Volume 5, Issue 2 (2025)
jpt 2025, 5(2): 1001-1007 |
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Moral Judgement about Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist. jpt 2025; 5 (2) :1001-1007
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79822-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79822-en.html
Abstract: (154 Views)
My problem in this article is to examine the point of view of Browne, Rypka, Levy, and Arberry, who consider Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī to be an immoral traitor. By philosophical analysis and adopting an epistemological approach, I show that his historical argument has three major flaws. First, some premises include value concepts/judgments. Second, they have drawn a conclusion containing value concepts/judgments. Thirdly, the historical reports mentioned by them are not accurate and complete, nor are they considered in the context of that time, nor are they even mentioned with regard to the entire works and life of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. A historical look leads us to the conclusion that presenting such a view of has two main reasons. First, until 1968, many and detailed researches about Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and his history and era had not been done. Second, not only Tūsī is a complex and interesting character, but also the time and events of his period.
Keywords: Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Historical Report, Epistemology, Value Concepts/Judgements, Inferring Value from Fact.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Philosophy of Ethics (Analytical)
Received: 2025/03/6 | Accepted: 2025/03/17 | Published: 2025/03/30
Received: 2025/03/6 | Accepted: 2025/03/17 | Published: 2025/03/30
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