Immortality as Project versus Mortality as Condition: Comparative Ontological and Ethical Implications in a Reading of Heidegger and the Transhumanist Views of Bostrom and Kurzweil

Anjomrooz, Matin; Khezri, Mohammad

Immortality as Project versus Mortality as Condition: Comparative Ontological and Ethical Implications in a Reading of Heidegger and the Transhumanist Views of Bostrom and Kurzweil

Document Type : Original Research

Authors

Matin Anjomrooz

Mohammad Khezri

Abstract

This article provides a comparative analysis of two radical formulations of the human condition: “immortality as project” in the transhumanism of Bostrom and Kurzweil, versus “mortality as condition” in Heideggerian ontology. The central question concerns the ontological and ethical implications of transforming death from a structural condition of Dasein into a technical problem. Through a comparative conceptual analysis, it is shown that in Being and Time, death as an insurmountable possibility constitutes the structure of temporality, authentic identity, and resoluteness. In contrast, by relying on radical life extension and mind uploading, transhumanism views death as a removable risk and the human as an optimizable information pattern. This shift reduces temporality to endless duration, embodiment to interchangeable hardware, and identity to informational continuity. Finally, this paper argues for a technology that serves the richness of human meaning within finitude, rather than seeking the elimination of death.

Keywords

Mortality

Immortality

Heidegger

Transhumanism

Bostrom

Kurzweil

Subjects