اندیشه فلسفی

استراتژی مفاهیم پدیداری و استدلال چالمرز

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی اصیل

نویسنده

مرضیه لطفی

پژوهشکده فلسفه تحلیلی، پژوهشگاه دانش‌های بنیادی، تهران، ایران

https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.3.1.1
چکیده
فیزیکالیست‌ها به استدلال‌های آنتی‌فیزیکالیستی مبتنی‌بر شکاف‌های معرفتی/تبیینی پاسخ‌های متعددی داده‌اند. یکی از مهم‌ترین این پاسخ‌ها به استراتژی مفاهیم پدیداری معروف شده است. طرفداران این استراتژی شکاف تبیینی میان حقایق فیزیکی و پدیداری را می‌پذیرند، اما با توسل به ویژگی‌های خاص مفاهیم پدیداری درصددند تا تبیینی از چرایی وقوع این شکاف ارایه دهند، تبیینی که با فیزیکالیسم سازگار باشد. چالمرز استدلالی به شکل یک دوراهی علیه این استراتژی ارایه کرده است. او ادعا می‌کند دنبال‌کردن هر دو حالت این دوراهی به شکست استراتژی منجر می‌شود. در این مقاله، استدلال چالمرز را توضیح می‌دهم. با تمرکز بر حالت دوم سعی می‌کنم نشان دهم که یکی از مقدمات استدلال او با اشکال روبه‌روست؛ هم‌چنین، استدلال می‌کنم که با پی‌گیری حالت دوم، حتی اگر یکی از شرط‌هایی که او برای موفقیت استراتژی لازم می‌داند برآورده نشود، استراتژی می‌تواند موفق باشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

شکاف تبیینی
فیزیکالیسم
استراتژی مفاهیم پدیداری
چالمرز
موضوعات
Introduction
Consciousness is one of the most critical problems in the contemporary philosophy of mind. David Chalmers [1996; 2002a; 2003] divides the concepts of consciousness and its problems into two main categories: 1. the easy problems concern the psychological consciousness 2. The hard problem is about phenomenal consciousness. Some anti-physicalists argue that there is an explanatory/epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal facts of the world [Jackson, 1982; Levin, 1983; McGinn, 1991; McGinn, 1995]. It means that the phenomenal truths are not deducible from the physical facts. Let P be the conjunction of all microphysical truths about the world, and Q be an arbitrary truth about phenomenal consciousness. P⊃Q is not knowable a priori; P&~Q is conceivable. Therefore, we cannot provide a reduction explanation for Q [Chalmers & Jackson, 2010: 241-247]. If the epistemic gap leads to the ontological gap between physical and phenomenal, physicalism will fail [Chalmers, 1996; Foster, 1996].
As Chalmers [2007: 4] states, physicalists respond to this kind of argument in two ways: Type-A physicalists deny the epistemic gap; type-B physicalists accept the epistemic gap but deny the inference to an ontological one. Some type-B physicalists attempt to explain the epistemic gap regarding certain distinctive features of phenomenal concepts. Following Stoljar [2005], Chalmers calls it “the phenomenal concept strategy” (PCS).

The Phenomenal Concept Strategy
According to the phenomenal concept strategy, the epistemic gap in the physical-phenomenal case can be explained through certain distinctive features of phenomenal concepts. Followings are the most common forms of the strategy:
  1. Recognitional concepts [Loar, 1990; Carruthers, 2003; Tye, 2003];
  2. Distinct conceptual role [Nagel, 1974; Hill, 1997];
  3. Indexical concepts [Ismael, 1999; Perry, 2001; O'Dea, 2002];
  4. Quotational concepts [Papineau, 2002; Block, 2006].
Chalmers claims that all forms of the phenomenal concept strategy share the general structure: they put forward a thesis C attributing certain psychological features to human beings. C should (1) be true; (2) explain our epistemic situation concerning consciousness; (3) be explained in physical terms [Block, 2006: 8]. The relevant epistemic gaps will not be explained if (1) or (2) fails. If (3) fails, although C may help understand the conceptual structure of the epistemic gap, it will have no force against the gap.
Chalmers presents a master argument against all forms of the strategy to show that (2) and (3) cannot simultaneously be satisfied. Either C is not physically explicable, or thesis C does not explain our epistemic situation concerning consciousness.

