Alethic Pluralism and the Problem of Mixed Discourse

Alaeinejad, H.

doi:10.58209/jpt.6.3.289

Alethic Pluralism and the Problem of Mixed Discourse

Document Type : Original Research

Author

H. Alaeinejad

Department of Logic, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.6.3.289

Abstract

Alethic pluralism maintains that truth is realized by different truth-conferring properties in different domains of discourse. A challenge for this view arises from mixed discourse: propositions and inferences that combine content from distinct domains. This paper examines the problem at three levels: mixed atomic propositions, mixed compound propositions, and mixed inferences. Its central claim is that these forms of mixed discourse are not equally problematic. Moderate versions of alethic pluralism, especially Lynch’s functionalist account, can explain mixed compounds and mixed inferences by appealing to a higher-order property of truth shared across domains. Mixed atomic propositions, however, remain resistant to such treatment because they involve cross-domain interaction at the most fundamental semantic level. The paper concludes that the ultimate viability of alethic pluralism depends on its ability to provide a convincing account of mixed atomic propositions.

Keywords

Alethic Pluralism

Mixed Discourse

Crispin Wright

Michael Lynch

Mixed Atomic Propositions

Alethic Functionalism

Subjects

Logic and Philosophy of Logic (Analytical)

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