“Immortality as a Project” of Bostrom and Kurzweil versus “Mortality as a Condition” of Heidegger

Anjomrooz, M.; Khezri, M.

doi:10.58209/jpt.6.3.327

“Immortality as a Project” of Bostrom and Kurzweil versus “Mortality as a Condition” of Heidegger

Document Type : Original Research

Authors

M. Anjomrooz ¹

M. Khezri ²

¹ Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities, Ra.C. (Rasht Campus), Islamic Azad University, Rasht, Iran

² Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Theology and Political Science, SR.C. (Science and Research Campus), Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.6.3.327

Abstract

This article compares two radical formulations of the human condition: “immortality as project” in the transhumanism of Bostrom and Kurzweil, versus “mortality as condition” in Heideggerian ontology. The central question concerns the ontological and ethical implications of transforming death from a structural condition of Dasein into a technical problem. Through a comparative conceptual analysis, it is shown that in Being and Time, death as an insurmountable possibility constitutes the structure of temporality, authentic identity, and resoluteness. In contrast, by relying on radical life extension and mind uploading, transhumanism views death as a removable risk and the human as an optimizable information pattern. This shift reduces temporality to endless duration, embodiment to interchangeable hardware, and identity to informational continuity. Finally, this paper argues for a technology that serves the richness of human meaning within finitude, rather than seeking to eliminate death.

Keywords

Mortality

Immortality

Heidegger

Transhumanism

Bostrom

Kurzweil

Subjects

Philosophy of Science (Modern)

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