Volume 5, Issue 2 (2025)
jpt 2025, 5(2): 1001-1002 |
Back to browse issues page
Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
Abdollahi J. Observation and Relativism. jpt 2025; 5 (2) :1001-1002
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79619-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79619-en.html
University of Tehran , jalaljalal13721372@gmail.com
Abstract: (72 Views)
The aim of the present article is to examine whether observation (experience) can serve as a criterion to refute relativism. In the traditional debate between epistemic absolutists and relativists, the main issue is whether there are neutral and absolute criteria for selecting epistemic systems, or whether such criteria are dependent on socio-cultural contexts. Absolutists consider empirical evidence as a neutral and absolute criterion, while relativists, emphasizing the theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination, argue that observation is always influenced by theoretical presuppositions and thus non-absolute. Recently, David Stump, by proposing a pragmatic stance as a third position, rejects both relativism and absolutism. He uses observation as an objective but non-absolute criterion to refute relativism. However, Shahram Shahriari demonstrates that Stump's third position cannot exist. We, by examining the debate between Stump and Shahriari, show that observation, as Stump envisions it, cannot provide the sufficient grounds to refute relativism.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Philosophy of Science (Analytical)
Received: 2025/02/21 | Accepted: 2025/03/9 | Published: 2025/02/28
Received: 2025/02/21 | Accepted: 2025/03/9 | Published: 2025/02/28
Send email to the article author
| Rights and permissions | |
 |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. |