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Motavalli M. Moral Judgement about Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist. jpt 2025; 5 (2) :155-163
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79822-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-34-79822-en.html
Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
Keywords: Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Historical Report, Epistemology, Value Concepts/Judgements, Inferring Value from Fact
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Introduction
Some have considered Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī an immoral traitor who follow any power for his own personal gain. My aim in this article is to examine this view. The main work here is done analytically.
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī as an Immoral Traitor
Browne, considering several points, concludes like this: “What irony that this double-dyed traitor should be the author of one of the best-known works on ethics written in Persian!” First, he persuaded Khūrshāh to surrender to the Mongols and deceived him. Second, he became a confidant of Hulāgū and convinced him that no heavenly calamity would arise from killing Musta‘ṣim [Browne, 1951: 456-457].
Based on the following evidence, Rypka calls Ṭūsī an unusual moralist. He was both in the service of the Assassins and their Mongol enemies and played a role in the downfall of the last Sunni Abbasid caliph. Having lived with the Ismailis, he wrote the Nāṣirīan Ethics to suit their wishes, and having joined the Hulāgū, he revised it to cover up his past [Rypka, 1968: 313-314].
Levy argues that the judgment of history about Ṭūsī is highly inappropriate, since one would expect more from a man of such mental ability than to seek personal gain. This is despite the fact that he betrayed his Ismaili masters and played a major role in the assassination of the caliph by the Mongols. He argues that the composition of two prefaces to the Nāṣirīan Ethics reveals Ṭūsī's character well [Levy, 1923: 63-65].
Arberry first considers him to be a completely different person, born into a Shiite family, but soon entered the service of the Ismailis. He then goes on to say that he had a secret correspondence with Mu’aiyid al-Dīn, the vizier of Musta‘ṣim, to transfer his allegiance from heretics to the caliph. But the vizier informed Nāṣīr al-Dīn of this, and he sent Ṭūsī to Alamūt. When the fortress was besieged by Hulāgū, the time for revenge came for him, and he betrayed Khūrshāh and handed him over to Hulāgū. In the presence of Hulāgū, he invaded Baghdād, and with helping him to depose and murder the caliph, he sought personal gain again. He aspired to academic excellence. In order to outshine Avicenna, he began to revise mathematical texts. He continues that the poem that Ṭūsī quotes in his second introduction to the Nāṣirīan Ethics well sums up the Shiite genius for duplicity that saved his life in that disorder. His last pretense, which is emerged in his valuable treatise on Sufism, The Attributes of the Noble, was to be a mystic [Arberry, 1958: 253-263].
Dabashi understands Wickens’ statement in the introduction to the Nāṣirīan Ethics as condemning Ṭūsī and questioning his moral principles [Dabashi, 1996a]. But it seems that Wickens says something else [Wickens, 2011: 9-13].
Precise Formulation of the Argument
Given the similarity of their arguments to each other, a single strengthened formulation can be presented as follows:
a) Ṭūsī was raised in a Twelver Shiite family, but later entered the service of the Ismailis.
b) At one point while serving the Ismailis, he corresponded with the vizier of Musta‘ṣim and intended to join him.
c) During the Mongol invasion and siege of Maymūn-Diz, he deceived Khūrshāh and made him surrender to the Mongols.
d) He joined his Mongol enemies and, with them, stormed the center of the Islamic Caliphate and played a role in the assassination of the Sunni Caliph.
e) Thereafter, he wrote according to the wishes of his Mongol masters.
f) With his services to the Mongols, he became a minister and used the wealth of the endowments for scientific exploitation. He aspired to academic excellence so that he would eventually shine more than Avicenna.
g) Finally, by writing The Attributes of the Noble, he fulfilled his last wish or ostentation to appear as a mystic.
h) In general, Shia have a special talent for duplicity.
i) In the new Mongol government, Ṭūsī tried very hard to hide his past.
Conclusion: Ṭūsī was not a moral person.
Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist
The premises and conclusion of their argument contain value judgments. In a historical argument involving value judgments, either the premises, which are historical accounts, contain a value judgment and the person draws a conclusion containing a value judgment based on them, or the premises, which are historical accounts, do not contain a value judgment and the person draws a conclusion containing a value judgment based on them. In the first case, the validity of historical reports is questionable, and in the second case, the validity of the conclusion. The third error concerns historical reports which are inaccurate. We will discuss each of these three errors below.
First Error: Inappropriateness of the Use of Value Concepts/Judgments in Historical Accounts
One of the five sources of justification and knowledge is testimony [Leonard, 2023; Green, 2008]. The development of social epistemology brought about a social turn in religious epistemology by Greco and Zagzebski. They paid attention to the beliefs and testimonies of the past in religious matters [Motavalli, 2023]. On the other hand, the main issue in analytical or critical philosophy of history or philosophy of historiography is an epistemological one. There, they ask about the objectivity/relativity of historiography, that is, to what extent historical research can be free from the subjectivity and interpretations of the historians [Kosso, 2009].
Now, with these studies at hand and with my own observations, I can continue my argument. The validity of historical accounts containing value judgments is questionable because, beyond the mention of events, they include personal inferences, subjective interpretations, and unscientific explanations.
Second Error: Incorrectness of Inferring Value from Fact
Now we come to the second case of the first dichotomy. It is not correct to infer value judgments or propositions containing value concept/judgment from non-value judgments and propositions regarding fact. The reason for this is that here we can no longer justify the inference of “ought” (value) from “is” (fact) by means of an actual relation between them. Many philosophers, such as Hare and Mackie, consider such an inference to be invalid [Hare, 1963; Mackie, 1977]. At the same time, there are those who have tried to demonstrate the validity of such an inference, such as Searle [Di Lucia & Fittipaldi, 2021]. Among these, the best and most powerful view, in our view, is that of Mesbah Yazdi [Arefi, 2020; Mesbah Yazdi, 2012; Mesbah Yazdi, 1993]. Assuming that Misbah's view is accepted, it still does not apply to statements containing moral value concepts/judgments about historical figures. This is because here the attainment of the goal, the desired perfection, or the result of the action is no longer involved so that a necessity-in-relation-to-something-else is established between it and the action.
Third Error: Inaccurate Historical Reports
It was not the case that Ṭūsī went to negotiate with the Mongols on behalf of Khūrshāh and simply handed him over to the Mongols and gained a position in their system. (premise c) Just like other philosophers and thinkers such as al-Kindī, Avicenna, and Suhrawardī, he also had relations with the government. Governments needed these scholars for various reasons. One reason was to have a wise minister or philosopher at their disposal, both to benefit from his guidance and to blame him for any possible subsequent wrongdoings [Dabashi, 1996a; Dabashi, 1996b].
It is true that Ṭūsī presented his works to kings and, in general, sought to approach them through various means (premises a and e), but most earlier scholars acted in this way, among other things, to obtain patronage [Adamson, 2016: 330].
Arberry says that Shia have a special talent for duplicity. (premise h) But he must see the Shia story in its historical context.
Finally, the writing of a mystical treatise by Ṭūsī is not so surprising (premise z) if we look at his report card. The mystical tendency is evident in many of his works [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, 1956: 1]. Signs of awareness of the works of the mystics are visible in Ṭūsī's writings [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, 2004: 90]. Moreover, such a thing is not bizarre from a polymath, especially since the learned minister Juvainī had requested him to write it.
Perhaps Ṭūsī had some correspondence with Mu’aiyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Alqamī, the vizier of Musta‘ṣim (premise b), but the details remain shrouded in mystery. There are conflicting reports here [Mudarres Razavi, 1975].
Conclusion
There was not much and detailed scientific research done on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and his history and time before 1968. On the other hand, both Ṭūsī and his era and the events of his lifetime are very complex and interesting. These two facts have led some, such as Browne, Rypka, Levy, and Arberry, to go beyond the bounds of a historian’s duty and pass moral judgments on Ṭūsī. Based on some evidence, they have considered him an immoral person who would stop at nothing to pursue his goals. But their historical argument has three major flaws.
