The Distinction between Minimal Concept and Robust Concept in Religious Language

Ghadiri, H.

doi:10.58209/jpt.5.3.279

The Distinction between Minimal Concept and Robust Concept in Religious Language

Document Type : Original Research

Author

H. Ghadiri

Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran

https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.5.3.279

Abstract

The semantics of religious language faces the question of how to understand the application of terms to God in a way that avoids both anthropomorphism and impossibility of knowing the divine. This article draws on Michael Lynch’s distinction between minimal and robust concepts and offers two possible solutions to this problem: (1) linguistic usage in the human context is based on minimal concepts, while usage in the divine context is based on robust concepts; (2) in both contexts, usage is grounded in robust concepts, but the divine usage is characterized by a higher degree of robustness. The article proceeds to critically assess these solutions and argues that, although the distinction between minimal and robust concepts helps to explain the difference between human and divine usage of language, it still encounters fundamental difficulties in specifying the metaphysical implications of the concepts ascribed to God.

Keywords

Religious Language

Metaphysical Pluralism

Michael Lynch

Relativistic Kantianism

Minimal Concept

Robust Concept

Subjects

- Alston WP (1996). A realist conception of truth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- Boghossian PA (2014). Fear of knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism. Oxford: Clarendon.

- Ghadiri H (2020). On Boghossian's objection on Putnam's internal realism. Philosophy. 18(1):169-188. [Persian]

- Hales SD (2001). Lynch's metaphysical pluralism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 63(3):699-709.

- Harris JF (2002). The problem of religious language. In: Analytic philosophy of religion. Dordrecht: Springer. p. 28-76.

- Hick J (1989). Philosophy of religion. Princeton: Pearson.

- Kenny A (2004). The unknown God: Agnostic essays. London: Continuum.

- Lynch MP (1998). Truth in context: An essay on pluralism and objectivity. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

- Lynch MP (2001). A functionalist theory of truth. In: The nature of truth: Classic and contemporary perspectives. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

- Lynch MP (2005). Alethic functionalism and our folk theory of truth. Synthese. 145(1):29-43.

- Naji H (2016). Revisiting of the negative and positive theologies in the gradation of existence theory. Comparative Theology. 7(16):115-124. [Persian]

-Putnam H (1987). The many faces of realism. Chicago: Open Court.

- Scott M (2013). Religious language. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Svensson T (2014). The heart of metaphysical pluralism and the consistency dilemma: A critical analysis of the possibility of incompatible truths. In: Other logics. Leiden: BRILL. p. 148-168.

- Tavakkolipoor M, Alizamani AA, Parsa A, Mohamadi N (2016). Al-Ghazali on religious language. Philosophy of Religion Research. 14(2):25-46. [Persian]

- Taylor C (1984). Philosophy and its history. In: Rorty R, Schneewind JB, Skinner Q, editors. Philosophy in History: Essays in the historiography of philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 17-30.

- Vafaiyan MH, Alizamani AA (2016). Impact of grades of existence in appreciation of divine attributes as from the MullaSadra perspective. Philosophy of Religion. 12(3):461-482. [Persian]

- White RM (2010). Talking about God. The concept of analogy and the problem of religious language. London: Routledge.

- Wright C (1992). Truth and objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.