Non-Conceptualism and Transcendental Exposition of the Space

Najjarnezhad, A.; Zali, M.

doi:10.58209/jpt.5.4.433

Non-Conceptualism and Transcendental Exposition of the Space

Document Type : Original Research

Authors

A. Najjarnezhad ^¶

M. Zali

Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.58209/jpt.5.4.433

Abstract

The conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate is very significant in Kantian scholarship. Conceptualists argue that apperception is involved in the appearance of all sensory intuitions. In contrast, non-conceptualism claims that at least some sensory intuitions in the subject's consciousness are independent of apperception. The focus of this debate has been the role of intuition in the Transcendental Deduction. However, Kant requires an argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic to show that space is a form of intuition, and this argument, too, must be considered in this debate. Therefore, this article shifts the focus of the dispute to demonstrate that in the Transcendental Exposition of space, space as a form of intuition is a condition for synthetic a priori propositions. Then, by considering the role of spatial intuition in synthetic a priori propositions, it will be proven that the distinction non-conceptualists draw between intuitive and conceptual space is incompatible with Kant's argument in the Transcendental Exposition.

Keywords

a priori Intuition

Conceptualism

Non-Conceptualism

Transcendental Exposition of Space

Subjects

Metaphysics (Modern)

- Allais L (2016). Conceptualism and nonconceptualism in Kant: A survey of the recent debate. In: Schulting D, editor. Kantian nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 1-25.
- Chaplin R (2022). Kant on the givenness of space and time. European Journal of Philosophy.30(3):877-898.
- Connolly K (2014). Which Kantian conceptualism (or nonconceptualism)?. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 52(3):316-337.
- Friedman M (2000). Geometry, construction and intuition in Kant and his successors. In: Sher G, Tieszen R, editor. Between logic and intuition: Essays in honor of Charles parsons. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 186-218.
- Ginsborg H (2008). Was Kant a nonconceptualist?. Philosophical Studies. 137(1):65-77.
- Golob S (2016). Why the transcendental deduction is compatible with nonconceptualism. In: Schulting D, editor. Kantian nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 27-52.
- Grüne S (2011). Is there a gap in Kant’s B deduction?. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 19(3):465-490.
- Guyer P (1987). Kant and the claims of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hegel GWF (1977). Faith and knowledge. Cerf W, translator. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Kant I (1998). Critique of pure reason. Guyer P, Wood AW, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kohl M (2021). A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant’s idealism. European Journal of Philosophy. 29(4):827-845.
- Land T (2015). Nonconceptualist readings of Kant and the transcendental deduction. Kantian Review. 20(1):25-51.
- Longuenesse B (1998). Kant and the capacity to judge: Sensibility and discursivity in the transcendental analytic of the critique of pure reason. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Matherne S (2015). Images and Kant’s theory of perception. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2(20201214).
- McDowell J (1994). The content of perceptual experience. The Philosophical Quarterly. 44(175):190-205.
- McDowell J (2017). Rationalism without dogmas. In: Giving a damn: Essays in dialogue with John Haugeland. Cambridge: The MIT Press. p. 311-328.
- McLear C (2020). Kantian conceptualism/nonconceptualism. Stanford: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Merritt MM (2010). Kant on the transcendental deduction of space and time: An essay on the philosophical resources of the transcendental aesthetic. Kantian Review. 14(2):1-37.
- Messina J (2015). Conceptual analysis and the essence of space: Kant’s metaphysical exposition revisited. ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. 97(4):416-457.
- Onof C, Schulting D (2014). Kant, Kästner and the distinction between metaphysical and geometric space. Kantian Review. 19(2):285-304.
- Onof C, Schulting D (2015). Space as form of intuition and as formal intuition: On the note to B160 in Kant’s critique of pure reason. The Philosophical Review. 124(1):1-58.
- Roche AF (2018). Kant’s transcendental deduction and the unity of space and time. Kantian Review. 23(1):41-64.
- Schafer K (2022). Kant’s conception of cognition and our knowledge of things in themselves. In: Schafer K, Stang NF, editors. The sensible and intelligible worlds: New essays on Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 248-278.
- Schulting D (2017). Kant’s radical subjectivism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sellars W (1968). Science and metaphysics: Variations on Kantian themes. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul.
- Shabel L (2004). Kant’s ‘argument from geometry’. Journal of the History of Philosophy. 42(2):195-215.
- Smyth D (2024). Intuition in Kant: The boundlessness of sense. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stephenson A, Gomes A (2016). Kant on the relation of intuition to cognition. In: Schulting D, editor. Kantian nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tolley C (2016). The difference between original, metaphysical, and geometrical representations of space. In: Schulting D, editor. Kantian nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 257-285.
- Tolley C (2017). Between perception and understanding, from Leibniz to Kant. Estudos Kantianos. 4(2):71-98.
- Tolley C (2020). Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations. Synthese. 197(8):3215-3244.
- Watkins E, Willaschek M (2020). Kant on cognition and knowledge. Synthese. 197(8):3195- 3213.