Volume 3, Issue 3 (2023)
jpt 2023, 3(3): 259-270 |
Back to browse issues page
Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
Moosavi S. Dretske's Analysis of Knowledge: Closure Preserved. jpt 2023; 3 (3) :259-270
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-69555-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-69555-en.html
Department of Analytical Philosophy, Research Center of Analytical Philosophy, Research Institute of Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, Iran
Abstract: (1754 Views)
Epistemic Skepticism is one of the most controversial issues in epistemology. To block it, some find the failure of closure helpful. Dretske puts forward a recursive analysis of Knowledge. In his view, the analysis makes the closure principle fail which in turn helps to undermine the paradigmatic arguments for epistemic Skepticism. However, some including contextualists, dogmatists, or neo-mooreans, on the other hand, maintain the closure and yet undermine skepticism. In the present paper, I am not going to explore various approaches to preserving closure, criticize Dretske’s analysis as a knowledge nor will I study the setbacks of closure failure. I intend to show that, contrary to the current understanding of Dretske’s analysis, the mentioned analysis does not necessarily lead up to closure failure: There is a specific reading of the recursive base such that not only does it preserve the closure principle but also it offers a way to defeat the classic arguments for Skepticism. To better examine my suggestion compared to Dreske’s and see their exact differences, I will first study Dretske’s analysis of knowledge. Then, I will show that my suggestion respects the closure principle yet undermines skepticism.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Epistemology (Analytical)
Received: 2023/05/31 | Accepted: 2023/09/1 | Published: 2023/09/16
Received: 2023/05/31 | Accepted: 2023/09/1 | Published: 2023/09/16
References
1. Audi R (1995). Deductive closure, defeasibility, and skepticism: A reply to Feldman. Philosophical Quarterly. 45:494-499. [Link] [DOI:10.2307/2220313]
2. Beebe JR (2004). The generality problem, statistical relevance, and the tri-level hypothesis. Noûs. 38(1):177-195. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00467.x]
3. Bishop MA (2010). Why the generality problem is everybody's problem?. Philosophical Studies. 151(2):285-298. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9445-z]
4. BonjouR L, Sosa E (2003). Epistemic justification: Internalism VS. externalism, foundations VS. virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. [Link] [DOI:10.1093/0195130057.003.0008]
5. Cohen S (1999). Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons. Philosophical Perspectives. 13:57-89. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.3]
6. Comesaña J (2006). A well-founded solution to the generality problem. Philosophical Studies. 129(1):27-47. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s11098-005-3020-z]
7. Conee E, Richard F (1998). The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies. 89(1):1-29. [Link] [DOI:10.1023/A:1004243308503]
8. DeRose K (1995). Solving the skeptical problem. Philosophical Review. 104:1-52. [Link] [DOI:10.2307/2186011]
9. Dretske F (1969). Seeing and knowing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Link]
10. Dretske F (1970). Epistemic operators. Journal of Philosophy. 67:1007-1023. [Link] [DOI:10.2307/2024710]
11. Dretske F (1971). Conclusive reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 49(1):1-22. [Link] [DOI:10.1080/00048407112341001]
12. Dretske F (1972). Contrastive statements. Philosophical Review. 81:411-437. [Link] [DOI:10.2307/2183886]
13. Dretske F (2003). Skepticism: What perception teaches. In: The Skeptics; Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. pp. 105-118. [Link]
14. Dretske F (2005). Is knowledge closed under known entailment? The case against closure. In: Steup M, Sosa E editors. Contemporary debates in epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 13-26. [Link]
15. Feldman R (1995). In defense of closure. Philosophical Quarterly. 45(181):487-494. [Link] [DOI:10.2307/2220312]
16. Feldman R (2006). Review: Bonjour and Sosa on internalism, externalism, and basic beliefs. Philosophical Studies. 131:713-728. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s11098-005-2113-z]
17. Fumerton R (1995). Metaepistemology, and skepticism. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. [Link] [DOI:10.5771/9781461639275]
18. Green M, Williams JN (2007). Moore's paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Link] [DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199282791.001.0001]
19. Goldman A (2009). Internalism, externalism, and the architecture of justification. Journal of Philosophy. 106(6):309-338. [Link] [DOI:10.5840/jphil2009106611]
20. Hales S (1995). Epistemic closure principles. Southern Journal of Philosophy. 33(2):185-201. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00739.x]
21. Hawthorne J (2005). The case for closure. In: Steup M, Sosa E, editors. Contemporary debates in epistemology.Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 26-43. [Link]
22. Hawthorne J (2005). Chance and counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 70(2):396-405. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00534.x]
23. Klein P (1981). Certainty: A refutation of skepticism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. [Link]
24. Klein P (2004). Closure matters: Academic skepticism and easy knowledge. Philosophical Issues. 14(1):165-184. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00026.x]
25. Moore GE (1959). Proof of an external world. Philosophical Papers. pp. 144-148. [Link]
26. Pryor J (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs. 34(4):517-549. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/0029-4624.00277]
27. Sosa E, Bonjour L (2003). Epistemic justification: Internalism VS. externalism, foundations VS. virtues. Oxford: Blackwell. [Link] [DOI:10.1093/0195130057.003.0008]
28. Stine GC (1976). Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure. Philosophical Studies. 29(4):249-261. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/BF00411885]
29. Vahid H (2005). Epistemic justification and the skeptical challenge. London: Palgrave Macmillian. [Link] [DOI:10.1057/9780230596214]
30. Williamson T (2000). Knowledge and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press. [Link]
| Rights and permissions | |
 |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. |