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Mohammad Ali Khalaj M, Sheykh Rezaee H. Cassam’s Philosophical Account of the Extremist Mindset; Assessment with a Focus on the Forqan Group. jpt 2024; 4 (4) :313-331
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-78425-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Khatam University, Tehran, Iran
2- Department of Science Studies, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran
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Introduction
Although modern philosophers, including Hume [1985] and Kant [2007], have discussed issues related to extremism, the topic has not received significant attention in contemporary philosophy until recently. However, following the publication of Cassam’s groundbreaking book, Extremism: A Philosophical Analysis, philosophers have become increasingly open to exploring the problem of extremism [Katsafanas, 2022; Katsafanas, 2023; Battaly, 2023; Peels, 2023; Malcolm, 2023]. In this paper, we examine a specific aspect of Cassam’s account of extremism in the context of a contemporary Iranian leftist militant group known as Forqan. In his book, Cassam [2021] distinguishes between three types of extremism: ideological extremism, which concerns extremist content; method extremism, which pertains to extremist methods; and psychological extremism, which concerns the mindset of extremists. Focusing on Cassam’s account of mindset extremism, we pursue a twofold objective in this paper. In the first part, we apply Cassam’s theory of mindset extremism to shed new light on the extremism of Forqan. Specifically, we argue that, in addition to being method extremists, the key members of the Forqan group also demonstrated an extremist mindset. In the second part, conversely, we utilize the particular extremism of Forqan to challenge Cassam’s account of the extremist mindset. While Cassam identifies purity as a component of the extremist mindset, we contend that the members of Forqan, on one hand, possessed an extremist mindset and, on the other hand, were eclectic—a trait that is typically viewed as contrary to the demand for purity. By providing a conceptual analysis of purity, we aim to demonstrate how an eclectic approach and the demand for purity can coexist within the extremist mindset of Forqan’s members. By addressing this challenge, we seek to overcome a limitation in Cassam’s account of the extremist mindset.

Cassam’s account of extremist mindset and the case of Forqan
Let us begin with a brief review of Cassam’s account of the extremist mindset. According to his proposal, the extremist mindset comprises four sets of components: specific mental attitudes (hostility to compromise, dogmatism, and moral indifference); a particular model of thinking (conspiracy thinking, apocalyptic thinking, and catastrophic thinking); distinct emotions (especially anger); and certain preoccupations (virtue and purity). Among these four aspects, the first set — the mental attitudes — constitutes the core of the extremist mindset, while the other components amplify the level of extremism within that mindset. Let us now shift to the Forqan group and explain its extremism in light of Cassam’s account. Forqan was a leftist group founded by Akbar Goodarzi, a young Shi’a cleric, in Iran in 1977, one year before the Islamic Revolution [Kordi, 2012]. Before the revolution, Goodarzi and his followers in Forqan engaged in cultural and theoretical activities, including holding Quran interpretation classes in various mosques in Tehran. However, after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Forqan transformed into a militant group opposed to the new Islamic regime, carrying out more than ten significant terror operations, including the assassination of (Ayatollah) Morteza Motahari, one of the most influential clerics during the Iranian Revolution. Ultimately, Goodarzi and his followers were arrested and executed in 1980. Since Forqan used terror as a legitimate instrument to achieve its political goals, it is clear, according to Cassam’s taxonomy, that it was a method extremist group. However, Cassam’s proposal adds to our understanding of Forqan by revealing that its key members, especially Goodarzi, also had an extremist mindset. Substantial evidence supports the claim that Goodarzi and his followers had extremist mindsets. One reason to believe that Goodarzi was hostile to compromise is that he was expelled from three religious schools in less than two years [Shobeyri Zanjaani, 2010]. Moreover, individuals who have encountered him from various perspectives have described Goodarzi as possessing a dogmatic mind [Ali-Bakhshi, 2022; Alviri, 2009; Alviri, 2010; Forqan Members, 2010: 282; Saalehi, 2017: 62; Roozi Talab, 2014: 73]. Additionally, in his interpretation of the Quran, Goodarzi emphasized verses such as “fight the leaders of unfaith” (9:12), adopting a takfiri understanding of them [Goodarzi, 1978a: 282] and using them to justify the assassination of their critics. He also displayed indifference toward the deaths of individuals who were not the direct targets of Forqan’s operations but were nonetheless killed in these attacks. Beyond these attitudes, which reflect an extremist mindset, Goodarzi and his followers exhibited amplifying characteristics such as conspiracy thinking, apocalyptic thinking, anger, and a preoccupation with virtue. As such, Goodarzi and his followers possessed all the constitutive and some of the amplifying aspects of the extremist mindset. As a result, Cassam’s account enhances our understanding of Forqan's extremism by demonstrating that its members were both method extremists and mindset extremists.    