Some have considered Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī an immoral traitor who follow any power for his own personal gain. My aim in this article is to examine this view. The main work here is done analytically.
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī as an Immoral Traitor
Browne, considering several points, concludes like this: “What irony that this double-dyed traitor should be the author of one of the best-known works on ethics written in Persian!” First, he persuaded Khūrshāh to surrender to the Mongols and deceived him. Second, he became a confidant of Hulāgū and convinced him that no heavenly calamity would arise from killing Musta‘ṣim [Browne, 1951: 456-457].
Based on the following evidence, Rypka calls Ṭūsī an unusual moralist. He was both in the service of the Assassins and their Mongol enemies and played a role in the downfall of the last Sunni Abbasid caliph. Having lived with the Ismailis, he wrote the Nāṣirīan Ethics to suit their wishes, and having joined the Hulāgū, he revised it to cover up his past [Rypka, 1968: 313-314].
Levy argues that the judgment of history about Ṭūsī is highly inappropriate, since one would expect more from a man of such mental ability than to seek personal gain. This is despite the fact that he betrayed his Ismaili masters and played a major role in the assassination of the caliph by the Mongols. He argues that the composition of two prefaces to the Nāṣirīan Ethics reveals Ṭūsī's character well [Levy, 1923: 63-65].
Arberry first considers him to be a completely different person, born into a Shiite family, but soon entered the service of the Ismailis. He then goes on to say that he had a secret correspondence with Mu’aiyid al-Dīn, the vizier of Musta‘ṣim, to transfer his allegiance from heretics to the caliph. But the vizier informed Nāṣīr al-Dīn of this, and he sent Ṭūsī to Alamūt. When the fortress was besieged by Hulāgū, the time for revenge came for him, and he betrayed Khūrshāh and handed him over to Hulāgū. In the presence of Hulāgū, he invaded Baghdād, and with helping him to depose and murder the caliph, he sought personal gain again. He aspired to academic excellence. In order to outshine Avicenna, he began to revise mathematical texts. He continues that the poem that Ṭūsī quotes in his second introduction to the Nāṣirīan Ethics well sums up the Shiite genius for duplicity that saved his life in that disorder. His last pretense, which is emerged in his valuable treatise on Sufism, The Attributes of the Noble, was to be a mystic [Arberry, 1958: 253-263].
Dabashi understands Wickens’ statement in the introduction to the Nāṣirīan Ethics as condemning Ṭūsī and questioning his moral principles [Dabashi, 1996a]. But it seems that Wickens says something else [Wickens, 2011: 9-13].
Precise Formulation of the Argument
Given the similarity of their arguments to each other, a single strengthened formulation can be presented as follows:
a) Ṭūsī was raised in a Twelver Shiite family, but later entered the service of the Ismailis.
b) At one point while serving the Ismailis, he corresponded with the vizier of Musta‘ṣim and intended to join him.
c) During the Mongol invasion and siege of Maymūn-Diz, he deceived Khūrshāh and made him surrender to the Mongols.
d) He joined his Mongol enemies and, with them, stormed the center of the Islamic Caliphate and played a role in the assassination of the Sunni Caliph.
e) Thereafter, he wrote according to the wishes of his Mongol masters.
f) With his services to the Mongols, he became a minister and used the wealth of the endowments for scientific exploitation. He aspired to academic excellence so that he would eventually shine more than Avicenna.
g) Finally, by writing The Attributes of the Noble, he fulfilled his last wish or ostentation to appear as a mystic.
h) In general, Shia have a special talent for duplicity.
i) In the new Mongol government, Ṭūsī tried very hard to hide his past.
Conclusion: Ṭūsī was not a moral person.
Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist
The premises and conclusion of their argument contain value judgments. In a historical argument involving value judgments, either the premises, which are historical accounts, contain a value judgment and the person draws a conclusion containing a value judgment based on them, or the premises, which are historical accounts, do not contain a value judgment and the person draws a conclusion containing a value judgment based on them. In the first case, the validity of historical reports is questionable, and in the second case, the validity of the conclusion. The third error concerns historical reports which are inaccurate. We will discuss each of these three errors below.
