Metaphysical Explanation as “What Represents Grounding”

Document Type : Original Research

Author

Department of Moral Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Vali Asr Research Institute, Qom, Iran

Abstract
Metaphysical explanation in contemporary metaphysics faces a profound conflict between the alleged objectivity of grounding relations and the mind-dependent features of explanation. This study explores the nature of the link between grounding and explanation, aiming to resolve the "inheritance problem"—i.e., how the properties of grounding are inherited from the properties of explanation—and the resulting methodological crisis within realist accounts. To this end, two primary frameworks, "Unionism" and "Separatism," are evaluated across five distinct realist and anti-realist versions. It is argued that traditional versions of realism fail to provide a consistent account of the relationship between objective reality and epistemic access. Ultimately, "Hybrid Separatism" is introduced as the preferred solution. By distinguishing between "explanation per se" (defined as that which represents grounding) and "successful explanation" (conceived as an epistemic act), this model offers a coherent framework that preserves the metaphysical objectivity of grounding without sacrificing its essential explanatory character.

Keywords

Subjects

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Volume 6, Issue 2
Spring 2026
Pages 179-195

  • Receive Date 17 February 2026
  • Revise Date 26 May 2026
  • Accept Date 28 March 2026
  • Publish Date 06 April 2026