The Weak, the Hasty, and the Half-Deaf: Aristotle's Map of Moral Failure and a Reassessment of Socrates' Promise (Winter2027;7(1))

Document Type : Original Research

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Abstract
On the intellectualist reading of Socrates, true knowledge of the good is bound up with an inability to do wrong knowingly, and Aristotle, who treated akrasia as undeniable, is usually said to have rejected that position. This paper shows that the simplified reading of this critique, which rests on the opening verdict of VII.2 alone, is incomplete. Along two intersecting axes (deliberation versus impetuosity, appetite versus anger) Aristotelian akrasia is arranged, on the reconstruction proposed here, into four combined forms of unequal textual support, and the relation between knowledge and desire is not the same across them. Akrasia is itself one of four character-types (virtue, continence, akrasia, vice), and even knowledge that wins the struggle may yield only continence, not full virtue. Assessing the Socratic remedy (measurement) and the Aristotelian one (habituation and foresight) at four levels of effect shows that they do not stand on a par: Aristotle makes the effectiveness of argument depend on prior habituation. On this reconstruction, Socrates' promise remains defensible as a claim about the goal and is limited as a claim about the route.

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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 17 November 2026

  • Receive Date 09 October 2026
  • Revise Date 09 November 2026
  • Accept Date 17 November 2026
  • Publish Date 17 November 2026