First Error: Inappropriateness of the Use of Value Concepts/Judgments in Historical Accounts
One of the five sources of justification and knowledge is testimony [Leonard, 2023; Green, 2008]. The development of social epistemology brought about a social turn in religious epistemology by Greco and Zagzebski. They paid attention to the beliefs and testimonies of the past in religious matters [Motavalli, 2023]. On the other hand, the main issue in analytical or critical philosophy of history or philosophy of historiography is an epistemological one. There, they ask about the objectivity/relativity of historiography, that is, to what extent historical research can be free from the subjectivity and interpretations of the historians [Kosso, 2009].
Now, with these studies at hand and with my own observations, I can continue my argument. The validity of historical accounts containing value judgments is questionable because, beyond the mention of events, they include personal inferences, subjective interpretations, and unscientific explanations.
Second Error: Incorrectness of Inferring Value from Fact
Now we come to the second case of the first dichotomy. It is not correct to infer value judgments or propositions containing value concept/judgment from non-value judgments and propositions regarding fact. The reason for this is that here we can no longer justify the inference of “ought” (value) from “is” (fact) by means of an actual relation between them. Many philosophers, such as Hare and Mackie, consider such an inference to be invalid [Hare, 1963; Mackie, 1977]. At the same time, there are those who have tried to demonstrate the validity of such an inference, such as Searle [Di Lucia & Fittipaldi, 2021]. Among these, the best and most powerful view, in our view, is that of Mesbah Yazdi [Arefi, 2020; Mesbah Yazdi, 2012; Mesbah Yazdi, 1993]. Assuming that Misbah's view is accepted, it still does not apply to statements containing moral value concepts/judgments about historical figures. This is because here the attainment of the goal, the desired perfection, or the result of the action is no longer involved so that a necessity-in-relation-to-something-else is established between it and the action.
Third Error: Inaccurate Historical Reports
It was not the case that Ṭūsī went to negotiate with the Mongols on behalf of Khūrshāh and simply handed him over to the Mongols and gained a position in their system. (premise c) Just like other philosophers and thinkers such as al-Kindī, Avicenna, and Suhrawardī, he also had relations with the government. Governments needed these scholars for various reasons. One reason was to have a wise minister or philosopher at their disposal, both to benefit from his guidance and to blame him for any possible subsequent wrongdoings [Dabashi, 1996a; Dabashi, 1996b].
It is true that Ṭūsī presented his works to kings and, in general, sought to approach them through various means (premises a and e), but most earlier scholars acted in this way, among other things, to obtain patronage [Adamson, 2016: 330].
Arberry says that Shia have a special talent for duplicity. (premise h) But he must see the Shia story in its historical context.
Finally, the writing of a mystical treatise by Ṭūsī is not so surprising (premise z) if we look at his report card. The mystical tendency is evident in many of his works [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, 1956: 1]. Signs of awareness of the works of the mystics are visible in Ṭūsī's writings [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, 2004: 90]. Moreover, such a thing is not bizarre from a polymath, especially since the learned minister Juvainī had requested him to write it.
Perhaps Ṭūsī had some correspondence with Mu’aiyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Alqamī, the vizier of Musta‘ṣim (premise b), but the details remain shrouded in mystery. There are conflicting reports here [Mudarres Razavi, 1975].
Conclusion
There was not much and detailed scientific research done on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and his history and time before 1968. On the other hand, both Ṭūsī and his era and the events of his lifetime are very complex and interesting. These two facts have led some, such as Browne, Rypka, Levy, and Arberry, to go beyond the bounds of a historian’s duty and pass moral judgments on Ṭūsī. Based on some evidence, they have considered him an immoral person who would stop at nothing to pursue his goals. But their historical argument has three major flaws.
Article Type: Original Research |
Subject:
Philosophy of Ethics (Analytical)
Received: 2025/03/6 | Accepted: 2025/04/16 | Published: 2025/05/15
Received: 2025/03/6 | Accepted: 2025/04/16 | Published: 2025/05/15
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