The conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate is very significant in Kantian scholarship. Conceptualists argue that apperception is involved in the appearance of all sensory intuitions. In contrast, non-conceptualism claims that at least some sensory intuitions in the subject's consciousness are independent of apperception. The focus of this debate has been the role of intuition in the Transcendental Deduction. However, Kant requires an argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic to show that space is a form of intuition, and this argument, too, must be considered in this debate. Therefore, this article shifts the focus of the dispute to demonstrate that in the Transcendental Exposition of space, space as a form of intuition is a condition for synthetic a priori propositions. Then, by considering the role of spatial intuition in synthetic a priori propositions, it will be proven that the distinction non-conceptualists draw between intuitive and conceptual space is incompatible with Kant's argument in the Transcendental Exposition.