A response to the challenge of purity and eclecticism
As mentioned earlier, Cassam considers the demand for purity a preoccupation of the extremist mindset. He also distinguishes between ideological, religious, and racial types of purity, suggesting that extremists' motivation to eliminate their opponents partly arises from their preoccupation with purity. However, the case of Forqan poses a challenge to Cassam’s proposal since, on the one hand, Goodarzi and his followers believed in mixed, eclectic, impure content, and, on the other hand, they considered themselves as fighting against impurity [Mottahedi, 2010: 201]. The current version of Cassam’s proposal lacks an adequate theoretical framework to address this challenge. A brief examination of Goodarzi’s writings is sufficient to support the claim that he and his followers embraced mixed, eclectic content. Goodarzi interpreted Quranic verses through the lens of Marxist teachings. For example, he proposed understanding the Islamic concept of Ghazaye Elahi (divine predestination) regarding the Marxist notion of transforming quantity into quality. He also described Allah as a revolutionary figure and believers in monotheism as a revolutionary party [Goodarzi, 1978a]. Furthermore, Goodarzi characterized Luqman’s advice to his son as revolutionary training [Goodarzi, 1978b: 3]. Thus, there is no doubt that Goodarzi and his followers subscribed to mixed, eclectic content. The puzzling aspect, however, is that they considered their beliefs pure and their mission a battle against impurity.
Employing the methodology of ordinary language philosophy [Hansen, 2014], we propose resolving the puzzle through a conceptual analysis of ascriptions of pure/purity in three stages. In the first stage, we distinguish between purity as a feature of a person (personal purity) and purity as a feature of a set of propositions (content-oriented purity). Evidently, the puzzle under consideration primarily challenges the explanation of content-oriented purity. In the second stage, we argue that the best resolution to the puzzle is to conceive of content-oriented purity as an instance of response-dependent concepts—those that, on the one hand, may have a mind-independent causal base and, on the other, require a viewer for their instantiation [Johnston, 1989: 145]. The most reasonable candidates for response-dependent concepts are secondary qualities like colors. We suggest that purity is another instance of such a concept. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assert that, on the one hand, the beliefs of Forqan’s members were undeniably pure from their perspective yet impure from the perspective of their commentators, including ourselves. In the third and final stage, we seek to deepen our proposal by distinguishing between two perspectives on content-oriented purity: the conservative and the reformist. According to the conservative view, pure content includes all inherited within a tradition. From the reformist perspective, however, pure content lies at the origin of a tradition, while what has been received over time has been polluted by impurities. To restore its original purity, the received tradition must be purified. We suggest that when commentators assert that Forqan’s members believed in impure content, they adopt the conservative view of purity. In contrast, when Forqan’s members claimed purity, they embraced the reformist perspective. They employed Marxism as the science of revolution to purify Islamic tradition and return to its pure, liberating origin. Thus, the puzzle is resolved when we recognize that Forqan’s beliefs were content-oriented, pure from a reformist standpoint, and eclectic from a conservative one.
Article Type: Original Research | Subject: Philosophy of Ethics (Analytical)
Received: 2024/10/31 | Accepted: 2024/12/25 | Published: 2024/12/30
* Corresponding Author Address: Department of Philosophy, Khatam University, Hakim Azam Street, No. 30, Tehran, Iran. Postal Code: 1991633357 (mhmakh@gmail.com)

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