Orexis or desire in Aristotle’s point of view is divided into rational and irrational desires. Rational desire includes Boulêsis while irrational desire includes Epithumia (appetite) and Thumos (passion). The study of Aristotle’s ideas shows that rational desire is different from other types of desire from different aspects. Firstly, rational desire as compared to the appetite and passion belongs to the rational part of the soul and thus is exclusively for human being whereas appetite and passion exist in animals too. Secondly, rational desire is concerned with goals which are realized through rational deliberation and such goals are good from the point of view of the agent instead of being merely pleasant and pleasurable. Thirdly, rational desire is engaged with the identification of truth and also contrary to the appetite and passion is a future-oriented desire. Finally, the striking feature of rational desire is its being an origin for moral actions; because the issue of rational desire is a rational goal; something from which the animals are deprived.
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Samadieh, M. (2023). Aristotle on βούλησις (Rational Desire); an Analytic Study. Philosophical Thought, 2(4), 325–337. https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.2.4.325
MLA
Samadieh, M. "Aristotle on βούλησις (Rational Desire); an Analytic Study", Philosophical Thought, 2, 4, 2023, 325–337. doi: 10.58209/jpt.2.4.325
HARVARD
Samadieh, M. (2023). 'Aristotle on βούλησις (Rational Desire); an Analytic Study', Philosophical Thought, 2(4), pp. 325–337. doi: 10.58209/jpt.2.4.325
CHICAGO
Samadieh, M., "Aristotle on βούλησις (Rational Desire); an Analytic Study." Philosophical Thought, 2 4 (2023): 325–337, doi: 10.58209/jpt.2.4.325
VANCOUVER
Samadieh M. Aristotle on βούλησις (Rational Desire); an Analytic Study. Philosophical Thought. 2023;2(4):325–337 (In Persian). doi: 10.58209/jpt.2.4.325