The Insufficient Radicality of Marburg Neo-Kantian Philosophical Contributions in Rescuing Metaphysics from Crisis

Gendeschmin, H.B.; Raayat Jahromi, M.; Heidari, M.H.; Rajabi, A.

doi:10.58209/jpt.5.3.339

The Insufficient Radicality of Marburg Neo-Kantian Philosophical Contributions in Rescuing Metaphysics from Crisis

Document Type : Original Research

Authors

H.B. Gendeschmin ¹ ^¶

M. Raayat Jahromi ¹

M.H. Heidari ¹ ^¶

A. Rajabi ² ^¶

¹ Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazwin, Iran

² Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.5.3.339

Abstract

In the second half of the nineteenth century, with the emergence of major crises in multiple dimensions of metaphysics, one of the major efforts to deliver metaphysics from the crisis was the contributions of the Marburg philosophical school, which made methodological efforts from 1870 until the First World War. In this article, after an impartial description of these activities, we will see that from a phenomenological standpoint, their contributions were not as radical, for two reasons: thematic and methodological. According to Husserl, such deliverance lies not in its salvation as Epistemology or the logic of sciences, but in the salvation of the Subject through the understanding and configuration of the three crises of philosophy, science, and the crisis of European man [thematic criticism]. In terms of methodology, the transcendental method of the Marburgians is not progressive like phenomenology, but rather regressive.

Keywords

Marburgian Neo-Kantianism

Crisis of Metaphysics

Transcendental Method

Husserl

Phenomenology

Subjects

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