Chalmers’ Master Argument
Chalmers attempts to argue that no account of PCS can simultaneously satisfy (2) and (3) because either C is not physically explicable or C does not explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness [Block, 2006: 9-10]. He raises a key question to run his argument in the form of a dilemma: “Is P&C conceivable?”
  1. If P&~C is conceivable, then C is not physically explicable;
  2. If P&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation;
  3. Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our epistemic situation [Block, 2006: 10-11].
His argument relies on the “conceivability” defined as follows:
  • We can say that S is prima facie conceivable (for a subject) when that subject cannot rule out the hypothesis expressed by S by a priori reasoning on initial consideration [Chalmers, 2010: 143-144].
In what follows, I will discuss both horns.
P&~C is conceivable
According to premise (1), if P&~C is conceivable, then C is not physically explicable. We can argue for this premise by reconstructing the reasoning from the claim that P&~Q is conceivable to the claim that Q is not physically explicable. As a result, additional explanatory materials are required to explain why creatures with the relevant physical structure satisfy C [Chalmers, 2007: 11]. It might be argued that proponents of PCS must take the first horn because C is about phenomenal concepts. To avoid this problem, Chalmers suggests that C should be cast in topic-neutral terms.
P&~C is not conceivable
According to premise (2), if P&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation. Chalmers argues for this premise as follows:
  1. If P&~C is not conceivable, then zombies satisfy C;
  2. Zombies do not share our epistemic situation (E);
  3. If zombies satisfy C but do not share our epistemic situation, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation;
  4. If P&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation [Chalmers, 2007: 13].
He thinks premise (2) plays a real work in this argument. He takes the epistemic situation of an individual, including the truth values of their beliefs and the epistemic status of their beliefs. It should be noted that, like thesis C, an epistemic situation should be understood in topic-neutral terms. In his view, “A zombie will share the epistemic situation of a conscious being if the zombie and the conscious being have corresponding beliefs, all of which have corresponding truth values and epistemic status” [Chalmers, 2007: 14-15]. He appeals to intuition to reason for the claim that zombies do not share our epistemic situation. Intuition tells us that the corresponding beliefs of my zombie twin are false, or at least they are less justified than mine [Chalmers, 2007: 15].

Examining Chalmers’ Argument
Chalmers thinks C should explain our epistemic situation concerning consciousness, and at the same time, it should be explained in physical terms. Now, let us focus on the second horn (P&~C is not conceivable). C (cast in topic-neutral terms) can be explained physically in this situation, but Chalmers thinks it cannot explain our epistemic situation. I aim to argue that Chalmers is wrong; if the epistemic situation is cast in topic-neutral terms, then it is not clear why zombies cannot satisfy E. Chalmers emphasizes that we should understand our epistemic situation in topic-neutral terms. Still, when he wants to claim that Zombies do not share our epistemic situation, he seems to think of our epistemic situation so that it builds in claims about the presence of phenomenal states. However, we can claim that for a strategy to be successful, C does not need to explain our epistemic situation. Explaining the inferential disconnection between our physical and phenomenal beliefs is enough. If PCS can explain the presence of the epistemic gap (the fact that our physical beliefs cannot entail our phenomenal beliefs) in physical terms, the strategy will be successful. In other words, C does not need to explain our epistemic situation; it is enough to explain that Q is not deducible from Hill & McLaughlin's [1999] claim that we can explain the epistemic gap by appealing to the distinct conceptual roles.
To respond to this strategy, Chalmers claims that “it may physically explain an inferential disconnection between physical and phenomenal beliefs, the anti-physicalist’s crucial epistemic gap involves a disconnection between physical and phenomenal knowledge. This strategy does not help reconcile this crucial epistemic gap with physicalism, so it does not support type-B materialism” [Chalmers, 2007: 24]. Chalmers thinks PCS should explain the inferential disconnection between our physical and phenomenal knowledge. He presumes the truth of Q in characterizing the gap. If C can explain the epistemic gap between our physical and phenomenal knowledge, then there will be no gap between P and Q.

Conclusion
Chalmers has presented an argument as a dilemma against the phenomenal concept strategy. He argues that each horn of the dilemma fails the strategy. In this paper, I explained Chalmers’ argument. Focusing on the second horn, I attempted to show that one of the premises of his arguments faces the problem; then, I argued that following the second horn, the strategy could be successful, even if one of the conditions he takes necessary for the success of the strategy is not met. In other words, C does not need to explain our epistemic situation; it is enough to explain Q is not deducible from P.
 
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اندیشه فلسفی
دوره 3، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 9
زمستان 1401
زمستان 1401
صفحه 1-13

  • تاریخ دریافت 24 آذر 1401
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  • تاریخ انتشار 26 اسفند 1401