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Roshani Rad H. Phronesis and its Relationship with Theoretical Wisdom According to Aristotle. jpt 2023; 3 (1) :59-72
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-65166-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-65166-en.html
Tehran University
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Introduction
In his ethical research in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines happiness as an activity in accordance with virtue, and based on this definition, he enumerates and examines virtues. In a general classification, virtues are divided into moral and intellectual virtues [Aristotle, 2006]. The sixth book of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics analyzes the intellectual virtues [Randall, 1960: 76-77], which include industry [τέχνη], scientific knowledge [ἐπιστήμη], practical wisdom [φρόνησις], theoretical wisdom [σοφία], and intuitive reason [νοῦς]. Aristotle says the soul has two parts: the vegetative part [φυτικὸν], which has nothing to do with intelligence and wisdom, and the sensual part [ἐπιθυμητικὸν], which especially its elevated aspect that means "willing part" [ὀρεκτικὸν], benefits from wisdom to some extent because this part of soul can hear the command of wisdom and follow it. We usually say in the same sense: "I have a wise relationship with the advice of my father or friend," and we mean that I obey his advice. Now, let's say that this part of the soul, i.e., the sensual part or the willing part of the soul, has an intellectual element in itself. It should be said that the rational part of the soul has two parts; one has a real sense of wisdom in itself, and the other can hear and obey, just as a child listens to his father. [Aristotle, 2006: 1102a-1103a30]. Thus, the soul has a vegetative part active only in sleep and has no connection with virtue. another part is "wisdom" in the true sense of the word, which Aristotle considers to be man's true ego or true self. Still, in the meantime, the semi-intelligent part of the soul, a kind of overlapping region resulting from the collision of the rational and non-rational parts of the soul, has a special place. Moral virtues are virtues and ergon of this part of the soul, but since this part has reason in one sense, it will be related to the virtues of reason [Aristotle, 2006: 1138b35-1139a15].
Two fundamental parts of the rational soul
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle divides the rational soul into two fundamental parts: knowing and calculating. The virtue of the first part is theoretical wisdom (Sophia), and the virtue of the second part is practical wisdom (Phronesis) [Hughes, 2001: 87]. This distinction is based on the ontological distinction between becoming and stability, because the subject of practical wisdom is the realm of changeable affairs, and the subject of theoretical wisdom, is eternal things [Zeller, 1962: 186]. In this research, we will first show that the intuitive intellect or Nous is the connecting element of these two realms: Nous receives the ultimate principles from both sides; in the framework of theoretical knowledge, Nous knows the most general concepts of eternity and in the framework of Practical wisdom receives the partial individual [Aristotle, 2006: 1143a30-b25]. This dual-level identity and this interpretation of the relationship between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom is based on Aristotle's thought about the relationship between becoming and stability. We will also argue that practical wisdom is the agent of realization of theoretical wisdom: Phronesis is the power of receiving the highest good [Pakaluk, 2005: 214-216], and according to Aristotle, the highest good is the theoretical life, that is, the life according to the virtue of Sophia [Aristotle, 2006: 1177a15-17]. Therefore, theoretical wisdom is the goal of practical wisdom [Aristotle, 2006: 1145a10-15].
Nous; the relationship between Sophia and Phronesis
The interpretation of the relationship between Phronesis and Sophia as a "necessary - goal" suggests a way out of two conflicting interpretations of Aristotle's ethics - the rationalist and holistic interpretation of happiness - which we will explain [Hardie, 1968]. The contradiction that has been disputed by the commentators is the struggle between the rationalist interpretation of Aristotle's ethics that gives importance to "theoretical life" and the inclusive interpretation that gives importance to "political life" and cannot be easy without removing all the contradictions and interpretative problems of the text of Nicomachean ethics, chosen one and left the other aside. In this study, we first showed that this opposition was formed based on the ontological opposition between becoming and stability because, according to Aristotle, the rational soul has two parts, each of which deals with the same beings in the world. Theoretical wisdom is a partial virtue of the self that deals with unchanging beings, and practical wisdom is a partial virtue that deals with beings subject to change and transformation [Aristotle, 2006: 1138b35-1139a15]. First, we showed that Nous is the basis and common factor in both virtues: Nous perceives majority (universal concepts) in the field of opinion and perceives minor terms (particulars) in the field of action, and this is due to Aristotle's special understanding of the relationship between becoming and stability. Secondly, we have shown that neither the rationalist interpretation, which considers happiness to be exclusively intellectual life, nor the holistic view, which considers happiness to be the algebraic sum of moral and intellectual virtues, can be the interpretation of the text of Nicomachean ethics, but the view that considers the relationship of moral virtues and theoretical life as “goal and necessary” to become closer to Aristotle's thought.
Conclusion
One of the things that can be addressed as the subject of future research in the continuation of this research is the issue of the reversal of this relationship in modern thought—for example, with thinkers like Francis Bacon and others—that what is the end is "action" and the field of political life. Theoretical thought is an essential instrument to reach this conclusion. The consequences and nature of this transformation should be investigated in independent research.
