Murphy, 2006: 10 & 21; Murphy, 2009: 4 & 11].Methodological Naturalism
Methodological naturalism (MN), which originates from TS, is a strategy for academic research that does not contradict the accepted findings of science. Murphy's physicalism is something like this. The main difference between the two views of naturalism is that the methodological type does not exclude the possibility of the existence of metaphysical concepts, such as theological concepts. Still, the ontological type is eliminativist [Halvorson, 2016: 136, 142, 147]. As George Gasser quotes from Murphy, she considers naturalism and theism as worldviews related to each other [Gasser, 2007: 14]; therefore, they do not completely contradict each other.Since Murphy sees theology interacting with science (TS), he develops the theory of MHP by using the Bible and science to solve the problem of human nature. In this way, he combines H (respective view in a complex system, different levels of properties, and downward causation), TS (coherence between scientific findings and theology), and MN (non-conflict of MHP with science) to shape MHP.
MHP on MP
According to the MHP, partitive interpretations of man contradicting the Bible are rejected. The authors of the Bible have considered human beings in their entirety as psycho-physical units, as spirited beings, and they have considered the soul and body as dimensions of human existence, not separate parts. This physicalist definition that the human is its body is confirmed by science and the Bible. So:1- MP, which is essentially a product of the Platonic-Cartesian partitive account of HN and is derived from SD, is not raised by MHP.
2- Even if MP is raised, H defines the mind and the body as different dimensions of a whole with an aspective (not partitive) view and explains their relationship with downward causation. These dimensions are meaningless and independent of this unit; their importance depends on the whole of human existence [Murphy, 2006: 22-23 & 8-10].
MHP is monistic and non-eliminative
If we consider SD as a belief in two distinct principles, since such a distinction is not seen in the holistic view, MHP is non-dualistic and monistic, depending on its two main sources (science and the Bible) [Gray, 2010: 638]. On the other hand, MHP, while being physicalistic, is not eliminativistic because it does not consider mental states to be illusory and removable.Changing the theological concepts
From Murphy's point of view, religious thoughts should also change some of their fundamental concepts, such as the resurrection. Based on MHP, the human being, the spirited body, survives with all its dimensions [Murphy, 2006: 22-23]; physical resurrection + spiritual resurrection.Critique of MHP on MP
Criticism of bases of MHP
In reductionism, everything is reduced to empirical matters. Does Murphy do anything else by simulating theology to science? [Murphy, 1999a; Murphy, 2002a; Murphy, 2008] Murphy herself has fallen into a kind of reductionism [Grace, 2003: 5 & 7], which also conflicts with her non-reductionist approach, And it causes the de-transcendentalization of religious concepts. On the other hand, eliminativism, the dominant approach in scientific societies, cannot consider theology a science due to its anti-metaphysical nature. Let alone put it at the top of the chain of sciences [Churchland, 1986; Churchland, 2012]. Therefore, TS is attacked by religious and scientific communities.This is also true for H and MN. Purely physicalistic perceptions of humans are not believable for religious people and will lead to their opposition to MN. H, which emphasizes downward causation and respective views, will not be easily related to the dominant view of the scientific community, which is eliminativist and emphasizes causation and partitive views upward.
Criticism of MHP itself; the confusion about the concept of physicalism
Physical causal closure means "all physical states have purely physical causes" [Popper, 1977: 51; Kim, 1993: 280]. Kim believes that if NRP cannot provide an explanation of the causal relationship between mental (M) and physical (P) states (explanatory gap [Chalmers, 2007; Chalmers, 2017]) and does not explain the supervenience of mental states from physical states (P → M), it will not be different from reduction physicalism. [Campbell & Bickhard, 2011: 41-43] Murphy does not explain why and how a mental state cannot be delivered to the physical [Murphy et al., 1998; Grace, 2003: 12 & 20]. Joubert calls theories such as MHP, which tries to reconcile physicalism and religion, fake physicalism [Joubert, 2011: 73].Criticism of the Results of MHP
Not solving the mind problem
One result of the explanatory gap in the problem of the supervenience of the mental (spiritual) state from physical matter is confusion about the concept of physicalism, and another is the failure to solve the MP.Moreland reviews; criticism of dualism on MPH
Moreland critiques MHP based on the (1) non-contradiction (intrinsic) of SD with science [Moreland, 2016: 113; Sajedi & Sajedi, 2019: 132-135 & 139-142; Sukopp, 2007: 113], (2) the criticism of Murphy's monistic interpretations of the Bible (Matthew 23:22-34, Acts 6:23-9) and Paul's second letter to the Corinthians (2:2-4) [Siemens, 2005: 187-190; Moreland, 2016: 11-108], (3) the objection to Murphy's hermeneutic methodology [Siemens, 2005: 188; Moreland, 2016: 107 & 110], and (4) the explanatory superiority of SD over MHP [Abdollahi et al., 2017; Dennett, 1992], and replaces his dualism.Conclusion
MHP is not a philosophical theory but a theological one. Murphy introduces the soul into his theory without using scientific and philosophical evidence and arguments but as a theological assumption. On the other hand, she creates a gap between the physical and the (mental) spiritual dimensions and brings MP back to the discussion table. So, a mix between the narrow and the strong supervenience may be suitable [Shagrir, 1999: 691].
