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Abdollahi J. Critique of the Negation of Relativism by Appealing to Observation. jpt 2025; 5 (2) :257-276
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79619-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79619-en.html
Institute for the History of Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
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This article investigates whether observation (experience) can serve as a criterion for refuting epistemic relativism. The longstanding debate between epistemic absolutists and relativists centers on the question of whether neutral, absolute criteria exist for evaluating epistemic systems or whether such criteria are inherently shaped by socio-cultural contexts. Absolutists posit empirical evidence as a universal, objective standard for justifying beliefs and selecting epistemic systems [Sankey, 2010; Sankey, 2012; Sankey, 2023; Boghossian, 2006; Seigel, 2004]. Relativists, however, counter this view by emphasizing the theory-ladenness of observation and the underdetermination of theories by evidence. They argue that observation is inextricably influenced by theoretical presuppositions, rendering it non-absolute and context-dependent [Bloor, 1981; Kusch, 2010; Kusch, 2016]. This debate is exemplified in the recent exchange between David Stump (2021, 2024) and Shahram Shahryari (2023).
At its core, the dispute revolves around the universality of justification criteria. Absolutists assert that belief justification relies on objective, transcultural standards, while relativists maintain that all epistemic evaluations are contingent upon specific socio-historical systems, with no neutral framework for adjudicating between them. This divergence is particularly evident in their treatment of observation and experience. Absolutists uphold observation as a neutral arbiter for theory selection, whereas relativists reject its independence, citing how theoretical and social biases color interpretation.
David Stump (2021) recently proposed a pragmatist middle ground, reconciling aspects of absolutism and relativism. He acknowledges the fallibility of criteria yet argues for the existence of objective standards rooted in empirical engagement with the external world. Stump contends that nature itself imposes constraints on human interpretations, offering a basis for rejecting radical relativism. Historical examples, he argues, demonstrate empirical evidence overriding theoretical bias. For instance, Peter Galison’s analysis of particle physics disputes reveals how scientists initially reinterpret conflicting evidence but ultimately concede to empirical resistance. Similarly, the acceptance of Einstein’s general relativity after the 1919 eclipse observation—which confirmed light bending—highlights the role of empirical validation in theory selection. Stump concludes that observation, though theory-laden, can function as an objective (albeit provisional) criterion for scientific consensus. By grounding criteria in the “resistance of nature,” he offers a framework that avoids both absolutist rigidity and relativist indeterminacy.
Shahryari, through philosophical reasoning, demonstrates that the third position proposed by Stump cannot exist. Aligning with relativists of the Edinburgh School, he relies on the theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination to argue that experience cannot be considered a neutral criterion. He references Kuhn, who states, "What we see is partly determined by the paradigm in which we operate" [Kuhn, 1996]. Shahryari emphasizes that observation is always influenced by theoretical presuppositions, training, and scientists' expectations. Even seemingly objective empirical data are interpreted within specific theoretical frameworks. Shahryari also discusses underdetermination, noting that when a theory conflicts with empirical evidence, it is logically possible to reconcile the evidence with the theory by appropriately adjusting auxiliary assumptions. Therefore, Shahryari concludes that observation cannot serve as an objective and neutral criterion for refuting relativism [Shahryari, 2023].
In response to Shahryari, Stump reiterates that the pragmatic concept of experience provides a non-absolute tool for opposing relativism. He asserts that his main argument against relativism is negative. Stump points out that relativism, including Bloor, downplay the importance of experience. He rejects the claim that underdetermination always allows for the resolution of inconsistencies and the construction of alternative theories. Stump argues that merely the logical possibility of constructing alternatives is insufficient for relativists; instead, sufficiently good alternatives must be available to be considered legitimate rivals. Stump maintains that observation, despite being theory-laden, can serve as an objective criterion for achieving consensus among scientists. He argues that the history of science demonstrates that some theories have been discarded based on empirical evidence, highlighting the objective role of observation in evaluating theories. [Stump, 2024]
In critiquing Stump's argument, the concept of objectified observation, as proposed by Chalmers, is considered a refined formulation of the idea of the resistance of the external world. Objectified observation is a form of observation that minimizes the influence of subjective and personal factors through the use of shared tools and procedures. [Chalmers, 1990] However, we show that this type of observation can only standardize the influence of social factors but cannot entirely eliminate them. Therefore, objectified observation cannot suffice to refute relativism, as the interpretation and understanding of its results remain dependent on theoretical presuppositions. This indicates that objectified observation itself is part of the dispute, not a solution to it. Even if objectified observation is considered an objective criterion, its interpretation and understanding remain tied to theoretical presuppositions, thereby reinforcing relativism.
