Late Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, with its emphasis on the central role of language in generating and resolving philosophical misunderstandings, offers a metaphilosophical approach that moves philosophy away from its traditional theoretical mode and transforms it into an essentially descriptive, therapeutic, and anti-theoretical activity. Paul Horwich, in Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy (2013), proposes an eight-step project in which traditional philosophical problems are identified as pseudo-problems, and Wittgenstein’s therapeutic solution is reinterpreted. The central question is to what extent Horwich’s reinterpretation is consistent with Wittgenstein’s purely descriptive and anti-theoretical spirit. The findings indicate that Horwich is notably successful in emphasizing the role of language, defending anti-theoretical philosophy, and clarifying its therapeutic dimension. However, in presenting the eight-step project as a form of systematization, in claiming that all philosophical problems can be reduced to an a priori/a posteriori conflict as an overgeneralization, in displaying inconsistency in the analysis of the problem of consciousness, and in attributing explanatory power to philosophical theories, he introduces tensions that at times steer his interpretation toward theoretical construction.