Abstract:
The normativity of logic is a central topic in the philosophy of logic and epistemology, addressing the role of logic in structuring beliefs and guiding everyday reasoning. Within this framework, significant disagreements exist between proponents of this view, such as MacFarlane, and critics, such as Harman—disagreements that have become one of the most prominent debates in contemporary philosophy. This paper, drawing on Steinberger’s distinction among three normative roles of logic, shows that the dispute between Harman and MacFarlane is largely “verbal” in nature, rooted in a conflation of the distinct functions of logic. Nevertheless, while we accept Steinberger’s claim, we argue that by applying certain revisions to the criteria for assessing the normativity of logic—particularly regarding MacFarlane’s acceptable bridge principles—his position can be changed so as to remain resilient against Harman’s criticisms. In other words, we demonstrate that, contrary to Steinberger’s claim, the disagreement between Harman and MacFarlane is not merely formal, and the bridge principles governing the normativity of logic can be reconstructed in a way that protects them from Harman’s objections.