A contradiction exists in Stump's claim: if observation is theory-laden, how can proponents of different theories arrive at the same interpretation of observation and agree on selecting or discarding a theory? Stump implicitly resolves this contradiction by disregarding the theory-ladenness of observation and adopting an absolutist stance. This contradiction becomes clearer when considering objectified observation as a philosophically refined version of the idea of nature's resistance. In standardizing objectified observation, we effectively appropriate one theory while excluding others. As Shahryari (2023) has shown, Stump cannot simultaneously accept the theory-ladenness of observation and the objective selection of a theory. If observation is theory-laden, its interpretation and understanding depend on theoretical presuppositions, which reinforces relativism. Conversely, if observation is considered an objective criterion, it must operate independently of theoretical presuppositions, but this contradicts the theory-ladenness of observation.
Stump claims that if no legitimate alternative exists and the appropriated theory is the only legitimate one, then relativists cannot challenge the objectivity of objectified observation. However, proponents of contingency in science argue that scientific outcomes are not inevitable and that the development of science could have followed different paths, yielding results equally valid to current science [Kidd, 2015]. Stanford's argument on unconceived alternatives demonstrates that the inability to conceive alternatives does not mean that no suitable alternatives exist [Stanford, 2006]. Therefore, the absence of legitimate alternatives can only refute relativism if we consider current theories to be inevitable and necessary. Given the arguments and examples provided by opponents of inevitability [Kidd, 2015; Hacking, 2000; Kinzel and Kusch, 2018; Collins, 1994; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985], we can deny inevitability and thus respond to Stump's claim regarding the absence of legitimate alternatives.
Stump, in rejecting the relativist implications of underdetermination, refers to Duhem's solution [Duhem, 1991], which relies on common sense. However, common sense cannot provide a specific mechanism for achieving consensus. [Zibakalam, 2017; Zibakalam, 2016] Arguments based on experience and common sense can only play a persuasive role [Kuhn, 1996] and cannot impose necessity on beliefs. Therefore, Stump's argument against relativism lacks sufficient justification. Stump believes that observation and common sense can serve as objective criteria for achieving consensus among scientists, but this claim is indefensible given the theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination. If observation is theory-laden, its interpretation and understanding depend on theoretical presuppositions, which reinforces relativism. On the other hand, if common sense is considered a criterion for achieving consensus, it must provide a specific mechanism for consensus, but this is untenable given the diversity of theories and scientists' presuppositions.
At its core, the dispute revolves around the universality of justification criteria. Absolutists assert that belief justification relies on objective, transcultural standards, while relativists maintain that all epistemic evaluations are contingent upon specific socio-historical systems, with no neutral framework for adjudicating between them. This divergence is particularly evident in their treatment of observation and experience. Absolutists uphold observation as a neutral arbiter for theory selection, whereas relativists reject its independence, citing how theoretical and social biases color interpretation.
David Stump (2021) recently proposed a pragmatist middle ground, reconciling aspects of absolutism and relativism. He acknowledges the fallibility of criteria yet argues for the existence of objective standards rooted in empirical engagement with the external world. Stump contends that nature itself imposes constraints on human interpretations, offering a basis for rejecting radical relativism. Historical examples, he argues, demonstrate empirical evidence overriding theoretical bias. For instance, Peter Galison’s analysis of particle physics disputes reveals how scientists initially reinterpret conflicting evidence but ultimately concede to empirical resistance. Similarly, the acceptance of Einstein’s general relativity after the 1919 eclipse observation—which confirmed light bending—highlights the role of empirical validation in theory selection. Stump concludes that observation, though theory-laden, can function as an objective (albeit provisional) criterion for scientific consensus. By grounding criteria in the “resistance of nature,” he offers a framework that avoids both absolutist rigidity and relativist indeterminacy.
Shahryari, through philosophical reasoning, demonstrates that the third position proposed by Stump cannot exist. Aligning with relativists of the Edinburgh School, he relies on the theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination to argue that experience cannot be considered a neutral criterion. He references Kuhn, who states, "What we see is partly determined by the paradigm in which we operate" [Kuhn, 1996]. Shahryari emphasizes that observation is always influenced by theoretical presuppositions, training, and scientists' expectations. Even seemingly objective empirical data are interpreted within specific theoretical frameworks. Shahryari also discusses underdetermination, noting that when a theory conflicts with empirical evidence, it is logically possible to reconcile the evidence with the theory by appropriately adjusting auxiliary assumptions. Therefore, Shahryari concludes that observation cannot serve as an objective and neutral criterion for refuting relativism [Shahryari, 2023].