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Philosophy of Mind (Analytical)
Received: 2022/10/23 | Accepted: 2023/03/4 | Published: 2023/03/10
Received: 2022/10/23 | Accepted: 2023/03/4 | Published: 2023/03/10
References
1. Abdollahi S, Nasiri M, Legenhausen M (2017). An assessment of perspective of neurophilosophy on problem of awareness. Hikmat-e-Islami. 3(4):33-68. [Persian] [Link]
2. Abdollahi S, Nasiri M (2022). Illusionism on mind problem. Journal of Philosophical Investigations. In Press. [Persian] [Link]
3. Baker LR (2006). Review of Nancey Murphy, bodies and souls, or spirited bodies?. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (8):1-6. [Link]
4. Campbell R, Bickhard MH (2011). Physicalism, emergence and downward causation. Axiomathes. 21:33-56. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s10516-010-9128-6]
5. Chalmers D (2007). The hard problem of consciousness. In: Velmans M, Schneider S, editors. The Blackwell companion to consciousness. New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing. pp. 225-235. [Link] [DOI:10.1002/9780470751466.ch18]
6. Chalmers D (2018). The meta-problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 25(9-10):6-61. [Link]
7. Chalmers D (2020). Debunking arguments for illusionism about consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 27(5-6):258-281. [Link]
8. Churchland P (2012). Matter and consciousness. Gholami A, translator. Tehran: Markaz Pub. [Persian] [Link]
9. Churchland PS (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-brain. Massachusetts: MIT Press. [Link]
10. Dennett DC (1992). The self as a center of narrative gravity. In: Kessel F, Cole P, Johnson D, editors. Self and consciousness. NJ: Erlbaum. [Link]
11. Dennett DC (2019). Welcome to strong illusionism. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 26(9-10):48-58. [Link]
12. DeVries W (2021). Wilfrid Sellars. In: Zalta EN, editor. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sellars/ [Link]
13. Gasser G (2007). How successful is naturalism?. Berlin: Ontos Verlag. [Link] [DOI:10.1515/9783110328950]
14. Grace RJ (2003). A critique of nancey murphy's nonreductive physicalist account of the human person and the abandonment of the human soul. California: Berkeley. [Link]
15. Gray AJ (2010). Whatever happened to the soul? Some theological implications of neuroscience. Mental Health, Religion and Culture. 13(6):637-648. [Link] [DOI:10.1080/13674676.2010.488424]
16. Halvorson H (2016). Why methodological naturalism?. In: Clark KJ, editor. Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. New Jersey: Wiley Blackwell. [Link] [DOI:10.1002/9781118657775.ch10]
17. Hershenov DB (2007). Book review of Nancey Murphy's bodies and souls, or spirited bodies?. Religious Studies. 43(2):237-242. [Link] [DOI:10.1017/S0034412507008967]
18. Joubert CWT (2011). Mindfulness and the Brain: A christian critique of some aspects of neuroscience. Conspectus: The Journal of the South African Theological Seminary. 12(99):59-87. [Link]
19. Kim J (1993). Supervenience and mind: Selected philosophical essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Link] [DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511625220]
20. Moreland JP (2016). A critique of and alternative to Nancey Murphy's christian physicalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 8(2):107-128. [Link] [DOI:10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.60]
21. Morvarid H (2008). Carnap's and Sellars' theories on universals. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research. 9(3):89-105. [Persian] [Link]
22. Murphy N (1997). Reconciling theology and science: A radical reformation perspective. London: Pandora Press. [Link]
23. Murphy N (1999a). Physicalism without reductionism: Toward a scientifically, philosophically, and theologically sound. Zygon. 34(4):551-571. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/0591-2385.00236]
24. Murphy N (1999b). Theology and science within a Lakatosian program. Zygon. 34(4):629-642. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/0591-2385.00241]
25. Murphy N (2002a). How physicalists can avoid being reductionists. In: Hilary DR, Mark WM, editors. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Cosmology and Biological Evolution (ATF Science and Theology Series). Hindmarsh: Australian Theological Forum Press. [Link]
26. Murphy N (2002b). Why christians should be physicalists. In: Hilary DR, Mark WM, editors. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Cosmology and Biological Evolution (ATF Science and Theology Series). Hindmarsh: Australian Theological Forum Press. [Link]
27. Murphy N (2006). Bodies and souls, or spirited bodies?. Edinburgh: Cambridge University Press. [Link] [DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511802805]
28. Murphy N (2008). Is nonreductive physicalism an oxymoron?. Metanexus Institute. 1-14. [Link]
29. Murphy N (2011). Avoiding neurobiological reductionism: The role of downward causation in complex systems. New Jersey: FT Press. [Link]
30. Murphy N (2013). Nonreductive physicalism. In: Runehov ALC, Oviedo L, editors. Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions. Dordrecht: Springer. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/978-1-4020-8265-8_793]
31. Murphy N, Brown W, Newton M (1998). Whatever happened to the soul?; scientific and theological portraits of human nature. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. [Link]
32. Nasiri M (2004). Methodology of Science and Theology. Qom: Imam Khomeini Institute Publication. [Persian] [Link]
33. Popper KR, Eccles JC (1977). The Self and its Brain. New York: Springer. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/978-3-642-61891-8]
34. Sajedi H, Sajedi A (2019). Non-reductive physicalism: An analysis and critique of Nancy Murphy. Religious Anthroplogy. 15(40):123-144. [Persian] [Link]
35. Shagrir O (1999). More on global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59(3):691-701. [Link] [DOI:10.2307/2653789]
36. Siemens DF (2005). Neuroscience, theology, and unintended consequences. Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith. 57(3):187-190. [Link]
37. Sukopp T (2007). How Successful Is Naturalism? Talking about Achievements beyond Theism and Scientism. In: Gasser G, editor. How successful is naturalism?. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 77-104. [Link] [DOI:10.1515/9783110328950.77]
| Rights and permissions | |
 |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. |