In his ethical research in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines happiness as an activity in accordance with virtue, and based on this definition, he enumerates and examines virtues. In a general classification, virtues are divided into moral and intellectual virtues [Aristotle, 2006]. The sixth book of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics analyzes the intellectual virtues [Randall, 1960: 76-77], which include industry [τέχνη], scientific knowledge [ἐπιστήμη], practical wisdom [φρόνησις], theoretical wisdom [σοφία], and intuitive reason [νοῦς]. Aristotle says the soul has two parts: the vegetative part [φυτικὸν], which has nothing to do with intelligence and wisdom, and the sensual part [ἐπιθυμητικὸν], which especially its elevated aspect that means "willing part" [ὀρεκτικὸν], benefits from wisdom to some extent because this part of soul can hear the command of wisdom and follow it. We usually say in the same sense: "I have a wise relationship with the advice of my father or friend," and we mean that I obey his advice. Now, let's say that this part of the soul, i.e., the sensual part or the willing part of the soul, has an intellectual element in itself. It should be said that the rational part of the soul has two parts; one has a real sense of wisdom in itself, and the other can hear and obey, just as a child listens to his father. [Aristotle, 2006: 1102a-1103a30]. Thus, the soul has a vegetative part active only in sleep and has no connection with virtue. another part is "wisdom" in the true sense of the word, which Aristotle considers to be man's true ego or true self. Still, in the meantime, the semi-intelligent part of the soul, a kind of overlapping region resulting from the collision of the rational and non-rational parts of the soul, has a special place. Moral virtues are virtues and ergon of this part of the soul, but since this part has reason in one sense, it will be related to the virtues of reason [Aristotle, 2006: 1138b35-1139a15].
Two fundamental parts of the rational soul
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle divides the rational soul into two fundamental parts: knowing and calculating. The virtue of the first part is theoretical wisdom (Sophia), and the virtue of the second part is practical wisdom (Phronesis) [Hughes, 2001: 87]. This distinction is based on the ontological distinction between becoming and stability, because the subject of practical wisdom is the realm of changeable affairs, and the subject of theoretical wisdom, is eternal things [Zeller, 1962: 186]. In this research, we will first show that the intuitive intellect or Nous is the connecting element of these two realms: Nous receives the ultimate principles from both sides; in the framework of theoretical knowledge, Nous knows the most general concepts of eternity and in the framework of Practical wisdom receives the partial individual [Aristotle, 2006: 1143a30-b25]. This dual-level identity and this interpretation of the relationship between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom is based on Aristotle's thought about the relationship between becoming and stability. We will also argue that practical wisdom is the agent of realization of theoretical wisdom: Phronesis is the power of receiving the highest good [Pakaluk, 2005: 214-216], and according to Aristotle, the highest good is the theoretical life, that is, the life according to the virtue of Sophia [Aristotle, 2006: 1177a15-17]. Therefore, theoretical wisdom is the goal of practical wisdom [Aristotle, 2006: 1145a10-15].
Nous; the relationship between Sophia and Phronesis
The interpretation of the relationship between Phronesis and Sophia as a "necessary - goal" suggests a way out of two conflicting interpretations of Aristotle's ethics - the rationalist and holistic interpretation of happiness - which we will explain [Hardie, 1968]. The contradiction that has been disputed by the commentators is the struggle between the rationalist interpretation of Aristotle's ethics that gives importance to "theoretical life" and the inclusive interpretation that gives importance to "political life" and cannot be easy without removing all the contradictions and interpretative problems of the text of Nicomachean ethics, chosen one and left the other aside. In this study, we first showed that this opposition was formed based on the ontological opposition between becoming and stability because, according to Aristotle, the rational soul has two parts, each of which deals with the same beings in the world. Theoretical wisdom is a partial virtue of the self that deals with unchanging beings, and practical wisdom is a partial virtue that deals with beings subject to change and transformation [Aristotle, 2006: 1138b35-1139a15]. First, we showed that Nous is the basis and common factor in both virtues: Nous perceives majority (universal concepts) in the field of opinion and perceives minor terms (particulars) in the field of action, and this is due to Aristotle's special understanding of the relationship between becoming and stability. Secondly, we have shown that neither the rationalist interpretation, which considers happiness to be exclusively intellectual life, nor the holistic view, which considers happiness to be the algebraic sum of moral and intellectual virtues, can be the interpretation of the text of Nicomachean ethics, but the view that considers the relationship of moral virtues and theoretical life as “goal and necessary” to become closer to Aristotle's thought.
Conclusion
One of the things that can be addressed as the subject of future research in the continuation of this research is the issue of the reversal of this relationship in modern thought—for example, with thinkers like Francis Bacon and others—that what is the end is "action" and the field of political life. Theoretical thought is an essential instrument to reach this conclusion. The consequences and nature of this transformation should be investigated in independent research.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Philosophy of Ethics (Ancient)
Received: 2022/11/1 | Accepted: 2023/02/9 | Published: 2023/02/20
Received: 2022/11/1 | Accepted: 2023/02/9 | Published: 2023/02/20
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