In response to Shahryari, Stump reiterates that the pragmatic concept of experience provides a non-absolute tool for opposing relativism. He asserts that his main argument against relativism is negative. Stump points out that relativism, including Bloor, downplay the importance of experience. He rejects the claim that underdetermination always allows for the resolution of inconsistencies and the construction of alternative theories. Stump argues that merely the logical possibility of constructing alternatives is insufficient for relativists; instead, sufficiently good alternatives must be available to be considered legitimate rivals. Stump maintains that observation, despite being theory-laden, can serve as an objective criterion for achieving consensus among scientists. He argues that the history of science demonstrates that some theories have been discarded based on empirical evidence, highlighting the objective role of observation in evaluating theories. [Stump, 2024]
In critiquing Stump's argument, the concept of objectified observation, as proposed by Chalmers, is considered a refined formulation of the idea of the resistance of the external world. Objectified observation is a form of observation that minimizes the influence of subjective and personal factors through the use of shared tools and procedures. [Chalmers, 1990] However, we show that this type of observation can only standardize the influence of social factors but cannot entirely eliminate them. Therefore, objectified observation cannot suffice to refute relativism, as the interpretation and understanding of its results remain dependent on theoretical presuppositions. This indicates that objectified observation itself is part of the dispute, not a solution to it. Even if objectified observation is considered an objective criterion, its interpretation and understanding remain tied to theoretical presuppositions, thereby reinforcing relativism.
A contradiction exists in Stump's claim: if observation is theory-laden, how can proponents of different theories arrive at the same interpretation of observation and agree on selecting or discarding a theory? Stump implicitly resolves this contradiction by disregarding the theory-ladenness of observation and adopting an absolutist stance. This contradiction becomes clearer when considering objectified observation as a philosophically refined version of the idea of nature's resistance. In standardizing objectified observation, we effectively appropriate one theory while excluding others. As Shahryari (2023) has shown, Stump cannot simultaneously accept the theory-ladenness of observation and the objective selection of a theory. If observation is theory-laden, its interpretation and understanding depend on theoretical presuppositions, which reinforces relativism. Conversely, if observation is considered an objective criterion, it must operate independently of theoretical presuppositions, but this contradicts the theory-ladenness of observation.
Stump claims that if no legitimate alternative exists and the appropriated theory is the only legitimate one, then relativists cannot challenge the objectivity of objectified observation. However, proponents of contingency in science argue that scientific outcomes are not inevitable and that the development of science could have followed different paths, yielding results equally valid to current science [Kidd, 2015]. Stanford's argument on unconceived alternatives demonstrates that the inability to conceive alternatives does not mean that no suitable alternatives exist [Stanford, 2006]. Therefore, the absence of legitimate alternatives can only refute relativism if we consider current theories to be inevitable and necessary. Given the arguments and examples provided by opponents of inevitability [Kidd, 2015; Hacking, 2000; Kinzel and Kusch, 2018; Collins, 1994; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985], we can deny inevitability and thus respond to Stump's claim regarding the absence of legitimate alternatives.
Stump, in rejecting the relativist implications of underdetermination, refers to Duhem's solution [Duhem, 1991], which relies on common sense. However, common sense cannot provide a specific mechanism for achieving consensus. [Zibakalam, 2017; Zibakalam, 2016] Arguments based on experience and common sense can only play a persuasive role [Kuhn, 1996] and cannot impose necessity on beliefs. Therefore, Stump's argument against relativism lacks sufficient justification. Stump believes that observation and common sense can serve as objective criteria for achieving consensus among scientists, but this claim is indefensible given the theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination. If observation is theory-laden, its interpretation and understanding depend on theoretical presuppositions, which reinforces relativism. On the other hand, if common sense is considered a criterion for achieving consensus, it must provide a specific mechanism for consensus, but this is untenable given the diversity of theories and scientists' presuppositions.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Philosophy of Science (Analytical)
Received: 2025/02/21 | Accepted: 2025/05/5 | Published: 2025/05/29
Received: 2025/02/21 | Accepted: 2025/05/5 | Published: 2025/05/29
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